POLITICAL PAMPHLETS—II

THE PUBLIC SERVICES IN INDIA

BY

HIRDAY NATH KUNZRU

Servants of India Society,
ALLAHABAD

1917

Ten Annas

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Printed by Anant Vinayak Patvardhan at the **Aryabhushan Press**, Poona City and published by Hirday Nath Kunzru, at the Servants of India Society, 6 Bank Road, Allahabad.

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Chapter I.

INTRODUCTION.

The question of the extensive employment of Indians in the higher ranks of the public services is not merely one of providing honourable careers for the youth of India. The exclusion of the children of the soil from all positions of power and dignity would be a legitimate grievance even if the effect of the injustice were confined to a few individuals, but the injury to individual interests pales into insignificance by the side of the wrong done to the whole nation. Our vital interests are bound up with the proper solution of this question, which is at once, moral, political and economic. It affects our manhood. It involves our national self-respect. It is a test, also, of England's good faith. If she is mindful of her moral responsibilities, if her dominion in India is not to be synonymous with the exploitation of a helpless people, if the Act of 1833 and the Proclamation of 1858 are not mere scraps of paper, it is her bounden duty to raise Indians to positions of trust and responsibility, and to make them feel that they are not treated as helots in their own country. She must put an end to the present system, born of racial pride and selfishness, which is stunting their growth and sapping their virility. In her own interest, too, it is necessary, in the words of Sir M. B. Chaubal, to "soften the sense of subjection and enhance the sentiment of a common citizenship," which is the only foundation on which she can build a lasting Empire. The path of duty in this case is also, as Macaulay said, "the path of wisdom, of national prosperity, of national honour."

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It needs no demonstration that India is a poor country. The fact is universally recognised. Responsible authorities have repeatedly acknowledged it, with a sigh or a shrug, according as they felt for the toiling millions, whose lives are an incessant struggle to keep the wolf from the door, or looked upon them as the "footstools" of their rulers. Even those who contend that India is growing richer are forced to admit that, whatever her present material condition as compared with the past might be, her existing resources are woefully slender. The greatest economy should, therefore, be exercised in regard to her public expenditure, so that no unnecessary burdens may be laid on the poor, and funds may be forthcoming for the fulfilment of those moral and material responsibilities which every civilised government owes to the people committed to its charge. The substitution of cheap indigenous agency for the foreign and costly agency of civil administration is, thus, a matter of no little importance. "You cannot work with imported labour," said Sir William Hunter, "as cheaply as you can with Native labour, and I regard the more extended employment of the Natives not only as an act of justice but as a financial necessity. If we are to govern the Indian people efficiently and cheaply we must govern them by means of themselves and pay for the administration at the market rates of Native labour." The Congress has been urging the adoption of the same policy for thirty years, but so far its appeals have fallen on deaf ears. According to a return presented to the House of Commons in 1892, excluding the rank and file of the British army, the total of the salaries, pensions and allowances received in 1889–90 by public servants and retired Government officials, drawing salaries of Rs. 1,000 and over annually, amounted to about 18½ crores, while the real revenue was about 61½ crores. Of

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this only about 3 crores was received by 17,000 Indians, while the remaining 15½ crores went into the pockets of 28,000 Europeans and Eurasians. That the lot of Indians has not improved materially since then is evident from the statistics published by the Government of India in 1912, which show that out of 5,390 posts to which monthly salaries of Rs. 500 and upwards were attached, no less than 83 p. c. were held by Europeans and Eurasians. The excessive costliness of the non-Indian agency is one of the greatest evils from which India is suffering. The extent of the relief, which will be afforded by restricting the employment of foreigners to cases of absolute necessity, may be gauged from the following figures, taken from the report of the Royal Commission on the Public Services, which show that in some of the most important departments Europeans are paid about twice or thrice as much as Indians.

	Average Salaries of Officers recruited in	
	England	India
	Rs.	Rs.
Indian and Provincial Civil Services. ...	1,587	424
Education Department ...	970	351
Police Department ...	726	405

The administrative advantage of employing Indians will be no less important than the economic. After the proof which Indians have given of their capacity in every position from the headships of districts to those of

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large states and the memberships of executive councils, it is too late to urge against them that they are wanting in executive capacity. On the contrary it seems axiomatic that Indians who are acquainted with the language, manners and customs of the people, and have an intuitive perception of their needs and wishes, should make better administrators than foreigners who lack these advantages, and among whose natural endowments the gift of sympathy is not prominent. Besides, at present, the rich store of knowledge and experience gathered by officers who have served the state in responsible capacities is lost to the country when they retire from service. If this intellectual drain ceases, who can compute what the gain to the nation will be ?

The political and economic disadvantages, to which attention has been drawn above, do not exhaust the evils of the present system. "There is," as Mr. Gokhale said in giving evidence before the Welby Commission, "a moral evil which, if anything, is even greater. A kind of dwarfing or stunting of the Indian race is going on under the present system. We must live all the days of our life in an atmosphere of inferiority, and the tallest of us must bend in order that the exigencies of the existing system may be satisfied. The upward impulse, if I may use such an expression, which every school boy at Eton or Harrow may feel, that he may one day be a Gladstone, a Nelson, or a Wellington, and which may draw forth the best efforts of which he is capable—that is denied to us. The full height to which our manhood is capable of rising can never be reached by us under the present system." The monopoly of power and responsibility by a class is producing its inevitable result. Our talents are growing rusty for want of use, and a belief in the superiority of the privileged class has been so sedulously fostered that some of our

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own countrymen have come to accept it. When a slave believes that he deserves no better fate he has sunk to the lowest depth of degradation. When a dependent country loses faith in itself its conquest is complete. It is a perfect example of the worst evil of foreign domination. This self-distrust is the greatest danger to be guarded against. If the spirit of self-reliance lives, it will free us sooner or later from the disabilities we are labouring under. But if that is crushed, no amount of peace and order can compensate for the loss. The shackles will have been permanently riveted on us.

Such being the importance of securing a fair field for our countrymen for the exercise of their administrative talents, the report of the Royal Commission on the Public Services in India, which was issued last January, deserves our earnest consideration. We should put forth every effort to impress the public with the seriousness of this question and to secure the justice which the Commission denies us.

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Chapter II.

HISTORICAL REVIEW.

The Indian Civil Service, of which the other services may be regarded historically as the offshoots, arose out of the service of junior and senior merchants, factors, and writers, who were employed for purposes of trade by the East India Company. These officials owed their appointment and promotion to nomination and favouritism. When Lord Cornwallis arrived in India, jobbing was rife in the matter of appointments and corruption prevailed among the servants of the state. "They were often remunerated," says Seton-Karr in his life of Lord Cornwallis, "by gratuities and commission, and the acceptance by them of large gratuities and of perquisites was common. It was the survival of an even worse state of things when men in the high position of Members of Council had not scrupled to accept lacks of rupees for giving a preference to one Nawab or pretender over another. . . . The Resident at Benares, who really wielded almost absolute power in that Province without check or control, drew only 1000 rupees a month, but from monopolies in commercial and other ventures, received besides four lacks every year. In other places, Collectors engaged in commercial speculation under cover of the name of some relative or friend, and it may be said roundly, that while no Collector drew above 1,200 rupees a month, his irregular and additional gains amounted to far more." Lord Cornwallis set himself at once to reform these abuses. The salaries of officials were enhanced and trading was forbidden. And the whole service was placed on a statutory basis by the East India Company Act, 1793, which gave its members

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the sole right of being employed in the higher civil appointments,—a right which, broadly speaking, they enjoy to this day.

The indefeasible moral right of Indians to occupy positions of trust and responsibility in the public services of their own country first received statutory recognition in 1833. Section 17 of the famous Charter Act of that year, which had been recommended or supported by Lord William Bentinck, declared that "no Native of the said territories nor any natural-born subject of His Majesty resident therein, shall by reason only of his religion, place of birth, descent, colour or any of them, be disabled from holding any place, office or employment under the said Company." This was not an ill-considered provision passed in haste by a reformed Parliament glowing with democratic zeal. On the contrary its implications were fully understood, and it was passed in spite of the opposition of men like Lord Ellenborough and the Duke of Wellington, who demurred to it on political grounds. No change was, however, made in the rules regulating admission to the Haileybury College, which depended on the patronage of the Court of Directors, in order to facilitate the entry of Indians. Notwithstanding the Act of 1833 no Indian was appointed to any post to which he might not have been appointed formerly. When the charter of the East India Company came under revision twenty years later, prominent men like Mr. Bright, Lord Stanley and Lord Monteagle drew pointed attention to this fact, and vigorously urged that the barrier to the admission of Indians to high offices which still existed in practice should be broken down. But their protests went unheeded, and the Act of 1853, which replaced nomination by open competition, opened to Indians no new avenue to employment in the higher ranks. The first competi-

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tive examination under this Act for appointments in the Indian Civil Service was held in 1855. The examination was theoretically open to all British subjects, but the practice of holding the examination in London alone virtually excluded Indians from the competition.

Five years after the passing of this Act the Government of India was transferred to the Crown, and Queen Victoria's Proclamation reaffirmed the principles of 1833 and solemnly promised us equality of rights with other British subjects. Soon after this the Secretary of State for India appointed a committee of five members of the India Council to suggest the best means of extending the employment of Indians. The committee which consisted of Sir J. P. Willoughby, Mr. Mangles, Mr. Arbuthnot, Mr. Macnaghten and Sir Erskine Perry, all of whom were well acquainted with India, reported as follows on the 20th January, 1860:—

"Two modes have been suggested by which the object in view might be attained. The first is by allotting a certain portion of the total number of appointments declared in each year to be competed for in India by Natives, and by all other natural-born subjects of his Majesty resident in India. The second is to hold simultaneously two examinations, one in England, and one in India, both being, as far as practicable, identical in their nature, and those who compete in both countries being finally classified in one list, according to merit, by the Civil Service Commissioners. The Committee have no hesitation in giving the preference to the second scheme, as being the fairest, and the most in accordance with the principles of a general competition for a common object. In order to aid them in carrying out a scheme of this nature, the Committee have consulted the Civil Service Commissioners. . . . The Civil Service Commissioners do not anticipate much

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difficulty in arranging for this. The Committee, however, are decidedly of opinion that the examination papers on which the competition is to proceed in India and England should be identical; but they think, in justice to the Natives, that three colloquial oriental languages should be added to the three modern European languages, so as to give the candidates the opportunity of selection." No action was taken on this report, of the existence of which the public was kept ignorant till 1876.

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The Government of India ignored this clause for several years, but the pressure of public opinion and the Secretary of State compelled it to frame rules in 1875, which, however, "remained practically inoperative, only one, or at the most two, appointments having been made thereunder to the judicial branch of the Service." *

The subject was reopened in 1878 when Lord Lytton proposed the formation of a "close Native Civil Service." A proportion of posts belonging to the Indian Civil Service were to be set apart for Indians and amalgamated with the higher posts in the Provincial Service, but Indian candidates were to be prohibited from appearing at the open competitive examination in London. The Secretary of State, Lord Cranbrook, having declined to accept this iniquitous proposal, the Government of India were forced to frame fresh rules, which were promulgated in 1879, and which laid down, roughly speaking, that not more than one-sixth of the men appointed to posts in the Indian Civil Service in any year shall be statutory Natives of India of "proved merit and ability", chosen otherwise than in accordance with the result of the London examination.

But while these rules secured one-sixth of the annual recruitment to Indians, the decision of Lord Salisbury in 1876 to reduce the age-limits for the I. C. S., examination from 17–21 to 17–19 converted what they regarded as a minimum into a maximum by practically destroying their chances of success in that examination. This order came into force in 1878. Commenting on it and the refusal to hold simultaneous examinations in India and England, Lord Lytton observed in 1878 that they "are all so many deliberate and transparent subterfuges for stultifying the Act (of 1833) and reducing it

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The right of Indians to be employed largely in what used to be called the uncovenanted civil services was also recognized, more in theory than in practice, in the very year the rules framed under the statute of 1870 were published. Sir Stafford Northcote laid down in 1868 that Indians had a preferential claim to appointments in these services. The attention of the Government of India was again drawn to the matter in 1870 by the Duke of Argyll and in 1876 by Lord Salisbury, who laid down precise rules for restricting the employment of Europeans in the uncovenanted services. Accordingly, the Government of India issued a resolution directing that except in certain departments, "no person other than a Native of India should be appointed to posts carrying salaries of Rs. 200 a month or upwards without the previous sanction of the Governor-General in Council in each case". The Opium, Salt or Customs, Survey, Mint, Public Works, and Police departments were among those excepted. The list of exceptions was so large that the protection which the resolution afforded to Indians was rendered almost nugatory. Its only result has been to prevent the provincial executive and judicial services from becoming a monopoly of non-Indians.

It is thus apparent that no little tenderness was shown by Government for European interests in connection with the uncovenanted as well as the covenanted services. But this failed to satisfy the Europeans who regarded the rules and the resolution of 1879 as the thin end of the wedge. They accepted the new policy for a while,

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but the smouldering fires of racial prejudice and jealousy were kindled three years later into a blaze by the Ilbert Bill, which provided a convenient opportunity for the display of low and angry passions which had remained repressed so long. This was the light in which Lord Ripon regarded the agitation against the Ilbert Bill. "The truth is," said his lordship "that the opposition to this Bill (Ilbert Bill) is in reality not so much an opposition to this particular measure, as an opposition to the declared policy of Parliament about the admission of Natives into the Covenanted Civil Services."* The Secretary of State, Lord Hartington, gave expression to the same view in Parliament in 1883. "I could quote passages," he said, "in letters in the Indian papers in which it is admitted that the agitation was directed against the policy of the Home Government in providing appointments for Native Civilians while there are many Europeans without appointments. . . . . In 1879 a resolution was passed which limited appointments of the value of Rs. 200 a month to officers of the army and to Natives. That restriction has been rigidly enforced and has met with all kinds of opposition from non-official classes of Europeans, who think that all the appointments must be reserved for them."

Unfortunately, the measures adopted by the Government in 1879, while they led to serious discontent among Europeans, gave no satisfaction to educated Indians. The resolution relating to the uncovenanted services defeated its own object by excluding a majority of the most important departments from the operation of the rule that appointments with monthly salaries of Rs. 200 and upwards should, in future, be filled by statutory Indians only. The Act of 1870, while genuinely designed to compensate Indians in some measure

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The Commission, which was appointed "to do full justice to the claims of Natives of India", put forward proposals which actually rested from us the ground we already occupied. Under the rules of 1870 Indians were entitled to one-sixth of the annual recruitment to the I. C. S. But the Commission recommended that one-sixth of the appointments occupied by civilians in all the provinces excepting Burma and Assam, which came to 108, should be removed from the cadre of the Indian Civil Service and amalgamated with the Provincial Service. The recommendation involved a double wrong. It virtually denied our right to be admitted into the Indian Civil Service and substituted a fixed for a growing number. By setting apart a specific number of appointments for Indians, it deprived us of a share in any increase in the cadre which might

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take place in future. But even this retrograde recommendation was not accepted in its entirety by the Secretary of State, who excluded the higher administrative appointments from the posts which, the Commission had recommended, should be listed as open to the Provincial Service, and reduced the number of these posts to 93.

Another important respect in which the Commission's proposals affected Indian interests prejudicially was the division of many important services into Imperial and Provincial. Hitherto Indians had been working on terms of equality with Europeans in many departments, notably in the Education and Public Works Departments. But the Commission destroyed this equality by recommending their bifurcation into higher and lower divisions, which were to be recruited from among Europeans and Indians respectively.

The retrograde character of the Commission's recommendations made Indians realize more than ever that justice could not be done to their claims without the introduction of simultaneous examinations. Owing to the efforts of Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji, who was then a member of Parliament, the subject was brought up in the House of Commons in 1893, and on the motion of Mr. Herbert Paul the House resolved that all competitive examinations for appointments in the Civil Service of India, which were till then confined to England, should thenceforward be held both in England and in India. When this news was received in India a thrill of joy passed through the whole country. It seemed at last that her venerable patriarch's lifelong labours in the cause of his country were about to bear fruit, and that a new era of hope and progress was to be ushered in. But we had reckoned without our host, and our hopes were soon dashed to the ground.

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Mr. Paul's resolution was carried in the House of Commons in spite of the opposition of the Government. But the resolution having been carried, "there is no disposition," said the Under-Secretary of State for India, "on the part of the Secretary of State for India or myself to thwart or defeat the effect of the vote of the House of Commons on that resolution." Yet the Secretary of State in forwarding the resolution to the Government of India thought it fair to state that "it is indispensable that an adequate number of the members of the Civil Service shall always be Europeans, and that no scheme would be admissible which does not fulfil that essential condition." The bureaucracy in India was not slow to take the hint. With the honourable exception of the Government of Madras, every Local Government opposed the resolution tooth and nail. The Government of India in expressing its own opinions said, "that it is indispensable that five-sixths of the cadre posts of the Indian Civil Service should for the present be held by Europeans or Indians who succeed in passing the competitive examination in London. We are indeed of opinion that the proportion of natives of India who succeed in entering the service by competition at the London examination requires to be closely watched; and we agree with Sir Charles Crosthwaite that it may become necessary hereafter to restrict the total proportion of Indians in the service, . . . to 18 p. c. or some similar figure." Thus was disposed of India's plea for justice, parliamentary and royal pledges notwithstanding.

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102, but even after the lapse of nearly twenty years only 92 of these were occupied by Provincial Service men. Out of about 1300 civilians only 64 were Indians, and from 1855, when the open competitive examination for admission into the I. C. S. was held for the first time, upto 1910 only 80 Indians had succeeded in entering the service by the door of examination as against over 2600 Europeans. On the 1st April 1917, there were 1478 officers occupying posts ordinarily reserved for the members of the Indian Civil Service. Of these, including seventy-two statutory civilians and officers of the Provincial service holding listed posts, only 146 or about 10 p. c. appeared to be statutory natives of India. The state of affairs outside the Indian Civil Service was hardly better. It appeared from the statistics supplied by Government on the 10th January, 1912, in answer to an interpellation by the Raja of Dighapatia in the Imperial Legislative Council, that of the 1678 posts carrying a salary of Rs. 500 and upwards, created between 1867 and 1903, only 472 or about 36 p. c. were given to Indians. Between 1903 and 1910 their number was further increased by 1530, of which, in spite of official professions of sympathy and the agitation carried on by Indians, only 318 or about 20 p. c. represented the share of the children of the soil. The total number of such appointments was 5390 in 1910, and of these only 924 or about 17 p. c. were held by Indians.

It was to remedy this state of things that the Royal Commission on the Public Services, which was the outcome of Mr. Subba Rao's resolution, was appointed in 1912. Referring to it the Under-Secretary of State for India said in the House of Commons: "The problem before us when we have educated Indians is to give them the fullest opportunity in the government of their own country to exercise the advantages

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Chapter III.

ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE.

The Royal Commission, the appointment of which was announced in the House of Commons on the 31st July, 1912, consisted of the following members :—

Chairman, Lord Islington ; the Earl of Ronaldshay, Sir Murray Hammick, Sir Theodore Morison, Sir Valentine Chirol, Mr. Sly, Mr. H. A. L. Fisher, Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, Mr. Madge, Mr. Gokhale, Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim and Sir Mahadeva Bhaskar Chaubal.

Thus, out of twelve members only three were Indians The inadequate proportion of Indians was the subject of criticism in the Indian press, specially in view of the composition of the Commission of 1886, of the sixteen members of which six were Indians, and representations were made to the Secretary of State for India for the appointment of one more Indian from the ranks of public workers, which, however, produced no effect.

The Commission assembled in India on the 31st December, 1912, and took evidence during the winter of 1912-13 and 1913-14. Its report was submitted to Government in August, 1915, and issued in January, 1917. It was signed by ten members. The death of Mr. Gokhale on the 19th February, 1915, prevented him from taking part in its preparation, while a radical difference of opinion between Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim and the Commission compelled him to abstain from affixing his signature to it, and to write a separate minute of dissent.

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assume that the statements of the witnesses whom it examined must have carried some weight with it in shaping its conclusions. Besides, an examination of the evidence will prove instructive to us in several ways. It will be a study in the psychology of Anglo-India. This may seem a somewhat superfluous task, but a perusal of the Anglo-Indian evidence will occasionally startle even those whom long association with public affairs has made painfully aware of the volume and strength of the forces that are constantly arrayed against us. It will also enable us to judge whether our claims were stated with the strength and clearness which India had a right to expect from her representatives. And, lastly, it will afford proof, if proof were needed, of the extent to which the spirit of nationalism has permeated the educated classes, making them demand their rights as Indians first and as representatives of the various communities to which they belong afterwards.

Turning to the Anglo-Indian evidence first, one is struck by the unanimity with which charges of general unfitness, administrative incapacity and communal partiality have been brought against Indians, and the similarity of arguments urged to oppose their more extended employment in the higher ranks in every department. The non-official witnesses, who included missionaries, educationists, merchants, etc., vied with the officials in depreciating Indian talent and capacity. Whatever their immediate sphere of activity, they felt that, in common with the civil and military officials, they formed part of the British garrison in India; and that the interests of all of them alike were bound up with the maintenance of the status quo. They saw that any arrangement, calculated to break through the existing monopoly of civil or military power,

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would immediately affect the privileged position which every European occupies in this country. To illustrate this attitude let us take the Civil Service first. The importance of the Indian Civil Service and the danger of making any change in its present position were duly urged on the Commission. Great stress was laid on the duties which a district officer is called upon to discharge, and which are so multifarious and responsible that few Indians can be expected to possess the energy and strength of character necessary to perform them efficiently. He is the representative of the ruling power in the eyes of the people. As his official designation indicates, he is primarily responsible for the collection of revenue. On him devolves the duty of preserving peace in his district. He is the head of the police and on his vigilance depends ultimately the detection and punishment of crime. He controls the subordinate magistracy and, therefore, supervises the administration of justice. He is the protector of the dumb millions and represents their needs and wishes to the Government. He holds the balance even between contending factions and prevents them from flying at one another's throats. He looks after the health of his district and watches with parental solicitude over the growth of institutions connected with local self-government. In addition to these arduous duties he has many other functions to discharge, but it is impossible to give an exhaustive account of them. Even a brief description of them, however, such as is given above, leaves one wondering whether their satisfactory performance is not beyond the power of any human being.

Nor were the other services at all backward in impressing their importance on the Commission. The Indian Police Service seemed to regard itself as hardly inferior to the Indian Civil Service. It is on the police

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that the duty of preserving peace and order rests in the first instance. It is primarily responsible for the arrest and punishment of offenders against the law. The subordinates in the Police department being invested with greater authority and exposed to greater temptations than corresponding officials in other departments, it is necessary for their superior officers to exercise a more vigilant supervision over their actions, lest they should misuse their powers to oppress the poor and the ignorant. The Superintendent has to be constantly touring and his charge is as extensive as that of the District Magistrate himself. He is further entrusted with the task of training Assistant Superintendents for their work, and he is the right hand man of the Collector through whom the latter's control over the police is exercised. The list of duties which an officer of the Indian Medical Service has to perform is even more formidable. The Civil Surgeon, said the representative of the Indian Medical Service officers employed in the United Provinces, was the chief medical officer of a district, "the population of which is usually between one and two millions scattered over an area of several thousand square miles." He is in charge of a large hospital at headquarters and has to supervise, in addition, a large number of dispensaries. He is in many places the health officer of his district and has to control a large establishment. The arrangements for coping with outbreaks of plague, cholera and other epidemic diseases are in his hands. He is responsible for the police hospital in his district and is superintendent of the district jail. And last but not least, he has to do a great deal of medico-legal work and "much of his time is often taken up in giving evidence in Criminal Courts." Similar descriptions can be given of the arduous duties that other Imperial services are called upon to perform, but

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the illustrations already given will easily enable the reader to picture them to himself.

The supreme importance of the Imperial services, whose functions are intimately connected with the moral and material well-being of the people, having been established, it would be obviously unwise, it was urged, to recommend any changes in their personnel which would impair their efficiency. Indians are fitted neither by upbringing nor by heredity to discharge the responsible duties associated with them, and their substitution for European agency will bring disaster on the people and discredit on the Government. The Indian Civil Service should be recruited in the main from among Europeans, for the presence of a large Indian element in it will reduce the efficiency of the administration and affect its purity. If simultaneous examinations are conceded the service will soon be swamped with Indians, and there is no guarantee that the administrative machinery will continue to be worked in accordance with British methods and ideals. It would be a calamity for India, said a professor in Madras, "to do anything that would reduce the number of Europeans in the Indian Civil Service." It is contended, moreover, that the introduction of simultaneous examinations will adversely affect the development of Indian education by compelling the universities to model their curricula in accordance with the subjects and courses of study prescribed for the Indian Civil Service examination. Besides, in view of the inadequate and unequal diffusion of education in India, simultaneous examinations will operate to the exclusive advantage of the intellectual classes who constitute a small fraction of the total population. The present system impartially keeps all Indians out, but if any change is made in it to facilitate their entry it will lead to a monopoly of the

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higher posts by the members of the more advanced communities, whose presence will excite racial jealousies and whose rule will be regarded with dislike by the more virile classes. The feelings of the martial classes, which are not wounded by alien rule, will be outraged if their countrymen are placed in authority over them. Again, there is the political unrest. It may be the direct outcome of the exclusion of Indians from responsible participation in the administration of their country, but no concessions can be made so long as it lasts. To transfer power into their hands in any direction under existing circumstances would be politically undesirable, and would hinder the commercial and industrial development of India by frightening away capital.

The considerations which should determine the increase of Indians in the Indian Civil Service, do not lose their force, it is claimed, when applied to the Indian Police service. Indians are swayed by caste and religious prejudices and will be influenced by communal feelings in making promotions and dealing out punishments. The police force consists for the most part of ignorant men whose feelings can be easily inflamed, and who can be dealt with successfully only by officers who are believed to be absolutely impartial. The life of a police officer is a very hard one requiring great energy and resourcefulness which are seldom possessed by Indians. Open competition may be the best mode of regulating admission into the Indian Civil Service, but it will not yield a desirable type of candidate if applied to the Indian Police service. It has also to be remembered, as the representative of the Indian Police officers of the Punjab stated in his cross-examination, "that the Police Force under certain circumstances might have very important quasi-military duties to perform, and on that ground it was essential that the

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superior officers should be Europeans in the same way that Europeans were employed in the higher ranks of the Indian Army."

The Indian Medical Service is another service in which, in the interests of Indians themselves, their number should not be allowed to become too large. The arduous duties of the officers of the Indian Medical Service to whom we owe a debt of gratitude for having introduced and popularized western medical science in our country, have been described already. Few Indians, say the Indian Medical Service officers of the United Provinces possess the "physical and mental energy and character requisite to make good Civil Surgeons." They cannot make efficient civil surgeons in large districts, and it would be undesirable to put them in charge of small districts as small districts are the best training ground for the junior members of the Indian Medical Service. The needs of the European population, who prefer to be attended by doctors of their own race, have also to be taken into account. Again, civil surgeons are generally in charge of district jails, and "such large penal establishments could not safely be entrusted to any but European hands." Besides, Collectors and District Judges, it is believed, "realising the importance of the administrative and medico-legal aspects of a Civil Surgeon's work strenuously oppose the appointment of Indian Civil Surgeons on an extensive scale." These considerations, taken in conjunction with the supreme importance of maintaining an efficient war reserve, make it imperative that all important civil medical appointments should continue to be occupied by the officers of the Indian Medical Service.

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Indian Civil and Police services. Its task is to diffuse European culture and to familiarise Indians with western thoughts and ideas. It has to keep alive the torch of western learning in India, and who can be the best torch bearers except those born and bred in a European atmosphere and nourished from their youth upwards on western science and literature. Besides, Indians are lacking in the capacity for administrative and research work. An irreducible European mininum is essential, therefore, if the department is to discharge effectively its duty of interpreting the West to the East, creating traditions of scholarship and maintaining a high standard of discipline.

Take again the Public Works Department. The department has produced brilliant Indian officers, but it is said that on the whole Indian engineers are inferior to their European colleagues. They are wanting in originality and have less initiative. They are deficient in the practical application of knowledge and are "far better at construction than design". They fail in situations calling for prompt action and so on. Our fitness has been questioned even as regards the Finance Department. The Comptroller-General admits that Indians possess the necessary intellectual qualifications, but they are inferior to Europeans in controlling the clerical staff. "Again" he says, "an attempt is being made to render audit less a mere technical application of rules and more a real check over extravagance and faulty methods of work. There is no doubt that it will be easier at first to train the European than the Indian officer in this respect because the Indian, for the very reason that law so appeals to him is prone to drive an argument to its logical conclusion, and to spend as much time and trouble in pursuing an objection on a technical point to a

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small amount as an objection to a large sum on a matter of principle."

Similar arguments have been used to justify the exclusion of Indians from the higher grades in every department. If a department employs a large number of superior officers whose work brings them into close touch with the daily life of the people, it is obvious that admission into it must be regulated by the strictest tests in order to ensure that the candidates who satisfy them shall be men of wide culture and broad sympathies. If, on the other hand, the cadre is small and the duties less onerous, it is no less necessary to keep Indians out, for even a very few failures may discredit the whole service. If Indians have hitherto been denied opportunities to prove their worth in any department, then it stands to reason that its doors cannot be opened wide to them suddenly without incurring a grave risk. If they have already given proof of their fitness in any service, which has been recognised by employing them a little more largely than before, it is all the more necessary that great caution should be exercised before making any further concession to them, for no right once given can be taken back. Thus, little or no advance on existing conditions is possible in any department. Including listed posts Indians occupy only 10 p. c. of the posts in the Indian Civil Service. In the Police Department their position is much worse. The maximum number of superintendentships open to them is only 5 p. c. of the total number of such posts, but on the 1st April, 1917, they occupied only 2 p. c. of them. In the Public Works Department they are appointed to one-third of the superior posts and so on. Obviously the Indian share in the different departments has been fixed on no principle. Nevertheless, these varying proportions are claimed to represent the maximum which can be conceded with safety to Indians.

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for the simple reason that they represent the existing state of affairs. But it will be no misrepresentation of facts to say that even these meagre proportions are not accepted cheerfully. The present arrangements are acquiesced in by the European element in the services because submission to them is inevitable. There is a note of regret running almost through the entire Anglo-Indian evidence at the political unwisdom which has made inconvenient demands on the part of Indians possible, and if it were possible for Government to retrace its steps, there is little doubt that Anglo-India would urge it to follow such a course.

The next point of agreement among Anglo-Indian witnesses generally is hostitily to competitive examinations. Indians should not, in the first place, be employed more extensively in the higher posts, but, if a contrary decision is come to by the authorities, they ought not to be chosen by means of competitive examinations which are no test of character. Promotion from the ranks of the subordinate services is the best method of rewarding merit. If the direct appointment of Indians in the higher grades is considered necessary, the number of men so chosen should be kept as low as possible, so that it may not lead to discontent in the subordinate services, and competitive examinations should be replaced by stiff qualifying examinations. Selection must precede or succeed examinations in some form or other. Of the Local Governments, whose representatives gave evidence before the Commission, not one was in favour of open competition as the principal method of recruitment for the higher posts. They were unanimous that in India there was no relation between intellectual and moral qualities. Suggestions for the recruitment of the provincial services by means of competitive examinations also met with determined opposition. They are incompatible

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with the principle that all important communities should be represented in the public services, and are, of course, open to the general objection that success in them does not connote the possession of those qualities which go to make a successful administrator. Nomination is the only method which can ensure the selection of candidates who combine knowledge with integrity, vigour and resourcefulness.

The conditions under which the competitive examination for the Indian Civil Service is carried on have effectually prevented Indians from competing on terms of equality with British-born candidates. Under these circumstances one would have thought that no desire would have been manifested to deprive them of the right of participating in the examination. But suggestions to this effect were actually put forward by several witnesses. To name only a few, Sir Alexander Cardew and Mr. Horne in Madras, and Mr. Marris and Mr. Campbell in the United Provinces advocated that Indians should be debarred from appearing at the English examination, which should be replaced, so far as they were concerned, by a system of combined nomination and examination in India. The ostensible reason given for making these suggestions was the efficiency of administration, but the statement will not stand a moment's examination. The real motive underlying all such proposals is to confine Indians to "a close Native Civil Service", as suggested forty years ago by Lord Lytton, so that the European monopoly of the Indian Civil Service may not be endangered.

The evidence relating to the Police Department is of the same character, and need not therefore detain us long. The members of the Imperial branch unanimously desire that Indians should not be allowed to take part in the competitive examination held in London. "The colour-

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bar," said the Inspector-General of Police, Bombay, "should be maintained for the examination in England." As regards deputy superintendentships, the same officer thought that the direct appointment of Indians to these posts seemed to have been dictated by political considerations. "In the interests of police efficiency, however," he said, "I am strongly in favour of all appointments to this rank being by promotion from among officers with police experience," although the Police Commission of 1902 commented unfavourably on the practice of promoting men from the lower ranks to superintendentships, as they proved to be inefficient and created a prejudice against the larger employment of Indians in responsible positions. To give only one more illustration, the representative of the officers of the Imperial branch in the Punjab also declared that he would like Indians "to go up from Inspectors to be Deputy Superintendents." Selection, he said, would give far more efficient men than a competitive examination. In connection with this it is interesting to note the information given by the Inspector-General of Police, Punjab, regarding the educational standard fixed for deputy superintendents in his province. "Matriculation was the minimum. Some men were graduates. All Deputy Superintendents could speak at least some English." It is only fair to add that the prejudice against the direct appointment of Indians as deputy superintendents was not shared by all the witnesses, but it was fairly general.

In passing one might cast a glance at the Indian Educational service, for, although it is not recruited by means of an examination, it furnishes a good illustration of the working of the Anglo-Indian mind. The evidence relating to it is not uniformly anti-Indian. But the majority of the witnesses do not appear to regard the introduction of a substantial Indian element

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In passing one might cast a glance at the Indian Educational service, for, although it is not recruited by means of an examination, it furnishes a good illustration of the working of the Anglo-Indian mind. The evidence relating to it is not uniformly anti-Indian. But the majority of the witnesses do not appear to regard the introduction of a substantial Indian element

into the higher division with approval. Appointments to the higher ranks are made by the Secretary of State for India. If, therefore, Indians are to be directly admitted into the Imperial branch they must be nominated by the same official. As nomination has generally been urged as the best mode of selecting Indians, one would not have expected any opposition on the part of Anglo-Indians to the appointment of Indians in England by this method. But it is contended, in the first place, that promotion from the provincial service would be more prudent, as actual work done by a man is a far better test of his capacity than academical qualifications however high, and, in the second place, that the Secretary of State, though assisted by a selection committee, would not be a competent judge of the qualifications of Indian candidates. It is undesirable, therefore, that the Secretary of State should exercise his power of nomination except on the recommendation of a Local Government, which would be able to take into consideration the claims of suitable candidates in India, and "it might happen," said the representative of the Indian Educational Service officers in the Punjab, "there was a man in India who would make a better professor or College tutor than the man who had been to England, and that man might go to England later to obtain experience." As for sending promising Indians to Europe for study, so that the Indian Educational service may be recruited from amongst them, it is by no means certain that on their return to India they will make good professors and be able to maintain the present high standard of education. The proposal was regarded with general disfavour, and Mr. Sharp, who is now Educational Commissioner with the Government of India, stated that he "would not begin with a scheme of sending the best men in India to the best universities in

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Europe, and recruiting the bulk of the Imperial Service from them. It would be very expensive!"

There are two more points of importance in regard to which Anglo-India has convinced itself of the correctness of its attitude; the unwisdom of separating judicial and executive functions, and the necessity for an increase in the salaries of Anglo-Indian officials. It is opposed to the separation of judicial and executive functions, and it demands that the pay and prospects of the European officials should be improved. The combination of judicial and executive functions, which means the union of the functions of the thief-catcher, the prosecutor and the judge in one and the same person, is favoured on the ground that their separation will lead to unnecessary expense and affect the prestige of the District Magistrate. The separation may entail some expenditure, but it is not quite apparent why the burden should be a heavy one, for the volume of work will remain the same. In the opinion of competent men it is very largely a matter involving redistribution of duties only. As for the prestige of the District Magistrate, it is difficult to understand, as Sir Harvey Adamson said in the Imperial Legislative Council in March, 1908, what advantage the present system can give him if he has no desire to use extra-judicial means to secure the punishment of those who may be unfortunate enough to incur his displeasure. The state of mind of those who advocate the retention of the existing system, which permits of the arbitrary exercise of power by District Magistrates, is well illustrated by the following cross-examination of Mr. Marris, Inspector-General of Police in the United Provinces, by Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim:

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Q. 44110—The District Magistrate is in a better position to deal with these cases (under sec. 110) than any other judicial official?—I think the judicial officer who is accustomed to decide these things in the light of strict legal evidence would tend to take a too ultra-legal view.

Q. 44116.—You do not want the rule of law to progress any further?—I think it is going on faster than is good for the country. I think the rule of law under the law courts in the long run is the rule of the long purse.

Q. 44117.—You would try to restrict the progress of the law as much as possible?—No, I do not go so far as that. I think there is an inevitable tendency to progress from the old primitive days of personal authority into a period of rule by law and order, but I am concerned at the rate at which it is progressing in this country. I am concerned at the rate at which the effective power is passing into the hands of the courts and the lawyer."

As already stated there was a general demand by Anglo-Indians for an improvement in their salaries and prospects. It is surprising that this demand should have come from those who are not only paid extravagantly, but who opposed the introduction of reforms asked for by Indian opinion on the ground that they would involve extra cost. Scholarships should not be given to Indians, to enable them to proceed to England for study or for competing in the Civil Service examination, as it would throw an unjustifiable burden on Indian revenues. The anomaly of allowing executive officers to exercise judicial powers should be continued as it is economical, though in all these cases India will get a good return for the expenditure that she may have to incur. But concern for economy does not prevent its advocates

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from putting forward demands, for larger salaries and better prospects, which, if conceded, will impose a heavy burden on India without any counterbalancing moral or material advantage.

The Indian point of view has been referred to by implication in criticising the Anglo-Indian evidence Besides, the agitation which educated India has been carrying on for the last thirty years has familiarized both the public and the Government with its demands. They constantly engage the attention of leaders of Indian political thought. They have been put forward from a thousand platforms and have been discussed exhaustively in the Indian press. It is not necessary, therefore, to dwell on them here. It will be sufficient if the main demands are summarized. Generally speaking, the educated classes desire that the examinations for the Indian services, which are at present held in the United kingdom alone, should be held in India also, so that Indians may not be debarred, in practice, from entering the higher ranks. They want that the distinction between Imperial and provincial services should be abolished in some of the most important departments, as it is based on racial considerations and compels highly qualified Indians to serve in inferior positions all their lives. They are against nomination as the sole method of selecting candidates for the more important services recruited in India. They strongly condemn the combination of judicial and executive functions in one and the same person, and advocate that the judiciary should be recruited separately from the Indian Civil Service, and from among persons who possess adequate legal knowledge and experience. They ask for various other reforms which will be dealt with in the succeeding chapters, and ask for them not on a priori grounds but because bitter experience has convinced them that the

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existing system is a cruel wrong to the people. All these points were duly urged on the Commission, though there were differences of opinion among the witnesses, specially with regard to the recruitment of the provincial services by open competition, which was opposed by classes which were afraid that it might injure their interests. These classes maintained that the principle of communal representation should continue to be recognised in making appointments to the locally recruited services.

It is a matter of regret that the Indian evidence was not marked by the strength or unanimity which characterized the Anglo-Indian evidence. The anxiety of our countrymen to state their case with scrupulous fairness and moderation and to avoid the charge of being unpractical, made it appear as if they had no faith in themselves and were afraid of the logical outcome of their proposals. For instance, the witnesses who demanded simultaneous examinations for the Indian Civil Service desired the continuance of the British element in the service and the maintenance of British methods of administration. This desire, instead of being regarded as a genuine appreciation on their part of western civilisation and culture, was taken as a confession of their inability to run the administrative machinery. In this view the preponderance of the British element in the Indian Civil Service was necessary in the best interests of India herself, and the question was frequently asked as to what would happen if simultaneous examinations resulted in the reduction of the western element below the proper limit. The answer generally given was that in view of the backward state of education in India and the character of the Civil Service examination, for a long time to come it would be virtually impossible for Indians to compete on terms of equality with can-

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didates who had been educated in Great Britain. As a practical answer it was perfectly valid. It is not possible to look very far ahead. The Commission itself takes only the immediate future into account in framing its proposals. It was not fair, therefore, to ask Indians what might happen in the remote future. But the question having been pressed, the only reply to it consistent with our self-respect was that given by Mr. Subba Rao. "I should welcome the day," he said, "when the whole service is manned by Indians, because it would show that a stage had been reached when . . . Indians could hold their own with Englishmen and even displace them in the highest service when the examinations were similar. Under those conditions the country would be so advanced that public opinion would be in accordance with such a state of things. Therefore if such a state of things should come about in the history of India, I should welcome it and I believe that was the aim of the statesmen who legislated in the year 1833; they looked forward to a time when India would be in the hands of Indians and the highest service would be manned by Indians." Mr. Subba Rao did not stand alone in giving expression to this view. Several other witnesses, for instance, Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, Sir Sankaran Nair, Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Mazharul Haque strongly repudiated the idea of an "irreducible minimum," but their number was not so large as one would have wished it to be.

The insistence of non-official Indian witnesses that in the event of simultaneous examinations being conceded, successful Indian candidates should be compelled to pass their period of probation in England was another point about the wisdom of which it is possible to entertain a doubt. This insistence was the outcome not of want of faith in their

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countrymen, but of a perception that it would be useful to Indians to acquire a first-hand knowledge of the social and political institutions of a country with which the destiny of their own is bound up. But it intensified the erroneous impression, referred to above, that Indians themselves believed that they were inferior to Englishmen in intellectual and administrative capacity. Out of the pretty large number of non-official Indians who were examined not more than half a dozen, amongst whom was Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, held the view that residence in England should not be made obligatory on successful candidates. Did Japan, which has radically changed her form of government in less than fifty years, insist on foreign education as a qualification for occupying positions of responsibility? The Duke of Argyle did not insist on this condition even in 1869. He stated in moving the second reading of the bill which became law in 1870 that in his opinion it would be "an important if not an essential qualification" in the holders of certain high appointments that they should be familiar with the actual working of the English constitution. "I would, however," added His Grace, "by no means make this a general condition, for there are many places in the Covenanted Service of India for which Natives are perfectly competent without the necessity of visiting this country: and I believe that by competitive examinations conducted at Calcutta or even by pure selection, it will be quite possible for the Indian Government to secure able, excellent, and efficient administrators." The "fund of ability" on which the Duke of Argyle expected to be able to draw in 1869 has certainly not become less in the intervening half a century.

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the absence of a strong and united protest by them against the scale of salaries fixed for Europeans. The salaries are pitched too high already, but the European witnesses demanded with one voice that they should be raised still higher. It was doubly necessary, therefore, to protest against the intolerable burden which the pensions and emoluments of Europeans impose on the revenues of India. Witnesses like Pundit Madan Mohan Malaviya and Mr. Subba Rao did not fail to discharge this duty, but the majority were weighed down by a feeling of helplessness. Their feelings were those of Mr. Bhupendranath Basu when he said that he would have recommended a general reduction if it had been an open question. That their protest would have been like a cry in the wilderness is made quite clear by the utter disregard for Indian opinion shown in the matter of the exchange compensation allowance, but a firm statement of Indian opinion on the point was as necessary as in respect of simultaneous examinations and the separation of judicial and executive functions.

The Indian evidence, however, discloses one highly encouraging feature. The representatives of the Congress, the Moslem League and the Khalsa, alike demanded that Indians should be employed far more extensively than at present in responsible positions. The adherents of the Congress were unanimous in pressing for simultaneous examinations. The trend of Moslem opinion, too, was in the same direction, though many Mohamedan witnesses were against simultaneous examinations or were opposed to competition, pure and simple, and desired that the interests of their community should be safeguarded by assigning to it a proportion of posts. His Highness the Aga Khan advocated the grant of simultaneous examinations and said, "All the Mohammedans I have spoken to are in favour of simultaneous examina-

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tions with the exception of one Government officer." And the representative of the All-India Moslem League, said that a majority of his co-religionists was in favour of simultaneous examinations. Of the three Sikh witnesses who gave evidence at Lahore, one had to be examined with the help of an interpreter. Of the other two one asked for simultaneous examinations. Of those who were against simultaneous examinations or, who, being in favour of them, suggested alternative proposals the majority was of the view that from 33 p. c. to 50 p. c. of the posts in the cadre of the Indian Civil Service should be conceded at once to Indians. Men of all shades of opinion bore testimony to the ability and efficiency of Indian officials and the confidence which the people reposed in them. And the representatives of the martial races instead of expressing the legendary contempt which they are supposed to have for their countrymen, desired that the number of the latter in the higher ranks should be substantially increased.

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Chapter IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS—GENERAL.

The Commission's inquiry extended to twenty-four departments. It excluded the Foreign and the Political departments, the posts in the secretariats of the Government of India and the Local Governments, the law officers, the presidency magistrates and the judges of the presidency courts of small causes from its consideration, although, as Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim says, there does not appear to be any sufficient warrant for it. The terms of reference are wide enough to cover all these cases, and it is as necessary to extend the employment of Indians in all these directions, specially in the secretariats, as in the departments dealt with by the Commission.

The low salaries attached to posts in the subordinate departments precludes all competition between Indians and Europeans. Broadly speaking, it comes into play only in regard to situations the monthly emoluments of which are Rs. 200, and upwards. The Commission, decided, therefore to limit its investigation, as a rule, to posts the initial salary of which is Rs. 200 or Rs. 250 per mensem. It was not found possible, however, to adhere rigidly to this rule. For while it would have brought within the purview of the Commission's enquiry many appointments of a subordinate character, it would have excluded a large number of officials, for instance civil assistant surgeons, who although paid at low rates, are discharging responsible duties. Thus, although the number of posts with salaries of Rs. 200 and upwards on the 1st April, 1913, was 11,064, the Commission's enquiry covered the cases of

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9,949 officers only. Of these 4140 or nearly 42 p. c. had been recruited in England. In other words recourse was had to England for filling almost one post out of every two. It must not be inferred from this, however, that appointments made in India have been given exclusively to Indians. Indians have had formidable rivals in domiciled Europeans and Eurasians. Of the total number of appointments on Rs. 200 a month and upwards, 58 p. c. were occupied by Europeans and Eurasians and only 42 p. c. by Indians. The disproportion becomes still more striking in the higher ranks. Of the 4,984 posts carrying monthly salaries of Rs. 500 and more only 942 or 19 p. c. were filled by Indians, while of the 2501 posts, the holders of which draw Rs. 800 or more per mensem, 242 or 10 p. c. were all that fell to the share of the children of the soil. In the face of these figures, comment on the policy hitherto pursued in regard to the public services is superfluous. They prove more eloquently than any argument that race and not merit is the criterion of eligibility, and that Indians have been persistently relegated to subordinate positions and denied all opportunity of rising to the higher grades because of the misfortune of their birth.

Such a situation, to be dealt with adequately, calls for radical measures. But one looks in vain for a perception of this truth in the recommendations of the Commission. As the Commission admits, under normal circumstances the recruitment for the services of a country should take place within its borders. In the Dominions, the civil services are recruited from among their own citizens, and the same course should be followed in India. But till this policy is adopted, the only method, generally speaking, of giving a fair chance to our countrymen of being employed more largely in

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the higher ranks of the public services, is that simultaneous examinations should be held in India and in England for appointment to those services, for which the examination is held hitherto in England alone, and the division of services into Imperial and Provincial branches, which was introduced at the instance of the Public Service Commission of 1886, should be done away with. The practice by which the competitive examination for admission into the Civil Service of India is confined to England manifestly places Indians at a serious disadvantage, and makes it impossible for them to compete on terms of equality with British-born candidates. As regards the examination for the police service they are in an even worse position, for they are not allowed to present themselves for it at all. The division of services into upper and lower sections does not work less injuriously to their interests. It confines them to the lower sections, and converts the superior and more well paid appointments into a close preserve for Englishmen. So long as there is no change in these directions it is useless to expect a marked improvement in the number of Indians in high offices. But the Commission has pronounced against simultaneous examinations as being detrimental to the best interests of India. It has also recommended the continuance of higher and lower divisions except in the Public Works Department and the engineering branches of the Railway and Telegraph departments, on the ground that they correspond to a real difference in the quality of the work which the members of the two classes are called upon to perform. The latter recommendation, however, will not affect Indians injuriously, except in the Education department, if the proposal of the Commission to recruit the scientific and technical services in India is accepted by the authorities. But the former recommendation

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will result in serious injustice to us, and that too in regard to the highest services. It deals with a question which was one of the most important which the Commission had to settle. As a body of responsible men, it was therefore necessary for it to deal with this matter in a serious spirit, to show that it recognized the gravity of the problem before it and to support its decision by cogent arguments. But it has trifled with the country by studiously refraining from discussing the pros and cons of the matter. Instead of stating fully the considerations which determined its views, it has contented itself with a bare statement of the conclusion at which it has arrived, as if it were a self-evident truth. Its main recommendations being so retrograde, its remaining proposals, even if conceived in a liberal spirit cannot provide an adequate opening for Indian talent and capacity. They can but touch the fringe of the problem. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Commission's report should have been received with keen disappointment and evoked bitter criticism. It does not carry us much further than the statutory rules of 1879 would have done. It has failed to appreciate the enormous change that has come over the spirit of India during the last forty years. It takes no note of the aspirations to which an impetus has been given by the war, and suggests changes which might have come with grace and efficiency in 1886.

It is a melancholy pleasure to note that Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim has refrained from signing this reactionary document, and has written a separate note which presents the Indian case with great force and comprehensiveness. He is entitled to the gratitude of every patriotic Indian for having championed our cause so manfully, and his note deserves the serious consideration of every well-wisher of India, Our position would

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undoubtedly have been stronger if Sir Mahadeva Bhaskar Chaubal had ranged himself on the side of Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim and refused to be a party to the report. But this need not detract from the intrinsic merit of the minutes of dissent which he has appended to the report, and which deserve praise for their grasp and lucidity. They are written from the same point of view as Mr. Justice Rahim's minute, and are almost identical in character with it where they cover the same ground.

At present, recruitment to many of the services enquired into by the Commission does not seem to be based on any principle. Some of them are recruited entirely in England, others entirely in India, and yet others in both the countries, although in many cases the reason for the existing practice is not quite clear. The Commission has attempted to bring order within this chaos by classifying the services recruited wholly or partly in Europe into three main groups. "In the first," say the Commissioners, "we place the Indian civil service and the police department, in both of which the nature of British responsibility for the good governance of India requires the employment in the higher ranks of a preponderating proportion of British officers. To the second group belong those services in which, on grounds of policy and efficiency, it is desirable that there should be an admixture in the personnel of both western and eastern elements. Such are the education, military finance, medical, telegraph (engineering), public works, railway (engineering and traffic), and survey of India departments. In the third group come certain scientific and technical services, such as the agricultural, civil veterinary, factory and boiler inspection, forest, geological survey, mines, mint and assay, pilots (Bengal), and railway (locomotive and carriage and wagon) departments. In

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these there are no grounds of policy for any considerable admixture of officers imported from Europe, and all that limits recruitment in India is the lack of facilities in that country for technical instruction and the consequent deficiency of qualified officers. There remain the customs and Indian finance departments. In these, also, no considerations of policy appear to exist for going to Europe, and the officers recruited are not required to possess any technical qualifications which are not procurable in India. None the less in the customs department, owing to the large part played by the European non-official community in the trade of the seaports with which this department deals, we think it necessary ... to continue for the present to recruit in part from Europe. For the finance department... recruitment in the future should be made wholly in India. We think, further, that if military considerations do not require that recruitment should be made in Europe, there is nothing in the nature of the work to be done in the military finance department which officers recruited in India would not be able to perform." The remaining departments, viz., the post office and the telegraph (traffic), Northern India salt revenue, salt and excise, registration, railway (stores), land records, (Burma), and survey (Madras) departments, are excluded from this classification as recruitment for them takes place entirely in India, an arrangement which has the complete approval of the Commission.

The commission of 1886 rested the case for the exclusion of Indians from high offices on administrative grounds. The efficiency and British character of the administration, they alleged, would be impaired, or at least jeopardized, if caution was not exercised in transferring authority into the hands of Indians. These pretexts deceived nobody, and Mr. Digby's analysis of the

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evidence tendered before it made it plain even to simpletons that the real motives which inspired its opposition to Indian aspirations were wholly different from the declared ones. But it did not shut the door of advancement upon us for ever, and even when it pretended to confer new rights by curtailing those which we were already enjoying, it paid a tribute to the principles which it was setting at nought. It put off the evil day when power might be in the hands of Indians, so far as it was concerned, but it set no limit to our aspirations. The Royal Commission of 1912, on the contrary, shuts us out from all hope. It tells us that our ambitions are impossible to satisfy, that we can go up to a certain point and no further. When it invokes "the nature of British responsibility for the good governance of India" as a reason for withholding what is in justice due to us, what does it mean in plain language but that so long as India continues under British rule, the higher administrative services must continue to be occupied in the main by men of British nationality? Indians must submit to be excluded from offices the duties of which they are qualified by ability and integrity to discharge for no other reason than that they belong to a subject country. The Commission's report is a flagrant violation of parliamentary and royal pledges. Authority may not have yielded willing allegiance to these pledges, in the past, but we cannot afford to see them so lightly set aside. In the course of a speech which Lord Morley delivered in the House of Lords in moving the second reading of the Indian Councils Bill, he said that after the promises contained in the Act of 1833 and the Proclamation of 1858 he could not, in obedience to usage and prejudice, refuse to appoint a competent Indian as a member of the Viceory's Executive Council. The Commission has had the courage to discard the

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The grounds of "policy and efficiency" on which it is proposed to retain a preponderant British element in the services which form the second group are not less objectionable than the principle which should, in the view of the Commission, regulate appointment to the Indian civil and police services. The Commissioners state that they do not contemplate that the preponderance of Europeans in the departments included in the second group will continue indefinitely. Would it not have been better then to class them with the scientific and technical services which comprise the third group, specially as they naturally fall under the same category? The line which divides the first group from the third is natural and obvious; but the distinction sought to be made between the second

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and third groups is a distinction without a difference. The Survey of India department is mainly engaged in the preparation of topographical maps required for military and other purposes. It may, therefor, be necessary that it should have a military element. But what are the grounds of "policy and efficiency" which require that Englishmen should predominate in the education, medical and public works departments, and in the engineering branches of the railway and telegraph departments? The public works department and the engineering branch of the railway department employ 648 officers belonging to the Imperial service. Of these only 70 are royal engineers. It is, thus, apparent that no military considerations stand in the way of employing Indians to any extent in this department. The same argument applies to the engineering section of the telegraph department, which appears to be manned entirely by civilians. Technical qualifications alone should determine admission into these departments, and if education of the requisite order is not available in India steps should be taken to provide it without avoidable delay. This should prove no more difficult than the provision of facilities for education in agriculture or forestry on which the Commission rightly lays so much stress. The medical department should be dealt with on similar lines. It is true that nearly all the higher posts in it are filled by officers belonging to the medical war reserve of the army. But there is no reason why the present system should not be altered. It hinders the growth of an independent medical profession in India, and it is contrary to the practice of all civilized countries, which keep their military and civil medical departments distinct. Indian public opinion therefore demands that members of the I. M. S. should be confined to military duties, and that a civil medical

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service should be formed to satisfy the medical needs of the civil population—a demand which is strengthened by the experience of the present war which necessitated the withdrawal of half the officers from civil duties within eight months of its commencement. The Indian Educational Service also stands on a similar footing. In fact the problem here is simpler than in the case of the Public Works and medical departments. There is no dearth of capable Indians who can be entrusted with the education of the youth of their country. If they are given the necessary opportunities, they will prove more efficient and will have a much greater hold on the minds of young men than men of average ability imported from Europe, who are not unoften swayed by political considerations in their dealings with students.

It has been stated above that 4140 officers have been recruited in Europe for the twenty-four departments dealt with by the Commission. Out of these 3304 or about 80 per cent are accounted for by the Indian Civil, police, education and medical services, and the Public Works department and the engineering branch of the Railway department, that is, the services included in the first and second groups. If Indians are to be denied admission in large numbers into these departments on racial grounds, what hope is there that they will ever acquire that share in the higher branches of the services of their country to which they are entitled alike on grounds of justice and higher expediency ?

The classification of services proposed by the Commission is open to objection from another point of view also. If in its view certain departments possess certain common characteristics to a sufficient degree to be grouped together, then, as Sir M. B. Chaubal observes, the recommendations relating to them should follow the same lines. But if the recommendations are widely

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dissimilar, the classification ceases to be intelligible. It cannot be said to be based on any principle. Now the Indian Civil and Police services are regarded as belonging to the same category by the Commission. But while the Indian share in the former is fixed at 25 p. c. of the superior posts, it is limited in the latter to 10 p. c. only for the present, though it is to be raised ultimately to 20 p. c. Admittedly, the Indian Civil Service is the premier service in India. Its duties are of a higher and more responsible character than those of any other department. If Indians can occupy a quarter of the posts in it with advantage to the country and without any risk to British rule, it is plain that a much larger proportion of the higher posts in the Police department can be safely conceded to them. But the Commission assigns to them a smaller share in the Indian Police than in the Indian Civil service. There is a similar want of consistency in the proposals made in regard to the services included in the second group. An equal division of the higher posts in the Public Works department and the engineering branch of the Railway department has been made between Europeans and statutory natives of India. But we are asked to be content for a long time to come with one-fourth of the appointments in the Indian Educational Service, with the prospect of obtaining half of them in a dim and distant future. With regard to the Indian Medical Service the Commission can hardly be said to have made any recommendation at all. It proposes that the medical needs of the army and the civil administration should be separately calculated. Military officers should continue to be appointed to civil medical posts as hitherto, and the posts remaining after officers belonging to the medical reserve of the army have been provided for should be recruited for in India. Even all of these are not to be filled by Indians. Thus,

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the chance of Indians securing a fair share of the higher posts in the medical department depends on a substantial reduction in the cadre of the Indian Medical Service. But if the Government of India always advocated its increase in times of peace, what chance is there of a proposal for its reduction being considered after the present war ?

The policy enunciated by the Commission in regard to the scientific and technical services is as gratifying as it is just. Referring to them the Commissioners say that "a determined and immediate effort should be made to provide better educational opportunities in India, so that it may become increasingly possible to recruit in that country the staff needed to meet all requirements." A large initial expenditure may be necessary for this purpose, but the money spent on the creation and development of scientific and technical institutions will be amply repaid by the impetus they will give to scientific and technical education and their beneficial effect on the economic condition of the people. But so far as the question of the appointment of Indians to responsible offices is concerned it must be remembered that all these services put together employ only 507 or less than one-eighth of the officers recruited in England. Again, as pointed out by Sir M. B. Chaubal, while the Commission desires that these services should eventually be recruited entirely in India, it recommends higher salaries and better prospects in the meanwhile for European officers in these departments, so that they may be able to attract properly qualified men and retain their services. If the conditions of service are made easier in order to attract Europeans, its obvious effect will be to delay the "Indianisation" of the departments in question for at least a generation, when the policy recommended by the Commission may be forgotton or quietly ignored. Be

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Thus, the practical measures, suggested by the Commission for giving effect to their recommendations, are unsatisfactory even in reference to those departments where it admits that the "nature of British responsibility for the good governance of India" and "grounds of policy and efficiency" do not require the presence of non-Indians. The majority of the Commissioners have viewed the whole problem from an entirely wrong standpoint. "The question they have asked themselves", says Mr. Justice Rahim, "is, what are the means to be adopted for extending the employment of Indians. But the proper standpoint which alone in my opinion furnishes a satisfactory basis to work upon, is that the importation of officials from Europe should be limited to cases of clear necessity, and the question therefore to be asked is, in which services and to what extent should appointments be made from England."

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Thus, the practical measures, suggested by the Commission for giving effect to their recommendations, are unsatisfactory even in reference to those departments where it admits that the "nature of British responsibility for the good governance of India" and "grounds of policy and efficiency" do not require the presence of non-Indians. The majority of the Commissioners have viewed the whole problem from an entirely wrong standpoint. "The question they have asked themselves", says Mr. Justice Rahim, "is, what are the means to be adopted for extending the employment of Indians. But the proper standpoint which alone in my opinion furnishes a satisfactory basis to work upon, is that the importation of officials from Europe should be limited to cases of clear necessity, and the question therefore to be asked is, in which services and to what extent should appointments be made from England."

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and in India, and on the removal of other racial disabilities under which Indians labour, so that they may be able to compete with non-Indian candidates on equal terms. It has not favoured the idea of having proportions fixed up to which it should be obligatory on the authorities to appoint Indians, because it is repugnant to the promises of equality made to her, and, because it is believed that a minimum tends in practice to become a maximum. But this view, says Sir M. B. Chaubal, betrays an imperfect appreciation of the strength of the forces which encourage recruitment from abroad. And he suggests that the fixing of minimum proportions for Indians, instead of being opposed, should be regarded as the first step on the road to equality. But these proportions, he says, "must be such as will cumulatively throughout the services help to create the feeling that we Indians are in a substantial degree carrying on the government of the country. At present the Indians are far and few : and every Indian officer, whether high or low, feels that he is not serving himself or his country, but is an individual hired to labour for somebody else. . . . To dispel this feeling there must, in the higher services in all departments of the administration, be present a large number of Indians, so that they may collectively feel that the responsibility for a strong and wise government of the people rests mainly on them." Even if Sir Mahadeva Bhaskar Chaubal's view be accepted as correct, the proportions laid down by the Commission in regard to the more important services are too low, except in the case of the Public Works Department, to remove the feeling alluded to above. As has been repeatedly stated, the percentage of superior posts set apart for Indians in the Civil Service practically leaves us where we were in 1879, while it is difficult to regard the corresponding proportion fixed in the police

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service as a proposal seriously put forward by a body of responsible men to satisfy Indian aspirations.

The method of selecting the personnel of the services recruited in India yet remains to be discussed. Competition, wherever it can be resorted to, would seem to be the best mode of regulating admission into the public services, as it ensures the possession of high educational qualifications on the part of successful candidates, and makes merit the sole test of fitness. It may not be the best system conceivable, but it is certainly the best available. The Commission, however, rejects this method, and recommends the creation of selection committees, containing an Indian element, which should make their nominations from among candidates possessed of a minimum educational qualification. The appointment of such committees will be a great improvement on the present system, but it can be no substitute for competitive examinations. The failure of the statutory system is a warning against the dangers of nomination, which will always be liable to defects inherent in the system unless human nature undergoes a revolution. It has been and will always be used to check independence of thought and action and to reward subserviency. It is true, as pointed out by the Commission, that in India education is not sufficiently widespread and that its diffusion has been somewhat unequal. But the competitive system was introduced into England with success in 1870, when it had neither free nor compulsory education, and when its educational condition was not far different from that of India. Even in India it has uniformly given satisfaction to the public, wherever it has been used as a mode of selecting men for the Provincial executive service, and its success has been acknowledged by the Government of the Punjab, where it is still in existence. Mr. Justice

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Abdur Rahim desires that "substantial recognition" should be given to it wherever possible. Sir Mahadeva Bhaskar Chaubal, also, is in favour of resorting to it where recruits have to be selected in sufficiently large numbers. He suggests that one-fifth or one-sixth of the posts might be reserved for nominated candidates and that the rest should be thrown open to competition. This suggestion if carried out will not only improve the tone of the locally recruited services, but will also provide men who will be fit to be promoted to posts in the Imperial services. Where nomination has to be retained for direct recruitment a sufficiently high and uniform standard of qualifications should be insisted on in the case of all communities alike. But the Commission, while it recommends a university degree for Indians, proposes that Anglo-Indians should be required to have passed "a suitable examination of a corresponding standard to be prescribed by Government for the European schools". The European schools mostly prepare their students for the Cambridge senior local examination, which no university appears to regard as the equivalent even of the F. A. examination. To accept it as equivalent to a university degree is to give a grossly unfair advantage to a community which is represented out of all proportion to its population in the public services, for while numbering about 102,000 only, or about $\frac{1}{20}$ p. c. of the population of British India, it occupies more than 14 p. c. of the posts which carry a salary of Rs. 200 a month and upwards. No further partiality should, therefore, be shown to it. On the contrary steps should be taken as early as possible to reduce its percentage substantially below the present figure.

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Chapter V.

RECOMMENDATIONS—FINANCIAL.

The various services, as already noted, were not at all backward in urging their claims to higher salaries, better prospects and easier conditions of service, and, on the whole, the Commission has not been slow to recognize them. According to the estimate made by it the acceptance of its recomendations will involve the state in an extra expenditure of about 42¼ lacs annually. But this calculation is based on the assumption that there will be a saving in the services which are to be ultimately recruited in India, and which, therefore, will be paid at substantially lower rates than at present. But it has been pointed out above that the increase proposed in the emoluments of the European officers in these departments will delay the substitution of Indian for European agency, and throw a greater burden on the state for at least a generation to come. It is not possible to say what the precise increase will be, but Sir M. B. Chaubal believes that it will come to about 20 lacs a year. Thus the cost of raising the salaries will amount to about 62¼ lacs annually. This leaves out of account the expenditure to be incurred in connection with pensions. The Commission proposes that the rule requiring the officers of the Indian Civil Service to contribute 4 p. c., of their salaries towards their pensions should be abolished. This will result in extra expenditure to the tune of 9 lacs. The acceptance of the recommendation to raise the maximum pension limit (in services other than the Indian Civil and Medical services) from Rs. 5,000 to Rs. 6,000 will cost about 9¼ lacs more. The special

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pensions recommended for officers who have held certain high posions will mean a further addition of 2¾ lacs. Over and above this, the creation of twenty professorial appointments outside the cadre of the Indian Educational Service, proposed in the annexure dealing with education, is computed by Sir M. B. Chaubal to cost about 5 lacs. Thus if all the recommendations of the Commission are given effect to, the net increase in expenditure will be not 42¼ lacs but about 88¼ lacs. This is exclusive of the cost which will be entailed by a revision of the scale of salaries of the inferior and superior appointments under the Government of India. Nor does it take into account the increase recommended in the pay of the members of the I. M. S. which will be between six and seven lacs, and which, as the language used by the Commission makes one fear, may swell still further after the war.

So large an addition to the cost of civil administration should not be made without the clearest proof of its necessity. It is incumbent on those who advocate this step to show that it is absolutely necessary in order to maintain a high level of efficiency in the various services, and that the finances of the country will be able to bear so huge a burden. Leaving a few departments, where the conditions are peculiar, out of consideration, the average monthly salary of the officers belonging to the higher branches of the services enquired into by the Commission range, roughly speaking, between Rs. 700 and Rs. 1,000. The corresponding figures for officers holding inferior and superior posts in the Indian Civil Service are about Rs. 862 and Rs. 2,400 respectively. Are these emoluments so low that in the interests of honest and efficient administration it is highly desirable to raise them by a substantial amount? It is no answer to this question to say that the cost of living has increas-

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ed considerably in India during the last twenty-five years, for the state is under no obligation to maintain salaries at the same level for all time. The only satisfactory method of dealing with the matter is to determine whether the quality of candidates has actually deteriorated. It would help in arriving at a correct conclusion if the result of this investigation is tested by a comparison of the scale of salaries in force in India with the standard which prevails in other parts of the British Empire.

Let us consider the case of the Indian Civil Service which is responsible for 20 lacs out of the total expenditure of 88¼ lacs involved in the recommendations of the Commission, the abolition of the 4 p. c. contribution accounting for 9 lacs and improvement in salaries for about 11 lacs. The evidence taken in England shows that a larger number of careers is open now to young men there than was the case a quarter of a century ago The measures recently adopted to ameliorate the condition of the masses have greatly widened the functions of the state, and provided a large number of openings for admission into government service without the necessity of passing through the ordeal of competitive examinations. A revision of salaries, too, in some services has made them more attractive. There are also greater facilities for obtaining profitable commercial appointments than before. Besides, to those who are willing to leave their country service in the self-governing colonies seems to appeal more strongly than service in India. This has affected recruitment for India to a certain extent, but there is nothing to show that, with the exception of the education and medical departments which will be dealt with later on, there is any appreciable

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deterioration in the quality or number of recruits for the Indian services. In particular, the popularity of the Indian Civil Service has hardly suffered any eclipse.

The representatives of Oxford and Cambridge, whose opinions are entitled to the greatest weight in this matter, did not think that there was any appreciable decrease in the number of those wishing to enter the Civil Service or that the average was deteriorating. Mr. Stanley Leathes inclined to the same view, and Professor Richard Lodge of the Edinburgh university said that India was getting "a very high average... of the university graduates of the present day." Even if this were not the case, it would be no ground for adding to the cost of administration. It would only emphasise the necessity for recruiting more largely in India. But as a matter of fact the evidence of the universities proves that the Indian Civil Service still stands high in the estimation of likely candidates. There has been some complaint regarding the inadequacy of pay and prospects owing to an erroneous impression created by members of the Indian Civil Service that the conditions of service are unsatisfactory, but neither Oxford nor Cambridge was sure that any improvement in them would add materially to the attractiveness of the Service. Any disinclination which may exist on the part of British candidates to chose an Indian career is due more to the growing political unrest and the increasing criticism to which the Civil Service is being subjected, than to the alleged insufficiency of remuneration. In the face of this evidence the Commission has come to the conclusion that the rise in the cost of living and blocks in promotion have affected recruitment prejudicially, and that an improvement in salaries and prospects is necessary to restore to the service its former attraction. This view is strongly controverted by both the

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Indian members, who declare that the present scale of salaries is quite sufficient to attract recruits of the right stamp. Indeed it contradicts the opinion expressed by the majority of the Commissioners themselves in regard to the maintenance of the competitive system. They consider it impracticable to impose a test of character on the literary test, though they would welcome it if it were possible. "But apart from this," they add, "we are fortified in our conclusion to leave well alone by the feeling, which is borne out by the evidence given both in England and in India, that taken as a whole, the personnel now recruited has not in any way deteriorated, and that India has been obtaining men who are keeping up the high level and the best traditions of the service."* If India is obtaining a satisfactory class of officers under the present conditions why should she be made to pay more to obtain the same type of officers?

Let us now compare the salaries of the Indian Civil Service with those of services which are more or less similarly recruited. Admission into the Indian, Home and Colonial Civil Services is regulated by the same examination which is held annually in London. Those who succeed in gaining an appointment in the Indian Civil Service start with an initial salary of £ 340 a year including exchange compensation allowance. After completing eight years' service, they may normally expect to earn about £ 800 a year. And whether they serve in the executive or the judicial line, they rise, practically by mere seniority, to positions the annual emoluments of which amount to about £ 2,000. Above these, including Lieutenant-Governorships and memberships of provincial executive councils but excluding the posts under the Government of India, there appear to be 135 appointments the salaries of which range between £ 2,200

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and £ 6,667. According to Mr. Justic Rahim the average annual emoluments of the appointments above the rank of collectors and district and sessions judges amount to £ 2,900. It may be added that an Indian Civilian can retire after 25 years' service on a pension of £ 1,000 a year, and is also entitled to the benefit of a family pension fund, to which a contribution is made by the state.

Compare with this the prospects of a man who enters the Home Civil Service. He starts on a salary of £ 200 a year, which rises to £ 500 in 15 years. Promotion after this stage depends theoretically on selection and not on seniority, but it appears that if a man is not rejected as unfit or does not get exceptionally rapid promotion he rises to the highest post in the first grade, which carries an annual salary of £ 1,000, in about 30 years. Beyond this there are prize posts the salaries of which range between £ 1,000 and £ 2,000, which it can fall to the lot of a few only to occupy.† As for pensions, an officer of the Home Civil Service cannot retire after 25 years' service unless invalided. And even then he cannot receive more than £ 500 including any bonus that may be due to him.§ Thus, roughly speaking, the salaries and prospects in the Indian Civil Service are twice as high as those in the Home Civil Service.

It may be said, however, that a comparison of these two services is hardly fair. A man who joins the Home Civil Service passes his life in his own country, among his friends and relatives and in familiar surroundings.

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It is perfectly natural that for the sake of these advantages he should be willing to accept a lower rate of remuneration than one whose days will be passed in exile, and in a climate which is generally far from agreeable. To eliminate this objection let us compare the Indian and Colonial Civil Services. The colonial service comprises situations in the Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States, Hongkong and Ceylon, where the conditions of service are not likely to be pleasanter than in India. The initial salary of a Cadet in the Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States is £ 250 a year (with free furnished quarters), in Hongkong £ 225 (with house allowance), and in Ceylon £ 300 (without free quarters), while in India it is £ 340.§ In the Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States it takes about 15 years apparently to rise to a position the emoluments of which are about £ 800 (including a non-pensionable allowance of £ 150 a year, given to officers while on duty), in Hongkong also about 15 years (including a duty allowance of £ 120), and in Ceylon over 12 years, while in India, as already stated, it takes only about nine years to reach that position. The highest salary in the regular line of promotion in the Straits Settlements and the Federated Malay States is about £ 1500 a year (including duty allowances), and apparently it takes about 30 years to come to the top. These are also half a dozen prize posts, the average salary of which is about £ 1800 a year. The salary and allowance of the highest prize post together come to £ 2,500. In Hongkong the highest salary (including duty allowances) in the topmost grade, which it seems can scarcely be reached in less than 18 years, is £ 1150 a year, and there is only one

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prize post the annual emoluments of which amount to £ 1600. In Ceylon the salaries of officers of the first class vary between £ 1050 and £ 1400. It is difficult to state with precision the period of service required to makes one's way to the top of the highest grade, but a perusal of the rules relating to the Civil Service of Ceylon leaves on one's mind the impression that it must be between 20 and 25 years. The rules are silent about the number and salaries of appointments superior to those in the first class, but it appears from the table of salaries given by Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim in his minute of dissent that the maximum salary attainable in Ceylon does not exceed £ 2,000. Thus, whether one takes into consideration the initial salary, the rate of promotion or the maximum salary, the Colonial Civil Service is far inferior to the Indian Civil Service. The latter is incomparably superior, specially so far as the higher appointments are concerned. Yet, with all its disadvantages, there is no dearth of candidates for the Colonial Civil Service, which attracts men possessing substantially the same qualifications as the successful candidates in the Indian Civil Service examination.

Without labouring the point unduly, we may institute one more comparison, and profitably compare the Indian Civil Service with the Far Eastern Consular Service which comprises China, Japan and Siam. It is recruited, from among candidates previously nominated by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, by means of a competitive examination identical with that for the Indian Civil Service except in one important respect, which cannot be said, however, to affect the standard of the examination. The subjects for the Indian Civil Service examination must be so chosen that the aggregate of the marks fixed for them does not exceed 6,000, but the maximum number of marks obtainable by a

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candidate for the Far Eastern Consular Service is limited to 4,000 only.§ The successful candidates are known as Student Interpreters, and the Service is classified into Interpreters, Assistants, Vice-consuls, Consuls and Consuls-General. The Interpreters receive £ 200 per annum in Siam and £ 250 in Japan and China. The pay of the assistants ranges between £ 300 and £ 400, and that of the other grades between £ 450 and £ 600, £ 600 and £ 900 and £ 900 and £ 1200, respectively. Thus the highest salary obtainable by an officer in the Far Eastern Service is £ 1200, which the Royal Commission which was appointed to enquire into the English Civil Service in 1912 recommends should be raised to £ 1400.* And these prospects are sufficient to induce Englishmen to leave their country and serve for a lifetime in the midst of strange peoples in far-off lands.

These comparisons not merely reinforce the conclusion which the evidence of competent witnesses enables us to arrive at, viz., that the attraction of the Indian Civil Service for British youths is undiminished, but expose the glaring injustice done to India in making her pay the members of the Indian Civil Service at rates which are nearly twice as high as those at which the Cadets for the Crown Colonies are remunerated. To repeat what has been said above, even if it had been proved that service in India no longer appealed to British youths, it would have afforded no justification for offering them better terms. It should only have led to the widening of the field of recruitment in India. But the facts cited above have made it incontestably clear that the unpopularity of the Indian Civil Service is a

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myth, and that in fairness to India the salaries of her Civilians should be reduced so as to bring them on a level with the market rate.

A word may be added here in regard to the rules governing the grant of leave and allowances to officers who come under the European service leave rules, and the favourable rates of exchange granted to European officers. The maximum period for which leave can be obtained during a full period of service is six years (in the case of the I. C. S. six and a half years). This generous allowance is fully availed of by the officers concerned, and, in consequence, provision for large leave reserves has to be made in some of the most important services recruited in Europe. In the Indian Civil Service in particular, the leave reserve amounts to 40 p. c. of the superior appointments. In other respects, too, the leave rates are as favourable to Europeans as they well can be. No proposal to make them still more liberal should be regarded with favour.

Allowances are of various kinds and their number is legion. The I. C. S. excepted, they vary in value from Rs. 100 to Rs. 300 per mensem. The maximum and minimum ordinary furlough allowances for Indian Civil Servants and military officers under civil leave rules are £ 1,000 and £ 500 and their rupee equivalents are Rs. 10,000 and 5,000. The corresponding figures for other services governed by the European service leave rules are £ 800 and £ 200, and Rs. 8,000 and Rs. 2,000. As a rupee is no longer equivalent to two shillings but only to 1s. 6d., for the purpose of making remittances to England, the Commission proposes that the rupee equivalents of the sterling amounts should be altered accordingly and replaced by Rs. 13,333⅓ and Rs. 6,666⅔ in the first case and Rs. 10,666⅔ and Rs. 2,666⅔ in the latter case. It is difficult to see any relevancy in this

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argument. There is no reason why the rupee allowances should be increased, no matter what the value of a rupee in relation to the currency of a gold-using country may be.

Although a rupee is nowadays equivalent to 1s. 4d., uncovenanted European officers are allowed to convert their pensions into sterling at the privileged rate of 1s. 9d. to the rupee. European officers in a number of departments, whether covenanted or uncovenanted, are also allowed to remit half their salaries to Europe, subject to the limit of £ 1,000 a year, at the rate of 1s. 6d. to the rupee. At the present rate of exchange this concession amounts to an allowance of 6¼ p. c. on salaries not exceeding Rs. 2,200 per mensem in round figures. Officers in receipt of salaries higher than this amount are given a fixed sum of about Rs. 139 per month. (Furlough allowances also are paid at the same rate.) This allowance which is known as the exchange compensation allowance, and which was granted to European officers in 1893 to compensate them for the fall in exchange, imposed a burden of more than 1¼ crores on the country when its finances were admittedly low, and tax upon tax was being levied to balance revenue and expenditure. The objections to the grant of this allowance have been clearly stated in the minority report of the Welby Commission. "The grant of this compensation", says the report, "was much resented in India (1).....because sufficient consideration was not shown for the taxpayer who, himself a sufferer from the fall in exchange, had to compensate his richer fellow-suffer.....(3) because it was indiscriminate, not regarding the rate of exchange when the employe entered the service, nor the fact whether or not any remittance was being made to England.....". These objections still hold. Exchange had been falling for two decades prior to 1893, but there

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was nothing to show that it had affected recruitment prejudicially. It established itself at 1s. 4d. to the rupee in 1898. More than half the higher branches of the civil services must consist of men recruited after that year, but the exchange compensation still continues to be paid separately or has been merged in the salary in the case of services in which the scale of salaries has been revised recently. The Commission sets the seal of its approval on this injustice by recommending that in all the departments it should be merged in the salary, which should be fixed at the figure representing the total of the salary and the allowance. The only just course to follow is to continue the allowance in the case of existing recipients and to discontinue it for all future recruits, though it is too much to hope that this will ever be done under the present regime.

Strictly speaking, it has become superfluous now to consider whether the country can bear any increase in the cost of the civil administration, for an increase is not required in the interests of efficiency. Nevertheless an examination of our financial position will not prove to be a needless waste of time. In fact, such an examination alone will unable us to understand the true bearings of the question and its effect on our moral and material welfare.

The poverty of India is the most patent fact about her. On various occasions official calculations have been made of the average income per head of her population. The data on which they have been based have been kept confidential, but it is enough for us to note that according to the most optimistic estimate the average income per head does not exceed Rs. 30 per annum or Rs. 2/8 per month. This income is totally inadequate to keep body and soul together, but, as it represents the average, it is obvious that even this pittance is not

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secured by everybody. There must be millions living in a state of starvation or semi-starvation and millions more living in daily dread of it. It was calculated by Sir William Hunter in 1881 that forty millions "go through life on insufficient food."

The next point that must be kept in mind in considering Indian finance is that a considerable portion of India's revenues is spent outside her borders, for which, to say the least of it, she receives no direct material equivalent. Whatever the causes which have brought this about, its effect is to deepen the poverty of the people, the great bulk of whom are already in a state of destitution.

In a country where poverty and ignorance are so deep and wide-spread, economy should never be allowed to become a "despised word." In richer countries extravagance may be imprudent; in a country situated like India it is a crime. Every pie needlessly raised is so much wrung from penury and distress. Every rupee needlessly spent is so much withdrawn from the scanty resources available for expenditure on objects which will bring happiness and prosperity into the homes of millions. To keep a watchful eye on the growth of expenditure is a matter of great political importance also. Speaking in the House of Commons on the 26th February, 1906, Lord Morley said: "If you want security and strength in India, one of your ways of getting it is to lighten taxation, and I should look, therefore, in the direction of greater economy in order to lighten taxation." But, as any one who has studied Mr. Gokhale's financial speeches can see, economy has never been practised so far. During 1886–98, there was a ceaseless piling up of tax on tax, owing partly to the difficulties occasioned by exchange. In 1898 the fluctuations in exchange, which settled down in the neighbourhood of

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16 d. to the rupee, ceased, and the era of surpluses began which lasted without a break for 10 years. The first 7 years of this decade covered the period of Lord Curzon's viceroyalty, during which advantage was taken of an overflowing treasury to push up expenditure in all directions. It is true that this period witnessed three reductions in the salt duty which brought it down from Rs. 2/8 to Re. 1 per maund. But, in the first place, these remissions were an act of bare justice to the people who had been taxed in order to make up the deficiency due to loss in exchange. And, in the second place, they were effected too late to restrain the tendency to extravagance on the part of the Government of India. A great deal of the increase in expenditure was incurred in creating new appointments, and granting higher salaries and pensions to European officers, and was therefore of a recurring character. The legacy of an overgrown expenditure thus remained with us even after these reductions had taken place, and the protests of Mr. Gokhale who pleaded year after year for economy went unheeded.

The effects of this policy on the finances of India have been fully set forth in the speech which Mr. Gokhale delivered in the Imperial Council on the 25th January, 1911, in moving a resolution on the growth of public expenditure. He reviewed the financial position of India during the years 1875-1908, which he divided into four periods, and showed that the expenditure had increased at an unprecedented and alarming rate during 1901-02—1907-08, which formed the last period. This period included four years and a half of Lord Curzon's administration. As has often been said it was a period of "Efficiency with a big E." "There was a hot pursuit," said Mr. Gokhale, "of efficiency in every direction, leading to increased establishments,

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creation of new appointments, and increases in the scales of pay and promotion and pensions of the European services of the country." So far had this process gone that Sir Edward Baker felt bound to enter an emphatic protest against it. Speaking in the Budget debate of 1907-8, he said, "I have now been connected with the Finance Department of the Government of India for five years continuously, and during the whole of that period I do not believe that a single day has passed on which I have not been called upon officially to assent to an increase of pay of some appointment or group of appointments, to the reorganisation of some department, or to an augmentation of their numbers. All experience proves that wherever revision is needed, either of strength or emoluments, the Local Governments and the Heads of Departments are only too ready in bringing it forward. Nor are the members of the various services at all backward in urging their own claims. I cannot in the least recognize the necessity for imparting an additional stimulus to this process." Expenditure went up at a rate which Mr. Gokhale calls "perfectly astonishing." While the increase in each of the two periods immediately preceeding 1901-07 was 6 crores, that in 1901-07 was no less than 18 crores. Even after this period the financial situation continued to be one of anxiety. In 1909 we had to face "all of a sudden and without any warning" a deficit of 5½ crores, "the heaviest deficit," according to Mr. Gokhale, "that this country has known since the mutiny." And, to quote Mr. Gokhale again, in the following year, the Finance Member, "as if to emphasize the gravity of the situation felt himself driven to impose additional taxation to the tune of about a million and a quarter in a perfectly normal year, free from famine, war, or any of those other disturbing circumstances which in our mind

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have been associated with increased taxation in the past."

The war has imposed fresh burdens on us. New taxes were levied last year. In consequence, the salt tax which, Lord Morley said in 1907, he "could not regard with patience," now stands at Rs. 1/4 per maund. Roughly speaking the total yield of the taxes imposed last year is estimated to be £ 4½ million. Taxes to the tune of £ 3·3 million have been levied again this year to enable the Government of India to meet the annual charge for interest, etc., on the war gift of £ 100 million made by it to the British Government. Thus, the total taxation during the last and current years amounts to about £ 7·8 million or 12 crores, and it may be enhanced next year. "It must be understood, however," said the Finance Member in presenting the Financial statement last March, "that while we refrain on the present occasion from imposing additional Government taxation on agricultural incomes, we can give no pledge that we shall refrain from doing so hereafter should future necessities oblige us to take this course." The gross income from land revenue which averaged £ 16·67 million in 1890-91—1895-96, averaged £ 21·33 millions during the quinquennium, 1911-12—1915-16. It has increased by £ 4·66 million or 7 crores in 20 years, and any further addition to it will impose a crushing burden on the poorest classes. The demands of education, sanitation, relief of agricultural indebtedness and industrial and technical education have yet to be satisfied, but our reserves have been almost exhausted. Is this the time for giving better salaries and pensions to European officers when the country is groaning under the heavy burden of taxation? If Sir Edward Baker regarded such callous proposals "with astonishment and something

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like dismay," in 1907, they must be regarded with a feeling akin to horror at the present juncture. The pruning knife should be applied vigorously to every department and earnest and determined efforts should be made to substitute Indian for European agency, in order that the cost of administration may not continue to be out of all proportion to the resources of the country.

As pointed out by Sir Mahadeva Bhaskar Chaubal, the first duty of the Government should be to carry out the recommendation of the Commission regarding the provision of facilities for imparting scientific and technical education upto the highest standard. No expenditure should be grudged to develop existing institutions, so that they may be able to impart the highest training, and to start new ones which will be as well equipped as similar institutions in Great Britain. In course of time they will not only reduce the burden of salaries, by supplying qualified men who will be able to take the place of the imported agency, but give an impetus to scientific and technical education and contribute to the industrial progress of the country. The next concern of the Government should be to improve the lot of the members of the subordinate services, which are paid at miserably law rates. They did not come within the scope of the Commission's enquiry, but this should not prevent us from asking that justice should be done to them. They groan beneath the burden of the administrative structure but receive less than a living wage. They have been hit hardest by the rise in the prices of the necessaries of life, and in proportion as this process continues their troubles will thicken. They can neither live in rude comfort themselves, nor enable their children to fare better in the race of life by giving them a decent education. The enhancement of their salaries is

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Chapter VI.

THE INDIAN AND PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICES.

The Indian Civil Service has been rightly regarded as the premier service in India. "The other Services," as Mr. H. A. L. Fisher says, "are excrescences, later developments due to the increase of specialisation, grafts upon the parent tree, which is the Civil Service of John Company, now for many years taken over by the Imperial Government." * But no view of it can be correct which regards it merely as a service. It is much more than a service. It is the Government of India itself. It regulates the internal as well as the external affairs of the country. It legislates as well as administers. It formulates policies as well as executes them. All power is centred in its hands. The legislative councils are its playthings. To quote again from Mr. Fisher, "The large lines of Indian policy may be shaped by a Secretary of State in the India Office; and a powerful Secretary of State may make his influence felt very strongly on the direction of Indian affairs, if he encounters no serious opposition from the Government of India. But, in reality, the last word lies with Indian official opinion, in the sense that a measure would not be forced upon India against the united opposition of the Indian bureaucracy, the Indian Viceroy, or the Indian Governors and and Lieutenant-Governors...The Indian Councils cannot turn out a Government, and cannot make a Govern-

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ment. The Indian Civil Service is the Government. It may accept amendments, it may withdraw a measure in face of criticism which it judges to be well founded, it may profit by the suggestions of non-official members, but it is master in its own house. Cabinet Councils, Government majorities, diplomatic agencies in the native states, administrative agencies in British India—all are provided by the Indian Civil Service, that wonderful bureaucracy recruited by a competitive examination in London, which is expected to turn out judges, revenue officers, heads of administrative departments, pro-consuls, legislators, political officers or diplomatists, and under the new regime, parliamentarians as well. " Such being the importance of the Indian Civil Service, admission into it has naturally been one of the principal objects aimed at by educated India.

The examination for appointment to the Indian Civil Service is at present held only in London. If Indians are to have a fair chance of entering it the examination should be held at some centre in India also. The importance of this question overshadows that of all others relating to the larger employment of Indians in positions which have been hitherto reserved in practice for Europeans. When, therefore, the Commission rejected the demand for simultaneous examinations and proposed a separate examination in India for a small number of posts, its recommendations lost more than half their interest and importance in the eyes of Indians. Wrong on this cardinal point, its proposals with regard to the other services, even if liberal in character, which is far from being the case, became a matter of minor importance.

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Suggestions were made, says the majority report, "though almost exclusively by the Indian witnesses", that the examination for entry into the Indian Civil Service

should be held simultaneously in India and in England. "Few, however," it adds, "pushed this suggestion to its logical conclusion. Some, for example, expressly proposed a British minimum from the outset, whilst many, who saw no necessity for imposing a minimum at the present juncture, admitted that a time might come when such would have to be established. In this uncertainty, will be found the main reason for rejecting this precise solution of the problem. For such an arrangement must, either, be accompanied by a fixed proportion between Indians and Europeans, or it must not; and in either case the results will be equally open to objection. In the former, the fundamental anomaly will be introduced, by which men, who pass lower in the examination will be preferred on racial grounds to those who have passed higher. In the latter, the maintenance of the British character of the administration will be made to depend on the chances of an examination, for it will never be practicable to start with no restrictions against statutory natives of India, and to impose them later when the educational advance of the country has produced its inevitable result. Again it is more than doubtful whether any system of simultaneous examinations would be good for Indian education." Indeed, later on it is stated that "the introduction into India of an examination fashioned on English lines for the purpose of bringing clever Indians into the Indian Civil Service is to be deprecated."

In view of the stress which the Commission lays on the maintenance of the "British character of the administration," it is necessary to analyse what that phrase signifies. If it is meant by this phrase that the administration of India is carried on in accordance with the methods and principles which prevail in England, nothing can be further from the truth. The spirit of the Indian

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administration is a virtual negation of the principles of freedom on which the government of England is based. The bureaucracy here usurps the functions of the legislator and the statesman, and flouts instead of following public opinion. The combination of judicial and executive powers in the same hands is another instance of the violation of British principles of justice. The lines on which the administration of land revenue is carried on is a further illustration of the same fact. All matters relating to land revenue have been withdrawn from the cognizance of civil courts. They can be decided only in revenue courts which are presided over by officers, who are directly responsible for the collection of land revenue, or their subordinates. The whole administration is thus modelled on despotic lines, and carried on by men who exhibit no desire to see the standards prevailing in the West enforced in India, and who shed their democratic eunthusiasm as soon as they set foot on Indian soil.

If, however, the fear, that the British character of the administration may be endangered by the presence of Indians, implies that they are lacking in administrative capacity, the accusation has no foundation in fact. Those who bring reckless charges of inefficiency and want of character against Indians as a class will do well to go through the cross-examination of Sir Herbert Carnduff, late judge of the Calcutta High Court, by Mr. Gokhale. He brought forward most of the stock objections to the employment of Indians in large numbers in the Civil Service, and advanced the failure of all but a small proportion of the Indian members of the Service to rise to high positions in the past as a proof that they had been weighed in the balance and found wanting. But when he was confronted with facts he was forced to admit that his aspersions were unfounded, and that Indians had shown

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themselves to be fully equal to their European colleagues in all the qualities needed to make succesful administrators, wherever opportunities of proving their worth had not been denied to them. Referring to the instances of Indian capacity cited by Mr. Gokhale, he said, "Those being the facts, they will alter my statement." Equally unwilling admissions were made by many other European witnesses, who acknowledged among other things that even political unrest, the existence of which was frequently urged as an unanswerable argument against the more extended employment of Indians, was less in districts under Indian officers. It is really impossible to deny administrative capacity to Indians with any regard for truth. They have served with distinction not only in the Indian Civil Service, but also in the Council of the Secretary of State for India, and the executive councils of the Government of India and the Local Governments, where their work has drawn warm encomiums from responsible authorities. They have shown in Mysore, Baroda, Travancore and many other Indian states what Indian talent can achieve when it is given a free field for its exercise. They have not contented themselves with merely organising the administration on a stable and efficient basis, but have introduced reforms which the inhabitants of British India have been asking for in vain. They have even set up representative institutions which are supposed to be foreign to the spirit of the Indian people and worked them with success. Had similar opportunities been given to them in British India who can doubt that they would have proved equally successful ?

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employed to bolster up their case, shows to what desperate straits the opponents of simultaneous examinations have been reduced. The syllabus for the Indian Civil Service examination is based on the courses of study pursued at Oxford and Cambridge, and the examination itself is designed to test the abilities of candidates who have received "the most finished, the most liberal education" Great Britain can afford. It is difficult to understand how the interests of education in this country will suffer by the introduction of such an examination. On the contrary, as Sir Pherozeshah Mehta said, it will be the best means of raising the standard of education and bringing it on a level with that prevailing at Oxford and Cambridge.

Not content with refusing to allow Indians to compete on equal terms with British-born subjects, the Commission makes proposals which will make it practically impossible for them to enter the Civil Service by the door of the competitive examination in London. At present the age-limits for this examination are 22–24, and successful candidates are required to go through a year's probation in England. Their age on arrival in India is, therefore, between 23 and 25. The Commission argues on a priori grounds that a man who arrives in India when he is 25 years old is more likely to get married and to have his tastes and aptitudes fixed than one who is younger, and who may, therefore, be expected to adapt himself to his surroundings more easily. It further considers the present age-limits faulty on the ground that they allow of one year's probation only, and that a man cannot act as a collector at present before he is 32 or 33 and in some cases 35. "Again", it says, it "is important, that if the Indian Civil Service is to be kept efficient, an officer should attain a position of responsibility at an early age ; for example that he should be

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acting as a collector by the time he has reached the age of 30." It recommends therefore that the age-limits should be lowered to 17–19, and the period of probation lengthened to three years. It should be spent at a university and the probationers should be paid an allowance of £ 150 a year. The age is to be reckoned from the 1st of January, so that the actual ages of the candidates at the time of the examination, which takes place in the first week of August, will be between 17½–19½. In order to guard against cramming it is proposed that every candidate should be required to furnish a certificate from the headmaster of a secondary school, recognized by the Civil Service Commissioners, that he had attended the school continuously for three years up to within six months of the examination, or, if he had left the school more than six months ago, that the school course had been followed by a year's attendance at a university. "This is, we recognize, an innovation," say the Commissioners, "but the step is called for."

The decision to reduce the age-limits was arrived at against the weight of evidence. It met with strong opposition from Indian witnesses. A respectable body of European witnesses in India also viewed it with disfavour. Out of 82 European witnesses who gave evidence regarding the I. C. S., twenty were silent on the subject, five gave doubtful answers and thirty-seven were definitely against the Commission's proposal. Only twenty were in favour of reducing the age-limits to 17–19 or 18–20. In England out of the twenty-two witnesses examined on the point no less than nineteen expressed themselves against it. Of these, with the exception of one witness, no one suggested lower age limits than 20–22. The representatives of all the universities, except the London university, were opposed to the age-

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limits proposed by the Commission. Oxford and Cambridge were willing to accept the lower age-limits if the Government considered them necessary from an administrative point of view, but their own opinion was decidedly against it. Dr. Warren, President of the Magdalen College, Oxford, stated that to select candidates at the school-leaving age would be in the nature of a lottery, and both he and Professor Richard Lodge of the Edinburgh University thought that the average of the candidates chosen during 1878–91, when the age-limits were 17–19, was inferior to that of the candidates chosen subsequently. The committee of the Hebdomadal Council, Oxford, wrote to the Commission that "the present system is better than any likely to be devised". Mr. Stanley Leathes, who was examined on behalf of the Civil Service Commissioners, when asked by Sir M. B. Chaubal for the reasons which led to the raising of the age-limits in 1892, said that "the main idea was the notion of getting the completed product of education.....The idea was that you ought to carry on education in a normal way up to the time that it is naturally completed and select people at that point, and that you would thereby probably get the best men." He was personally in favour of retaining the present limits, but did not object to their reduction as he assumed that such a course was necessary in the interests of Indian administration. "I have had a good deal of evidence to that effect," he said, "I have seen the letters of the Government of India." Until these letters are published it is impossible for the public to criticise the views of the Government of India, but no facts were placed before the Commission which could prove in the slightest degree that men selected at the higher age-limits now in force have proved inefficient because of the age

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The Scottish universities were specially opposed to the lower age-limits proposed by the Commission. The university of Edinburgh did not want any change unless it was "conclusively proved that the interests and the opinion of India demanded such a change." Glasgow and St. Andrews also were strongly in favour of the existing system. Aberdeen alone suggested that the age-limits might be reduced to 20–22, if it was necessary to alter them. It appears now that the university of St. Andrews has addressed a memorial to the Secretary of State for India protesting against the age-limits recommended by the Commission, which have been criticised by other responsible authorities also. *

The opposition of those who deprecated lowering the age-limits was based on the highest grounds. Members of the Indian Civil Service discharge functions which require intellectual and administrative qualities of no mean order for their efficient performance. In fact, from the start, a civilian is placed in a position of considerable influence and authority. It is highly desirable, therefore, that he should receive a high degree of education and should not commence his career at an age when his ideas are not formed, and when his faculties have not reached their fullest development. If candidates are selected at the age of 17 or 18, the competitive test will have to be reduced to the standard of a schoolboy examination, such as the one in force for recruits for the Indian Police service or for the Second Division clerkships in England, which are very subordinate positions, and the initial and minimum salaries of which are £ 70 and £ 300 respectively. The selection will thus be a leap in the dark.

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The appointment of raw youths to responsible offices will neither be beneficial to them personally nor conduce to the efficiency of the administration. Unchecked power, such as European officers enjoy in India, is always demoralising, but it may have a disastrons effect on immature minds. Positions below the headships of districts are not of minor importance as the Commission seems to imagine. In no self-governing country will a man of twenty-five be entrusted with the duties attaching to them, and allowed to develop his capacities at the expense of the people committed to his charge. Nor is it at all a disadvantage that a Civilian cannot become a district officer before he is 32 or 33, unless the question is looked at solely from the point of view of the salaries and promotions of the members of the Indian Civil Service. In fact, as Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim says, the promotion is too rapid at present, and no one should be allowed to occupy so high a position permanently before he is about forty.

Weighty as the objections to the lowering of age-limits are on general grounds, they become doubly so when its effect on the chances of success of Indian candidates is taken into consideration. Between 1892 and 1912, when the age-limits were 21–23 or 22–24, 5.6 p. c. of the successful candidates were Indians, while between 1878 and 1891 when the minimum and maximum limits of age were 17 and 19 the corresponding percentage was only 2·5. Lowering the age thus handicaps Indians seriously, but the recommendation of the Commission for reducing it, coupled as it is with the condition that attendance for three years at a secondary school, recognized by the Civil Service Commissions, should be made compulsory for all candidates, will make their position much worse than it was between 1878 and 1891. It is true that the Civil Service Commissioners are

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to be given power to dispense with this condition, at their discretion, in the case of candidates belonging to India or the colonies, but it is unlikely that Indians will be exempted from the operation of this rule except rarely and for special reasons. The reduction of age-limits would, in any case, have reduced the proportion of successful Indians, but compulsory attendance at a secondary school for three years will effectually prevent them even from presenting themselves for the examination, for very few people will be willing to take the risk involved in sending their children to a strange country at the tender age of 13 or 14. The Commission itself admits that "it seems doubtful if any appreciable number of Indian parents would be willing to part with their children at so early an age, and still more doubtful whether it would be well for them to do so if they would." And with this knowledge, it proposes a scheme which will operate as a bar to the success of Indian youths, unless their parents are willing to expose them to influences which it is not inclined to regard as wholesome. The scheme is an iniquitous device to keep Indians out. Anglo-India has been longing for years to close the London channel of admission into the civil service to Indians, and the Commission has shown it how it can gratify its cherished desire without laying itself open to the charge of violating solemn pledges given by Parliament and the Crown. And unless educated India opposes it with vigour and unanimity, the proposal may soon be an accomplished fact, for it appears from the evidence of Mr. Stanley Leathes that the Government of India has already made up its mind on the subject.

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nation virtually cancelled, because tho Commission proposes that recruitment for a proportion of the Civil Service posts should take place anunally in India. It recommends that for the present provision should be made for the appointment of statutory natives of India to 25 p. c. of the superior posts, which are 755 in number. Thus 189 posts have to be recruited for in India. Of these 41 are to be filled by promotion from the provincial civil service and 40 are to be recruited for from the bar. Direct recruitment is to take place for the remaining 108 posts. On the basis of existing calculations this will allow of a recruitment of nine officers annually. The Commission suggests that seven posts should be thrown open to competition among candidates nominated by the Local Governments on the recommendations of committees, appointed for the areas served by the various universities, who would advise the Local Governments after scrutinising the educational record of the would be candidates and taking into account "their suitability for Government service from the point of view of physique and character." Twenty candidates should be nominated from each university area, and if new universities are created their claims also should be taken into consideration. The age of the candidates should not be less than 20 and more than 22 at the time of the examination. For the remaining two posts two candidates, to be termed "King Emperor's cadets," "should be nominated each year by the Secretary of State, on the advice of the Government of India, from among graduates of the various universities and of an age similar to that of the competitors at the examination." This provision is intended to give representation to communities which may not fare well in the competitive examination, and the Commission proposes that "members of the domiciled community" might also benefit under it! The cadets

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and the candidates chosen by means of the competitive examination are to be required to pass their period of probation in England and receive the same training as candidates selected in England.

The first thing that should be noticed here is that just as the age-limits were lowered when Indians came to be appointed in India under the rules of 1879, so does the Commission, while making provision for the recruitment of Indians in India, take away from us, in reality though not in name, the right of appearing at the London examination. The second thing that deserves our attention is the inadequate proportion of superior posts allotted to Indians. As already stated 189 superior posts are to be set apart for them, of which 81 will be recruited for from the provincial civil service and the bar, thus leaving 108 posts to be filled by directly recruited officers. According to official calculations 194·5 officers are required to man 100 superior posts. Proceeding on this basis we find that 108 posts will necessitate a total recruitment of 210 officers. Thus, when all the posts set apart for Indians come to be occupied by them, in the course of a generation, there will be 291 Indians in the Indian Civil Service, the actual strength of which was 1411, when the Commission reported. The proportion of Indians in the service will, therefore, be less than 21 p. c. Roughly speaking, 80 p. c. of the posts will still continue to be in the hands of Englishmen.

When under the statute of 1870 rules for the admission of Indians into the Indian Civil Service were framed in 1879, one-sixth of the annual recruitment was promised to them. According to the calculations then made the average recruitment would have been 7·56 a year. Taking 35 years as the maximum period of official life, if the rules of 1879 had remained in force, there would have been 265 Indians in the Civil Service

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in 1914. Allowing for decrement, we may say that the number would have been about 250. The actual number would probably have been higher as the cadre of the Civil Service has increased substantially since those days. Taking these facts into consideration one sees that the proportion recommended by the Commission represents hardly any advance on the share which was promised to us in 1879, and which we would have been enjoying but for the set-back caused by the recommendations of the Commission of 1886. It was the duty of the Commission, as Sir M. B. Chaubal says, in making its proposals not only to give us back what was forcibly snatched away from us in 1886, but to take into account "the progress that India has made since 1886 and such further progress as she may reasonably be expected to make during the next 30 years, for it will take fully that time to work up the proportion recommended." But it does not take even the progress already made into consideration. It dismisses the promise made in 1879 with the remark that although it was hoped then that "it would be possible to work up to one-sixth, the true comparison is with what has actually been achieved in this respect." Thus one wrong is made to justify another. But the Commission is gravely mistaken if it thinks that the meagre proportion recommended by it would give satisfaction to educated India. Those who are aspiring to acquire a substantial control over the management of their internal affairs immediately after the war, will reject the crumbs offered to them by the Commission with contempt. The recruitment of the entire Civil Service in India is the only permanent solution of the question, which has been dealt with so unsatisfactorily by the Commission, but the introduction of simultaneous examinations will give general satisfaction and settle the question for an appreciable

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length of time. But failing this solution, we ought to insist on 50 p. c. of the posts being recruited for in India. This is the minimum that should be conceded. Nothing less than this will satisfy the exigencies of the situation.

As for the methods proposed for filling the posts to be recruited for in India, there is no reason why any post should be reserved for nomination. The principle is vicious and ought not to be accepted. There is still less reason for allowing the domiciled community to be treated with special favour. Their representative on the Commission harped incessantly on their British ancestry, and their capacity to "revert to the British type of character" under favourable conditions. If they claim to be Europeans, they have no right to participate in benefits which are meant for Indians. As regards the competitive examination, would be candidates should be required to produce formal certificates of good conduct as in England, but no scrutiny should be made of their educational record, nor should they be prevented from appearing at the examination on medical grounds. Medical examination by competent professional men should come after the examination. The age-limits for examination should be 21-23, as Indian students cannot graduate before 20. Those who graduate a year later, and they will probably be the majority, should be given two chances of appearing at the examination.

RECRUITMENT OF JUDICIARY.

The Indian Civil Service is recruited primarily for the discharge of executive duties. The Civilian is not fitted by training for the performance of judicial work. From the commencement of his service upto the time he is appointed to a judicial post his work lies entirely in the executive line, and to the day

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of his appointment he does not know whether he will be selected to act as a judicial or an executive officer. The judicial service is regarded as an inferior service and it was stated before the Commission by several witnesses, *e. g.* the U. P. Government and Sir Ralph Benson, late civilian judge of the Madras High Court, that men had been transferred to the judicial branch who had proved failures in the executive branch. In the opinion of competent authorities the civilian judge's knowledge of law leaves much to be desired, and his meagre acquaintance with the language of the people places him at a disadvantage in appreciating evidence. His imperfect equipment, always an obstacle to the proper administration of justice, is regarded in these days, when judges have to deal with trained and competent lawyers, as a source of political danger. In a despatch to the Secretary of State dated, 1907, passages from which are quoted by Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim, the Government of India says, "It would be difficult to exaggerate the political dangers of the present situation or the importance of effecting a material improvement in the capacity, training and status of the Indian Civil Service Judges. It is impossible at any rate in the advanced provinces to justify a system under which a gentleman who has no knowledge of civil law and who has never been inside a civil court in his life can be and often is at one step promoted to be a judge of appeal in civil cases, and to hear appeals from subordinate judges who are trained lawyers with years of legal experience. On public grounds it is imperative that drastic steps should be taken to remove this blot on our administration." Every Local Government admitted before the Commission that Civilian Judges were very imperfectly equipped for their work. Various proposals were put forward by European witnesses in order to

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remedy this glaring defect, but in essence there was no difference between them. It was suggested that before being transferred to the judicial line, officers should be required to proceed to England on study leave for varying periods in order to read in chambers or to qualify themselves for the bar, and that their fees should be defrayed out of the revenues of India. This proposal is open to the obvious objection that it throws a needless burden on Indian revenues and even then does not provide for a satisfactory training. If the judiciary were wholly or partly recruited from among trained lawyers, the state could obtain the services of highly competent men without having to pay for their training. According to the evidence received by the Commission, there should be no difficulty in recruiting the judiciary in this manner. Sir Alexander Cardew and the Government of the United Provinces were in favour of making over half the district and sessions judgeships to Indians. Sir Arnold White, Chief Justice of the Madras High Court, expressed the same opinion. "I should have no objection," he said, "to a system under which one-half of the District and Sessions Judges were appointed from the Civil Service and the remainder from the bar and the Provincial Service." The evidence of these witnesses proves that there is no administrative reason against the course advocated. Nor would there be any difficulty in securing the services of competent lawyers. Asked how many barristers in Bengal were fit in his opinion for district judgeships, Sir S. P. Sinha said, "I could name a dozen men who would do very well as District Judges," and added that many men equally qualified would be found among the vakils also. Sir Herbert Carnduff, late Civilian Judge of the Calcutta High Court, agreed with Sir S. P. Sinha and admitted that the

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men selected from the bar would not be lacking in administrative efficiency.

Some Indian witnesses, among whom were Mr. Govindaraghava Iyer and Mr. Justice Seshagiri Iyer, suggested that the higher judicial posts should be filled entirely by lawyers and members of the provincial judicial service, who are graduates in law with at least three years practice at the bar. Others, for instance Pundit Madan Mohan Malaviya and Mr. Bhupendra Nath Basu, suggested that the judicial service should be recruited by means of a competitive examination separate from that for the I. C. S. Yet others, and among these were Sir Pherozeshah Mehta and Sir Sunderlal, advocated that the judiciary should be recruited in equal proportions from the I. C. S., the Provincial Service and the bar. The first proposal would be in consonance with English practice to a large extent, and it would also be fair to the provincial judicial service which is recruited from men who have graduated in law and whose competence appears to be admitted on all hands. It will be completely in accord with public opinion and will also give relief to Indian finances. A Civilian before being appointed to a superior post has to serve for eight years in comparatively junior positions, and during this period he receives an average salary of Rs. 862 per month. The average salary of officers of the provincial judicial service, on the other hand, is only Rs. 414, or half that of an Indian Civilian. There are at present 153 higher judicial posts in the Indian Civil Service, and the cost, says Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim, of training officers for these posts amounts to about Rs. 8 lacs annually. If the judiciary were entirely separated from the I. C. S., the posts reserved for training junior officers will naturally come to be occupied by Provincial service men, which should result in a saving of

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CADRE OF I. C. S.

According to the Public Service Commission of 1886, including Burma the number of superior and inferior appointments occupied by members of the Indian Civil Service in 1886 was 765. Taking into account the posts occupied by non-civilians, the number of charges in the Indian Civil Service would probably have been about 800, which, according to the basis of calculations adopted at the time, would have included about 550 superior appointments. The recommendations of the Commission of 1886 ought to have led to an appreciable reduction of the cadre, but during the intervening quarter of a century it has increased considerably. In 1893, 41 superior and 52 inferior posts were listed as open to the members of the Provincial service. The Indian Civil Service should have had to be recruited, therefore, for 509 superior posts in 1893 unless their number had been added to in the meanwhile, and its strength should have been about 975. But in 1914, excluding 61 listed posts, the number of superior appointments was 694 and the sanctioned strength of the service stood at 1350. The strength has increased still further since the report was signed. According to the latest Civil List for India it was 1406 on the 1st April, 1917, exclusive of 64 listed appointments and eight appointments held by statutory civilians and others. The share of Burma in the figures for 1914 amounts to 88 and 171 respectively. Excluding it we find that during the last twenty or twenty-five years, the number of superior posts has grown from 509 to 606 or by about 100, and the number of officers employed from 975 to 1179 or by about 200. In order to be

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strictly accurate, the figures for Berar which was leased to the British Government in October, 1902, should also be eliminated, but their inclusion cannot affect the result materially. Considering the average emoluments of members of the Indian Civil Service the large increase that has taken place in its cadre must impose a heavy burden on Indian revenues. Under these circumstances, one would think that steps should be taken to check the growth of the cadre and even to reduce it if possible. But the rate at which the establishment is growing does not satisfy the Commission, which recommends that further additions should be made to it. It considers that the officers of the Civil Service are overburdened with work and suggests the division of large districts and the employment of more officers in order to grapple with this evil. Both Sir M. B. Chaubal and Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim condemn this recommendation. "Except for certain vague and wide statements" says the latter, "on the part of a few officials, particularly in the departments for which appointments are made in England, there is not a shred of evidence which would justify us in giving the lead to the authorities to increase the number of officers."

While no increase in the cadre of the Civil Service is called for, several considerations demand that it should be curtailed. The recruitment for the service is based on the number of superior appointments. As already pointed out above, including leave and training reserves etc., a strength of 194·5 is required for every 100 such posts. Thus, roughly speaking, every post requires two men. The definition of a superior post, therefore, becomes a matter of great importance. The Civil Service has often been called a corp d'elite and it is recruited in order to provide officers for posts of independent respon-

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Apart from the untenability of the definition of a superior post adopted by Government, there are other grave objections to the inclusion in the cadre of the Civil Service of a large number of posts requiring qualifications which a civil servant has no opportunity of acquiring at any stage in his career. Civilians should be recruited only for posts the duties of which cannot be efficiently discharged without the training which service under the state alone can provide. As already discussed, judicial posts do not fall under this category, and it has been recommended, therefore, that they should be excluded from the cadre of the Indian Civil Service. But even if a certain proportion of district and sessions judges are appointed from the ranks of the Indian Civil Service, it should not be obligatory to appoint

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There are a number of miscellaneous departments the heads of which are chosen from the Civil Service. The Commission recommends that this practice should be discontinued in the case of the Department of Agriculture, and that the posts of Inspectors-General of Police should no longer be borne on the cadre of the Civil Service. In regard, however, to the departments of salt (Northern India), salt and excise, customs, registration, etc. it approves of the existing arrangements. It recommends, further, that rural commissionerships should be created to coordinate the activities of departments like agriculture, civil veterinary and co-operative credit, whose task is to promote the well-being of the masses, and that rural commissioners should be chosen from among Civilians. Both Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim and Sir M. B. Chaubal advocate that the principle laid down in respect of the departments of agriculture and police should be followed in other departments also, and strongly oppose the creation of rural commissionerships,

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which will serve no purpose except that of providing comfortable berths for the members of the Civil Service.

SALARIES, PENSIONS AND ALLOWANCES.

This subject has already been discussed at length. A brief reference to it is all that is needed here.

The Commission recommends the introduction of an incremental in place of the present graded system to remove blocks in promotion, and the raising of the salaries of junior officers so as to bring them on a line with the salaries of the civilian officers of the Political Department, in regard to which it decided at the very outset not to make any enquiries. These recommendations, if carried out, will raise the average pay of a Civilian, which is already inordinately high, from Rs. 1587 to Rs. 1653 per month, and involve an expenditure of no less than 11 lacs every year. There is no reason why the state should be saddled with this expenditure. If the Government of India is giving unjustifiably high salaries to the officers of the Political Department, why should they be adopted as a standard for other departments? As for blocks in promotion, they are not improbably due to over recruitment. The Commission says that the present rate of recruitment stands in need of revision as it is perhaps too high, and Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim endorses this opinion.

Every Civil Servant who has been in the Civil Service for 25 years or more, and who has rendered 21 years' active service, is entitled on resignation to an annuity of £1,000. Towards this annuity he contributes 4 p. c. of his salary, which according to official calculations accounts for a quarter of the annuity. The pension paid by the state thus amounts to £750. The Commission recommends that the 4 p. c. contribution should

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be abolished and the entire pension of £ 1,000 provided by the state. The cost of this proposal amounts to 9 lacs a year. When the annuity system was started it was contemplated that the state would contribute £ 500 a year, and that the other half would be contributed by the service. "But with the fall in the rate of exchange and in the rate of interest," says Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim, "the 4 p. c. contribution by the officers is now equivalent to an annuity of £ 250, so that the state is at present paying the deficit of £ 250 per annum in addition to the £ 500 which it had originally undertaken to pay." The state is thus paying £ 250 per annum more than what had been stipulated for originally. Besides, leave and and furlough rules have been considerably modified in the past so as to enable Civilians to obtain leave more easily and on better terms, as is shown by the growth of charges due to absentee and furlough allowances. Add to this that invalid pensions were increased substantially in 1905, that the Civil Service enjoys the benefit of a Family Pension Fund, to which the state makes a contribution, and that the cost of its management, which amounts to over 6 lacs will now be borne by the Indian exchequer. When all these manifold pecuniary benefits are taken into consideration, one may perhaps say without exaggeration that the Indian Civil Service is the most highly paid service in the world. There is no reason, therefore, why any further concessions should be granted to it, unless India is to be regarded as its private domain. Mr. Fisher and Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, although of opinion that contributions should cease after the completion of the twenty-fifth year of service, take substantially the same view. "The existing arrangements with regard to pension in this service", they say, "are generally regarded as satisfactory by young men when they are considering an Indian

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career, and it must be remembered that if effect is given to the recommendations of this report, Indian Civil Servants will in future enter the service earlier, retire from the service earlier, and draw their pensions for a longer period."

PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICE.

When the Public Service Commission of 1886 began its enquiries, the system of examination, in some form or other, for the recruitment of a portion of the executive branch of the Provincial civil service had been in force in Bengal and the Punjab for some years. In consequence of its recommendation that for selecting officers of the Provincial service "a system of open competition should be adopted wherever the Government of India thinks it not inexpedient," this method was adopted in 1893 in Madras and in 1898 in the United Provinces. The results of this system gave satisfaction to the public. Even the Local Governments which declared themselves against the institution of competitive tests or their further extension, in 1913, admitted that the products of this system had produced some very capable men and had a high reputation for honesty. Nevertheless, during the administration of Lord Curzon, to whom we owe many of the blessings of bureaucratic rule, this method was abolished everywhere except in the Punjab. It came to an end in Bengal and Madras in 1905 and in the United Provinces in 1903. "In 1901," said Mr. Burn on behalf of the Government of the United Provinces, "an educational conference was held at Simla, which recommended the abolition of competitive examinations as the qualifying test for the higher appointments. The view taken by the Government of India was that the principle of competition for Government posts was unknown in India till a few years before and did not spring from the tra-

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ditions of the people ; and that the exercise of legitimate patronage was an important function of Government which ought not to be committed to the chances of the the examination room." Nomination became the sole method of recruitment after 1905 in every province except the Punjab, where a competitive examination among nominated candidates still takes place for two posts annually and has proved an unqualified success. The Government of the Punjab informed the Commission that selection from among young men of good families had proved the least satisfactory of all the methods in force, and that "recruitment by competitive examination among nominated candidates has on the whole proved to be a very good method, the majority of the men being intellectually and otherwise superior to a large proportion of those promoted from the subordinate and other services, and on the whole more honest." If competitive examinations had been continued in other provinces, the results would undoubtedly have been equally satisfactory, and, as mentioned above, while they were in vogue they did give immense satisfaction to the public. Nomination should be replaced, therefore, by examination, at least 75 per cent. of the posts in the Provincial Executive service being thrown open to competition.

When the Commission submitted its report the number of listed appointments was 61. It is now 64. If its proposals are accepted this number will be reduced to 41. This will be regarded as unfortunate by all who are desirous of improving the standard of the provincial service by attracting to it men of a higher stamp. To accomplish this purpose the number of posts open to men belonging to the provincial service should be increased and not curtailed. The service contains a number of men who are well qualified to occupy responsible positions. If the appointment of officers of the provincial ser-

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vice to higher posts has not been uniformly successful in the past, it may be because promotion has often been delayed till the officers were past the period of their full vigour. Under the proposals of the Commission there will be no such risk, as men will be promoted while in the prime of life. There should be no hesitation, therefore, in increasing the number of Civil Service appointments which should be reserved for them. For the judicial branch it has been recommended that a substantial proportion of the higher judicial posts should be filled from its officers. As regards the executive branch, one-fourth of the collectorships should be reserved for it if 50 per cent of the superior posts in the Indian Civil Service are recruited for in India. The Commission of 1886 recommended that one commissionership, one membership and one of the secretaryships (where there are more than one) of the Board of Revenue, in every province where these or corresponding posts existed, and under-secretary ships to the several Governments in India should be set apart for the provincial service. This recommendation should be give n effect to, and a few secretaryships to the various governments should also be open to members of both the branches of the provincial service. Further, provincial service men when appointed to a post rdinarily reserved for Civil Servants should become full members of the Indian Civil Service.

The Commission recommends that provincial service men should receive Rs. 150 or Rs. 200 a month while on probation, and that thereafter their salaries should be regulated in accordance with the scale Rs. 250–40/3–450–50/3 –500 for the executive branch, and Rs. 300—40/3—500 for the judicial branch. Beyond this there should be grades of Rs. 600—40—800 for both the branches with further selection grades of Rs. 1,000 a month for 2 p.c. of the service. Thus, including the period of probation, it will take

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about 20 years in the executive line and 17 or 18 years in the judicial line to reach the Rs. 500 grade. At present, it appears, at least in the United Provinces and the Punjab, that from 12 to 15 years are required to reach this position. The Commission's proposals, therefore, make the prospects of the comparatively ill-paid and hard-worked officers of the provincial services much worse than before. They will press with special severity on judicial officers who are generally five years older than their executive colleagues when they get permanent appointments. They should not, therefore, be given effect to. If the duty of developing facilities for scientific and technical education and raising the salaries of the members of the subordinate services makes it impossible to improve the prospects of the officers of the provincial service, their lot should not be made harder at any rate.

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Chapter VII.

SEPARATION OF JUDICIAL AND EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS.

The question of the separation of judicial and executive functions has greatly exercised the public mind during the last thirty years. In the interests of an impartial administration of justice it is essential that the agency which is entrusted with the prevention and detection of crime should not possess the power to award punishment. But the combination of judicial and executive functions in the person of the District Magistrate and Collector violates this elementary principle of justice. The District Magistrate is not only the head of the police, and, as such, responsible for the preservation of the peace and the prosecution of those who commit offences against the law, but also controls the subordinate magistracy which tries criminal cases, can transfer cases, decide a certain class of appeals, and bind over people under the summary sections of the Cr. P. C. He is also responsible for the administration of the revenue, forest and excise laws. In particular, he is a court of appeal in regard to offences against the revenue laws, although as the Commission says, he is "the direct revenue superior of the prosecutor in the suit." As has been well said, he unites in himself the functions of the constable, prosecutor and judge. The evil does not stop here, however. It extends to a certain extent to the subordinate magistracy, the deputy collectors and tahsildars, also. The system has inevitably led to grave abuses, and demands for its reform have been made insistently during the last quarter of a century.

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The union of magistrate, collector and judge was first effected by Lord Cornwallis, under instructions from the Court of Directors in 1787. Experience, however, having convinced Lord Cornwallis of the unsoundness of the principle underlying the union, the collector was deprived of all judicial powers in 1793. The year 1821 saw a return to the old arrangement, which was again superseded by the juster system of 1793 in 1837 and the following eight years. A year after the mutiny, collectors were once more invested with judicial powers as a temporary measure. In 1860 a commission, consisting of men of ripe experience from all the provinces, was appointed by the Government to enquire into the organisation of the police, which condemned the principle of allowing an officer, concerned with the apprehension of offenders and collection of evidence, to try cases in which he is directly interested in securing convictions, but recommended the retention of judicial powers by collectors as a matter of temporary expediency. This recommendation was embodied in Act V of 1861, but during its passage through the Legislative Council Sir Bartle Frere, who was in charge of the measure, explained that the principle of depriving the collector of judicial powers had not been acted upon fully as it was opposed to "prejudices of long standing," and expressed the hope that it would gain complete recognition at no distant date. An opportunity for carrying the reform to its legitimate conclusion presented itself when the second code of Criminal Procedure was passed in 1872, but false and exaggerated notions of the prestige and dignity of the district officer prevented its realisation. "The maintenance of the position of the District Officers," said Sir James Stephen, who was then Law Member of the Viceroy's Council, "is essential to the maintenance of British rule in India and.....any diminution of their influence

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and authority over the natives would be dearly purchased even by an improvement in the administration of justice."

The Congress has, of course, been protesting against this iniquitous principle since its birth, and eminent Indians as well as Europeans have expressed themselves strongly against the continuance of the present system, the late Mr. Manmohan Ghose being one of the most prominent workers in the cause of the separation of judicial and executive functions. In 1893 the principle received the approval of the Secretary of State for India who, however, expressed his inability to carry it out in view of the large expenditure it would involve. Soon after this declaration by Lord Kimberley, Mr. Romesh Chandra Dutt published a scheme for effecting the separation of judicial and executive powers, which, he claimed, would not impose a heavy financial burden on the state. The essence of his scheme was that the District Officer "should be employed purely on executive and revenue work" and should have such a number of deputy collectors under him as may be necessary for the performance of this work. The remaining deputy collectors were to be employed on purely judicial work and to be placed under the District and Sessions Judge. The support which the proposal received from Sir Richard Garth, retired Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court, and Mr. Reynolds, who had been Secretary to the Government of Bengal, showed that both judicial and executive authorities considered it perfectly feasible. In 1899 a memorial signed by Lord Hobhouse, who had been Law Member of the Viceroy's Council, Sir Richard Garth and Sir Richard Couch, retired Chief Justices of the Calcutta High Court; Sir William Wedderburn and others was submitted to the Secretary of State for India, in which the memorialists, after giving

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a history of the question and pointing out the injustice of the existing system, prayed that the functions of a criminal judge should no longer be exercised by the Collector. These efforts brought forth no results at the time, but it seemed in 1908 that the Government, yielding to public opinion, had at last decided to introduce the reform for which it had asked in vain so long. On the 25th of March, 1908, Sir Harvey Adamson announced in the Imperial Legislative Council that the Government of India had decided to introduce it tentatively into Bengal. The abuses of the present system have been so well described by him that no apology is needed for quoting from his speech at length. "The faults of the system," he observed, "are not to be gauged by instances of gross judicial scandals.....The exercise of control over the subordinate Magistrates by whom the great bulk of criminal cases are tried is the point where the present system is defective. I fully believe that subordinate Magistrates rarely do an injustice wittingly. But the inevitable result of the present system is that criminal trials, affecting the general peace of the district, are not always conducted in the atmosphere of cool impartiality which should pervade a court of justice. Nor does this completely define the evil which is not so much in what is done, as in what may be suspected to be done, for it is not enough that the administration of justice may be pure; it can never be the bedrock of our rule unless it is above suspicion." And referring to the cost involved in carrying out the separation of judicial and executive functions he said, "The experiment may be a costly one, but we think that the object is worthy." He then outlined the scheme which was to be given a trial in Bengal, and the principle of which was that "the trial of offences and the control of Magistrates who try them

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The hopes raised in 1908 have been frustrated. So far as the public is aware nothing has been done to carry out the undertaking given by Sir Harvey Adamson on behalf of the Government of India. Mr. Bhupendra Nath Basu was asked by Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim if Sir Harvey Adamson's scheme had been put into operation in Bengal. "No," he replied, "it was supposed to be put into operation in two districts I know of but in quite a different form; that is to say, they have put in another Magistrate to look after the magisterial work; unfortunately owing to the state of the province at the time one Magistrate became practically the political head of the district and another was discharging the actual duties of a Magistrate, and consequently the experiment as Sir Harvey Adamson wanted it, has not been tried at all in the sense of dividing the functions from the very start and putting one set of officers under separate control altogether."

When opinion was invited on this subject by the Commission, it excited keen interest among Indians, who gave the proposal for separating judicial and executive functions their strong and almost unanimous support. Needless to say that it was opposed with equal strength and unanimity by Anglo-Indian witnesses on grounds which have been stated in an earlier chapter. At a later stage, however, the Commission decided that this question was not one of training but of functions, and consequently fell outside the terms of their reference. This view has not been accepted by Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim, who thinks that the Commission was not precluded from drawing the attention of the authorities to problems affecting the efficiency of the Civil Service. Considering that the Commission was

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Chapter VIII.

POLICE.

Before 1893 the higher grades of the Police Service were recruited by means of nomination. The Commission of 1886 condemned this method as unsatisfactory. "The system," it wrote, "naturally supplies youths who have failed to succeed in examinations held in England, and who come to India in the hope of securing a nomination to the Police by influence brought to bear on the nominating authority." While some of the officers selected had turned out to be excellent, "others on the contrary have taken years to become fairly efficient and in some extreme cases have never become efficient at all." The system was abandoned, accordingly, and replaced in 1894 by a competitive examination in England. A few appointments were also made in India by means of combined examination and nomination. This mode of appointment also failed to yield officers of the proper type. "The charges made against them," observed the Police Commission of 1902, "are that they are often not well educated or intelligent men, that their training is defective, that their knowledge of the vernacular is not such as to enable them to have free intercourse with the people...that they are too much in the hands of their subordinates, that their views are too narrow and their sense of responsibility too weak to allow them to pay due regard to complaints against their subordinates...or to take due notice of misconduct....The Commission are of opinion that there is a great deal of truth in these complaints." In consequence of this expression of opinion the prevailing system was modified, the most

Chapter VIII.

POLICE.

Before 1893 the higher grades of the Police Service were recruited by means of nomination. The Commission of 1886 condemned this method as unsatisfactory. "The system," it wrote, "naturally supplies youths who have failed to succeed in examinations held in England, and who come to India in the hope of securing a nomination to the Police by influence brought to bear on the nominating authority." While some of the officers selected had turned out to be excellent, "others on the contrary have taken years to become fairly efficient and in some extreme cases have never become efficient at all." The system was abandoned, accordingly, and replaced in 1894 by a competitive examination in England. A few appointments were also made in India by means of combined examination and nomination. This mode of appointment also failed to yield officers of the proper type. "The charges made against them," observed the Police Commission of 1902, "are that they are often not well educated or intelligent men, that their training is defective, that their knowledge of the vernacular is not such as to enable them to have free intercourse with the people...that they are too much in the hands of their subordinates, that their views are too narrow and their sense of responsibility too weak to allow them to pay due regard to complaints against their subordinates...or to take due notice of misconduct....The Commission are of opinion that there is a great deal of truth in these complaints." In consequence of this expression of opinion the prevailing system was modified, the most

important change being the introduction of a period of probation in India after the examination in England. Recruits are now selected by means of an open competitive examination held in London, Edinburgh and Dublin, among candidates whose age is not below 19 and above 21, and power has been reserved to the Governor-General in Council to appoint Anglo-Indians in India assistant superintendents in exceptional cases on the recommendations of Local Governments. Candidates for the examination in the United Kingdom are required to be "British subjects of *European descent*." No one who is not a pure European is allowed to sit for the examination. If not justice, at any rate the knowledge that Europeans had proved a failure in the past ought to have induced the Government to keep the examination open to Indians. But disregarding parliamentary and royal pledges and the verdict of experience it has closed the British channel of entry to the people of this country.

In spite of its palpable injustice, the maintenance of the present system was strongly urged on the Commission by Anglo-Indian opinion. Every Local Government thought that it would be undesirable in the highest degree to remove the restrictions against Indians, for, in the words of the Government of the United Provinces, "the severity of the examination is not such as to afford a guarantee that not more than a reasonable number of Indian candidates would be successful." The evidence given by European witnesses was of the same tenor. They were unanimously opposed to the admission of Indians into the service by the door of the examination in Great Britain. The Inspectors-General of Bengal, Bombay, Madras, and Bihar and Orissa repeated almost in identical language that so far as recruitment in Great Britain was concerned the "colour bar"

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should be retained. The Inspector-General of the Punjab Police would not admit Indians, even if qualified, into the superior grades, on account of the peculiar conditions prevailing in the Punjab, and had the hardihood to say that he had never heard any criticisms against the rule limiting competition to candidates of pure British descent. The witnesses were almost unanimously of opinion that it was not possible to appoint Indians to more than 5 p. c. of the superintendentships, for which they were rendered eligible by the orders of the Government of India in 1907. The Governments of Assam and Bihar and Orissa proposed, however, that the precentage should be raised to 10 p. c., and the Government of the U. P. and the Inspector-General of Police, Madras, stated that it should be increased to about 15 p.c. According to the latest combined civil list for India, the total number of superintendents on the 1st April, 1917, was 397. If the instructions of the Government of India had been loyally carried out 20 superintendentships should have been in the hands of Indians to-day, but only 9 Indians have been appointed superintendents so far. It is instructive to note that the U. P. Government, which was in favour of raising the percentage of superintendentships open to Indians from 5 to 15 p. c. and their number from 3 to 8, declined to accept a resolution moved in April last in the local Legislative Council asking for the appointment of two Indians as superintendents.§§

The Commission, although doubtful if the exclusion of Indians from the examination is illegal, recommends that the restriction should be removed, for its object can be attained more smoothly but not less surely in another way. It insults our intelligence by proposing that

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the present rule should be modified so as to allow Indians and Eurasians "who have been educated in the United Kingdom for a period of five years prior to the examination" to take part in it. In order to appear at the Civil Service examination three years' education in Great Britain is regarded as enough, but five years is the least period necessary to qualify for the Police examination, for the simple reason that the age-limits for the latter are higher by two years than those proposed by the Commission for the former. The police service may be a "security service," but surely the duties of a superintendent of police are not more responsible than those of a district officer which have been efficiently discharged by Indians. The examination for the selection of police officers, which is of an elementary character, and the training given to successful candidates furnish ample proof of the estimation in which the Police service is held by Government as compared with the Indian Civil Service. To deny Indians, therefore, the opportunity of entering the higher ranks of the police service is absolutely indefensible. Cannot men be found in India who will be able to do their work at least as well as ordinary English lads, who have received only a school education? The examination for the Indian Police service should be held simultaneously in England and in India, and the age-limits should be raised from 19–21 to 21–23.

As in the case of the I. C. S., the Commission recommends that the cadre which has increased considerably since 1886 should be expanded, although there is no evidence to prove that its existing strength is inadequate. The Commission itself admits that it did not investigate this question. In paragraph 61 of the report, after acknowledging that the cadre of the various services have been increased from time to time in the past, it

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The salaries of the officers in the Indian Police service were revised when the police department was reorganized in accordance with the report of the Police Commission of 1902. Generally speaking, the pay of assistant superintendents was increased from Rs. 400 to Rs. 500 per mensem, and a selection grade of Rs. 1,200 was created for superintendents. The salaries of Deputy Inspectors-General also, which ranged between 1250 and 100 in 1900, now range between Rs. 1,500 and Rs. 1,800. No further increase should, therefore, be made in the salaries of assistant superintendents or Deputy Inspectors-General. On the contrary, they should be reduced to the level at which they stood in 1900.

DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENTS.

The class of deputy superintendents was created in accordance with the recommendation of the Police Commission. It suggested that they "should have the same departmental status as Assistants." The resolution of the 21st March, 1905, containing the orders of the Government of India on the recommendations of the Commission stated that "their functions and their departmental status will be similar to those of Assistant Superintendents." "The Governor-General in Council trusts," it went on to say, "that it may be found possible to secure good material for this class, on whose judicious selection will greatly depend the enlistment of the sympathies of educated Indians on the side of the police, and who will furnish the source from which Indian District Superintendents may eventually be drawn."

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The hopes which this announcement created have been disappointed, and the treatment of deputy superintendents has given rise to great dissatisfaction. The Indian witnesses complained that although they were promised equality with assistant superintendents, in practice they were regarded as inferior to the latter, who were placed in officiating charge of districts even when a senior deputy superintendent was available. A U. P. witness deposed that not long after the resolution quoted from above was issued, two members of the Provincial civil service got themselves transferred to the Police department. But experience soon disillusioned them and they went back to the revenue line. Direct appointments to the grade of deputy superintendents are made in most of the provinces from among graduates, and responsible police authorities testified to their efficiency. In view of their qualifications and their efficiency, the humiliations to which they are subjected are particularly galling. The distinction observed between them and assistant superintendents should, therefore, be removed. The equality promised in 1905 should be conceded in practice, and they should be graded with assistants. It is not preposterous surely to ask that Indian graduates may be regarded at least as the equals of men who, although having the good fortune to be born in England, have been educated upto the school-leaving standard only.

The Commission recommends that 10 p. c. of the superintendentships should be set apart at once to be filled by promoted deputy superintendents, and that the percentage should be raised ultimately to 20. The recommendation appears to be suitable.

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Chapter IX.

EDUCATIONAL SERVICES.

The organisation of the educational services before 1882 is described by the Education Commission which was appointed in that year. Roughly speaking, there were two divisions, known as the graded and non-graded services, of which the graded was the superior service. It was divided into four grades and its emoluments ranged between Rs. 500 and Rs. 1,500 per mensem. In those days although the door of admission to the higher ranks was barred against Indians in almost every department, there was no bar to the appointment of Indians to posts in the higher division in the Education Department, and once they were promoted to it they occupied a footing of equality with their European colleagues with regard to salary and status. It was fully recognized that no distinction should be made between men performing the same duties and invested with the same responsibilities.

In 1882, however, a retrograde move was made, and it was laid down that in future Indians promoted to the graded service should receive only two-thirds of the salary drawn by Europeans. "In the early eighties," states Sir Sunderlal in his evidence before the Royal Commission, "the statutory Civil Service was created to open the door for the admission of Indians to appointments reserved for the Civil Service and till then recruited exclusively by open competition in England. Persons so admitted to the service received two-thirds of the pay of the covenanted Civilians recruited in England. The analogy of that system was extended to

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In 1886, the organisation of the educational services was again enquired into by the Public Service Commission appointed by the Government of Lord Dufferin. It condemned the system which was in force at the time, and was of opinion that a close educational service in its existing form was not called for. "The result of the system," it wrote, "and of the modes of recruitment adopted has been to secure a body of officers who, with numerous brilliant exceptions, are not superior to the average graduates of British Universities." It recommended accordingly the abolition of the graded service, and suggested for the professorial branch that recruitment should be made in England only for "(1) Principalships of Colleges and (2) Professorships in those branches of knowledge in which the European standard of advancement has not been attained in India," that "recruitment of Professors should be ordinarily of specialists, and when practicable, for a term of years, with power of reappointment," and that "the remuneration of officers recruited in England should be fixed with reference to the attainments required and duties to be performed in each

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As admitted by Mr. Sharp, who was Joint Secretary to the Government of India in the Department of Education in 1913, Government has shown no disposition to give effect to these recommendations. In selecting professors in England no attention has been paid to the principle that they should be specialists. On the contrary, professors have been recruited in England for posts for which

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The system of a close educational service, which was condemned by the Commission, was allowed to flourish. The graded service was changed into the Indian Educational Service in 1896, but the old system was not merely retained in its essential features under a new name, but even made more rigid. Till the eighties it was possible for Indians to rise to the highest positions, and many of them were appointed to posts in the superior graded service. In a note submitted to the Commission of 1886 by the Director of Public Instruction, Bengal, it was stated that of the posts included in the superior service "one sixth are, under the orders of the Secretary of State, to be held by Natives of India." But in 1895 a provincial educational service was created, and it was laid down that Indians should be appointed as a rule to this service. Indian professors and inspectors, whose efficiency had been acknowledged by two Commissions and who were engaged in performing precisely the same duties as Europeans holding corresponding posts in the Indian Educational Service, were relegated to an inferior service and condemned to pass their days in subordinate positions. If the recommendations of the Commission

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Not merely are Indians practically debarred from holding posts in the Indian Educational Service, but they are not allowed to occupy positions which will enable them to acquire influence over their students. For instance, the principal wardens of hostels attached to Government colleges are generally members of the Indian Educational Service, who scarcely mix with the students and know little of their inner life. The reasons for appointing them seem to be mainly political. Their ostensible duty is to prevent students from taking part in undesirable political activities, but how can patriotism which is a vital part of character grow up at all under men who are not identified with the country, whose own patriotism is different and brings them occasionally into conflict with that of their students, and whose ideas of official discipline are so strict that even professors subordinate to them shrink from exercising their legitimate rights of citizenship? The purpose they serve is best illustrated by the following recommendations made by a committee, appointed by the Government

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of Burma to enquire how the "Imperial idea" may be "inculcated and fostered" in educational institutions, the report of which has been just published :—

(1) "In all aided Anglo-Vernacular High Schools the Superintendent or Headmaster should be of British nationality and of a status equivalent to that of an officer in the Indian Educational Service."

(2) "In all Government Anglo-Vernacular High Schools the Principals should eventually be officers in the Indian Educational Service."

(3) "The chairs in the Burma University connected with Imperial studies, *e. g.*, civics, history, geography and economics, should for the most part be held by men of British descent trained in a British University."

Several witnesses stated before the Islington Commission that the Indian Educational Service should be amalgamated wholly or in part with the Indian Civil Service, as the qualifications required for both the services were the same in their opinion. There is little chance of this brilliant suggestion being accepted, but if it is carried out it will be a logical development of the proposals of the Burma committee.

The figures relating to the employment of Indians in the Indian Educational Service, which have been quoted above, furnish the strongest condemnation of the unjust policy, which has been followed since 1896 and which is founded on racial prejudice. It has had a discouraging effect on education by disinclining men to take up an educational career, and has led to political bitterness. It condemns distinguished educationalists like Dr. P. C. Roy, Prof. Jadunath Sarkar and Prof. Ruchi Ram Sahni to serve all their life in an inferior capacity, while the youngest recruit from Europe is placed above them. The treatment meted out to Prof. Jadunath Sarkar in 1913 is a forcible illustration of

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this injustice. Professor Sarkar has written books on Indian history, which are recognised as standard works on the subject, and had been senior professor of history for 14 years when he was examined by the Royal Commission in 1913. Yet, his position was reduced to that of a junior professor by the appointment to the Indian Educational Service as professor of history of a man who, Professor Sarkar said, had just taken his degree in England. The reasons given by the Government of Bihar and Orissa for taking such a step made the injustice even more glaring. "It was not open to the Local Government," said the Government of Bihar, "to recommend the promotion of Prof. Jadunath Sarkar to the Indian Educational Service, since that service is not recruited in this manner, nor would such promotion, accompanied by the appointment of a third professor from an Indian University, have strengthened the staff in the manner desired." Comment on this policy is superfluous. It may be added that recently Prof. Ruchi Ram Sahni has been appointhd to fill the senior professorship of chemistry, which belongs to the Indian Educational Service, but he has not been promoted to the superior service.

But it is not in point of scholarship alone that Indians have established their right to be appointed to the higher posts in the educational department. They have shown themselves as capable of maintaining discipline and managing first-rate institutions as of carrying on research work. To cite only a few instances, the Fergusson College, Poona, the City College, Calcutta, and the St. Stephen's College, Delhi, are brilliant examples of the administrative efficiency of Indians. Yet Indians must never hope to enter the charmed circle of the Indian Educational Service. They must remain content for ever with the provincial

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service, where the initial and maximum salaries are Rs. 200 and Rs. 700 per mensem, respectively. The service, however, is not a graded one everywhere. In some provinces, for instance the United Provinces, fixed salaries are attached to particular posts, so that a man cannot rise to the top grade in the regular course of promotion. Unless he is selected for the inspectorial line, he is not likely to receive more than Rs. 400 or Rs. 500 per mensem as a rule. Compare with this the emoluments of a member of the Indian Educational Service. His starting salary is Rs. 500 which rises by annual increments of Rs. 50 to Rs. 1,000. Beyond this, he is eligible for an allowance which may vary in value from Rs. 200 to Rs. 500 per mensem. The number of such allowances is twenty. If he is not in receipt of any one of these allowances he is entitled to a consolation allowance of Rs. 100 per mensem. And then there is the exchange compensation allowance which amounts to 6¼ p. c. on the salaries. Taking all these items into consideration, the average monthly salary of a member of the Indian Educational Service amounts to about Rs. 970, while the salary of a man belonging to the provincial service comes to about Rs. 350 only, or slightly more than one-third of that of his colleague in the Indian Educational Service.

Apart from the costliness of the Indian Educational Service and the grave injustice to Indians which the policy commented on above has caused, the evidence received by the Royal Commission discloses that the candidates hitherto selected are not men of exceptional ability, and that their quality is not likely to improve. Mr. Hornell, Director of Public Instruction, Bengal, after describing the machinery of selection, says, "I admit that the result of all this is frequently a very poor field of selection," and adds that "the number of

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Britishers really suitable for educational work in India and at the same time willing to come will probably always be small." The evidence of Mr. Heath, Chairman of the Board of Selection for the Indian Educational Service, is to the same effect. The number of candidates from the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, he stated, was rapidly declining. "The large majority," he said, "of the men now appointed, and an increasing majority, were from the Scottish and Provincial Universities, but even from these the Committee often failed to obtain a first-class man". Besides, he did not feel sure that an increase in salaries would attract men of better qualifications.

The difficulty experienced in recruiting men of distinction is due, it appears, mainly to three reasons. In the first place, the teaching profession has decreased in popularity with British youths. In the second place, there are greater facilities now for obtaining employment in England than there were a quarter of a century ago. In the third place, the requirements of the Indian Educational Service have increased considerably during the last thirty years. "Years ago," said the Secretary in the Judicial and Public Department of the India Office, "when a very much smaller number of men was required, it was much easier to get men with first-class honours. Now, men were taken for professorships in a good many cases with a good second-class honours degree but that was simply due to the fact that they now had to find a larger number of candidates". The difficulty in recruiting suitable men is not so great as it is represented to be. The officer already quoted stated that in 1907 or 1908, when an officer was placed on special duty in order to make the Indian Educational Service better known at the universities, a much larger number of applica-

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tions was received than before. Besides, as Dr. P. C. Roy said, the Calcutta University has been able to secure distinguished men for its newly created chairs. But however difficult it may be to recruit men of high academic qualifications, there is no dearth of second-rate men who will be appointed to a large majority of the posts. The Commission raises the scale of salaries considerably in order to attract men of high calibre. Higher salaries cannot affect, however, the root causes which make it difficult to secure the services of such men, and to which attention has been drawn above. The number of experts will always be small, and improved salaries will be enjoyed by inferior men, who can be obtained easily on the terms offered at present.

The only remedy suggested by an impartial examination of facts is that the distinction between the Indian and Provincial educational services should be abolished, and that recourse should be had to Europe only for the recruitment of specialists. It may be possible to maintain in other departments that officers in the provincial services perform work of an inferior character to that entrusted to officers belonging to the Imperial services, but the statement will not bear a moment's examination in regard to the education department. A professor, say, of mathematics has the same duties to discharge whether he belongs to the Indian or the Provincial branch. Similarly, the responsibilities of an inspector will not become lighter or heavier according as he belongs to the inferior or superior service. If, therefore, men in both the services are engaged in discharging the same duties, it stands to reason that no differentiation should be made between them on the score of their creed or colour. As for confining recruitment to India, as a rule, no fear need be entertained that it will result

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in lowering the standard of education. There is no dearth of capable Indians. Professor Jadunath Sarkar declares that, without further delay, he "would be prepared to see the chairs in all colleges, except for certain specified scientific purposes and except for some of the higher University posts, entrusted to Indians, without drawing any of the staff from Europe." Dr. P. C. Roy and Sir Jagadish Chandra Bose also gave expression to the same view and added that a visit to Europe, although not without an advantage of its own, should not be insisted on in the case of Indians appointed to the Indian Educational Service. They were of opinion that, as a rule, men trained in India would be quite competent to perform duties which members of the Indian Educational Service are called upon to discharge. As regards subjects in which a high standard of instruction is not yet available in India, men of promise should be sent to foreign countries to acquire proficiency in them and employed in preference to foreigners, whose knowledge and experience are lost to the country when they retire.

These considerations, which will appear decisive to unbiassed minds, seem to have carried little weight with the Commission. It lays down that on grounds of "policy and efficiency" it is necessary to have a substantial European element in the Indian Educational Service which it designates class I, and, although highly qualified graduates of Indian universities have no chance of finding admission into it, maintains that the number of Europeans employed in the Indian Educational Service is not excessive. Strictly speaking, in this view, there is no room for Indians in the Indian Educational Service, for the replacement of even a single European by an Indian will reduce the strength of the European element below the level at which it should

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Twenty professorships are to be kept outside the cadre of class I for the appointment of specialists, whose selection should not depend on considerations of race or colour. They should be chosen from men of established reputation in Europe and in India, and to teach only those subjects which are "capable of being pursued to the point of originality in India." Three proposals were made to the Commission in connection with the position which they should occupy in the present educational system. One suggestion was that they should be Government servants, and should be collected in one place in a central institute which will keep abreast of the advance of knowledge, impart the highest instruc-

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The solution proposed by the Commission if not satisfactory is at least ingenious. It attempts to satisy Indian aspirations by promoting a few Indians into the superior service, and shows its solicitude for the interests of Europeans not merely by leaving them in safe possession of every appointment already held by them, but by providing for an increase in their number as the cadre is expanded to meet the growing needs of higher education. It also concedes their demands for improved pay and prospects by recommending that their salary should be Rs. 550–50–1250 (Rs. 350–50–1250 in the case of Indians) per month, and that beyond this there should be two selection grades, each of 10 p. c. of the cadre, on Rs. 1250–50–1500, and Rs. 1500–50–1750 per mensem, respectively, in all the provinces except Assam, and proposes a considerable enhancement of the salaries of Directors of Public Instruction. It has been mentioned above that, excluding the Directors of Public Instruction, the average monthly emoluments of a member of the I. E. S. amount to Rs. 970 at present. If the proposals of the Commission are carried out his average salary will come to Rs. 1,043 per mensem, and

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the State will have to incur an additional expenditure of about 9½ lacs. The financial recommendations of the Commission have been discussed at length in an earlier chapter. It is not necessary, therefore, to enter on a detailed examination of them here. It is sufficient to point out that the creation of selection grades and the enhancement of the salaries of Directors of Public Instruction is opposed strongly by Mr. Justic Abdur Rahim and partly by Sir M. B. Chaubal, and Mr. Ramsay Macdonald also, and that there is no justification for imposing extra burdens on the State in pursuance of a policy which is based on race prejudice.

The Commission insists on the retention of a large number of Europeans in the I.E.S. as it considers that the presence of men of European birth and training is essential to the advancement of western culture and science and the maintenance of western standards of education. It is true that India needs to assimilate the best in western civilisation, but we do not want that our education should be a soulless imitation of the system followed in the west. If we are to profit by western education it must be adapted to our needs, so that we may learn from the west without losing our individuality. This is a task which requires men who have a thorough knowledge of Indian life and character, of Indian customs and manners. It cannot be accomplished by any foreigner. Japan has imbibed western culture and adopted western standards, but she has not found it necessary to entrust her education to foreigners. In his evidence Sir J. C. Bose quoted some interesting and instructive facts concerning Japanese education from an official publication. "Subseqent to 1895," says the publication in question, "there were 67 Professors recruited in Europe and America. Of these twenty came from Germany, 16 from England and 12 from

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the United States. The average pay was £ 384. In the highest Imperial University the average pay is £ 684. As soon as Japanese could be found to do the work, even tolerably well, the foreigner was dropped." In French and German universities, says Principal Paranjpye, Englishmen are not appointed even to chairs of English literature, so that it may not be taught by those who do not understand the spirit of their students. India should take a leaf out of the book of other countries, and entrust the supreme task of educating her youth and forming their character to her best men. To accomplish this object Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim's proposal, which had the support of Mr. Gokhale, that "there shall be no recruitment of untried Englishmen, fresh from the universities for educational work in India," should be given effect to without delay. This is also the view taken by Mr. Ramsay Macdonald. The professorships, the number of which Mr. Justice Rahim fixes at 90, should be recruited from among specialists. The best men available should be selected for these posts and appointed for a term of years. High salaries should not be grudged to them and the choice should not be confined to Englishmen. On the contrary, no hesitation should be shown in importing distinguished educationalists from France, Germany and America if they can be attracted to India.

The need of utilizing indigenous agency for the development of Indian education, great as it is in the case of men, is greater still in the case of women. The cause of the education of Indian women will be considerably strengthened if it is controlled by Indians, who understand Indian life and character and who will not be regarded with suspicion which attaches itself to foreigners. It is necessary, therefore, that every effort should be made to induce educated women to take up the profession of teaching. The number of those fit for

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Chapter X.

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The Indian Medical Service, which is recruited by means of a competitive examination held twice a year in Great Britain, is primarily a military service, charged with the care of sick soldiers and the duty of looking after the health of the Indian army generally. As the medical requirements of the army during peace time are much smaller than during war, in ordinary times it is burdened with a large reserve of officers, for whom it can find no employment. Accordingly, their services are utilized in normal times by the civil administration, but they are liable to be recalled to military duty, should the need for it arise. The civil medical departments are thus administered by men belonging to a military service. The officers of the Indian Medical Service are not merely in charge of civil hospitals, but the officers of the sanitary, jail and bacteriological departments are very largely drawn from their ranks, and the professorships of the medical colleges and the chemical examinerships also are recruited for almost entirely from the same source. When the Commission commenced its enquiry there were 285 civil and presidency surgeoncies and a few appointments of a kindred character. No less than 192 of these were occupied by officers of the Indian Medical Service. Of the 44 professorships and chemical examinerships, 39 were filled by members of the same service. In the Sanitary deparment they supplied 33 out of 47 officers, and in the Jail department 38 out of the 43 officers concerned with central jails. In the Bacteriological department all the 27 posts were held by them. The plague appointments

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also which numbered 20 were exclusively in their possession. They preponderate overwhelmingly in every pepartment. Their monopoly of the higher posts is brought into clearer light by the following table*, which deals with all but a few superior appointments which lay outside the scope of the Commission's enquiry.

	Officers of the Indian Medical Service.	Officers of the Indian Subordinate medical department (Military Assistant surgeons.)	Civil Officers.	Total.
Administrative and staff appointments.	17	...	...	17
Civil and presidency surgeoncies and certain miscellaneous appointments of a kindred character	192	46	47	285
Professorships.	33	...	4	37
Chemical Examinerships.	6	...	1	7
Superintendents of Lunatic Asylums.	6	...	...	6
Bacteriological Department.	27	...	...	27
Sanitary department.	33	...	14	47
Plague appointments.	20	...	...	20
§Jail department (Central Jails).	38	1	4	43
Leave Reserve (20 p. c. of the cadre).	74	...	...	74
	446	47	70	563

* Report of the Public Services Commission, Vol. I., pp. 244 and 276–79.

§ Report of the Public Services Commission, Vol I., p. 279.

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also which numbered 20 were exclusively in their possession. They preponderate overwhelmingly in every department. Their monopoly of the higher posts is brought into clearer light by the following table*, which deals with all but a few superior appointments which lay outside the scope of the Commission's enquiry.

	Officers of the Indian Medical Service.	Officers of the Indian Subordinate medical department (Military Assistant surgeons.)	Civil Officers.	Total.
Administrative and staff appointments.	17	...	...	17
Civil and presidency surgeoncies and certain miscellaneous appointments of a kindred character	192	46	47	285
Professorships.	33	...	4	37
Chemical Examinerships.	6	...	1	7
Superintendents of Lunatic Asylums.	6	...	...	6
Bacteriological Department.	27	...	...	27
Sanitary department.	33	...	14	47
Plague appointments.	20	...	...	23
§Jail department (Central Jails).	38	1	4	43
Leave Reserve (20 p. c. of the cadre).	74	...	...	74
	446	47	70	563

* Report of the Public Services Commission, Vol. I., pp. 244 and 276–79.

§ Report of the Public Services Commission, Vol I., p. 279.

Thus 79 p.c. of the superior appointments are held by officers of the Indian Medical Service, and 8·5 p. c. by members of the Indian Subordinate Medical Department, which is closed to Indians and is primarily of a military character like the Indian Medical Service, while the share of civil officers is confined to 12·5 p.c., or one out of every eight appointments.

This state of things is justified on the ground that the members of the Indian Medical Service are highly qualified men, and that since a war reserve has to be maintained in any case, its employment on civil duty conduces to economy as well as efficiency. In the first place, it can scarcely be maintained that the recruitment for the Indian Medical service is based solely on military requirements. The Service consisted in 1913 of 772 officers of whom only 297 were engaged in military duties. The services of the remaining 475 officers who are alleged to constitute the war reserve had been lent to the civil authorities. The reserve was, thus, more than half as large again as the body on active service. The notion of such a reserve is somewhat bewildering to the plain man. If a reserve larger than the main body were to be suggested for a civil department, it would be laughed out of court. And although the ignorance of a layman in regard to military affairs may make him more deferential to military authorities, he can scarcely help feeling that the so-called reserve has been purposely enlarged to its present dimensions in order to permit of the recruitment of all the higher civil medical posts, the number of which has risen by about 100 since 1885, from the Indian Medical Service. And his supicions are strengthened when he finds that of the 475 men employed in civil medical departments only 337 have to be surrendered to the military authorities in the event of a mobilisation. The Government

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of India itself admitted in 1908 that one-third of the Indian Medical Service did not belong to the war reserve, and that there could be no objection to its transference to civil medical practitioners from a military point of view.

In the second place, if this system possesses all the merits that its advocates claim for it how comes it about that it has not been adopted in England? The members of the Indian Medical Service and the Royal Army Medical Corps, it appears, receive similar professional training, but the medical officers of the army are not allowed to usurp civil appointments in Great Britain. The administration of medical relief and the performance of civil medical duties in general, are entrusted to civil medical officers. The continental powers, which maintain huge armies, could have followed this course easily, but they show no inclination to adopt it. Even Germany, where the spirit of militarism is more predominant than elsewhere, has refrained from amalgamating her civil and military medical organisations. These countries do not want that the administration of medical relief and the development of medical science and education should depend on military exigencies, as is the case in India. Up to the 3rd March, 1915, 286 officers of the Indian Medical Service amongst whom were 188 civil surgeons and 8 professors, had reverted to military duty and 15 were awaiting orders. Sir Pardey Lukis told the Commission that the surrender of these officers "has been effected smoothly and has not led to any serious dislocation of work." One is disposed on general grounds, however, to agree with Sir M. B. Chaubal when he remarks in reference to this claim, "It is, I think, idle to contend that, with so many trained officers suddenly called away and their places filled from a promiscuous and motley group of

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all descriptions, there should be no serious dislocation of work." The Commission appears to adopt the same view when it says, "There is a clear objection to an arrangement under which the medical education of a country is liable to be disorganised during the course of a serious war," and recommends that military officers holding professorships should be exempted from liability to recall to military duty.

Apart from disorganisation due to war, the present system has been sharply criticized on various grounds. It is said that it hinders the growth of an independent medical profession, as private medical practitioners have no opportunity at present of gaining hospital experience and of carrying on research work in laboratories. Stress was laid on this point by every non-official witness before the Commission. Lord Morley took the same view when he issued peremptory orders in 1908 stricty prohibiting the expansion of the cadre of the I. M. S. Again, the I. M. S. includes a number of professorships and other appointments the holders of which should be specialists in their subjects. In European countries such posts are given to men who have attained distinction in the branches of medical science with which they are concerned. But in India the existence of a close medical service has rendered the appointment of distinguished outsiders almost impossible. It was alleged by men like Dr. Nilratan Sircar and Sir Bhalchandra Krishna that this had led to inefficiency, and the evidence of English witnesses gives a general support to their statements. 'He would not like to say," said Sir Clifford Allbutt, Regius Professor of Physic at the Cambridge University, "that an Indian medical officer, most of whose previous service had been in general practice, would not be competent to fill scientific chairs, but he would scarcely

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A further count in the indictment against the existing system is that it does not give Indians a fair scope for their activities. In 1913 out of a total of 772 officers in the I. M. S. only 54 were Indians. Their proportion has risen slightly since then, which has created uneasiness in Anglo-Indian circles, but it is still too small to be regarded with satisfaction by the people of this country.

In view of these facts it has been urged that the civil medical organisation of the country should be placed on a stable basis by being divorced from the military organisation, and that a separate civil medical service should be established, which should be recruited mainly from private medical practitioners. The question of the formation of such a service has been one of the most important problems before the country since it was brought into prominence by the late Dr. Bahadurji, who moved a resolution on the subject at the Congress of 1893. The proposal was strongly supported by eminent Indian witnesses before the Commission. In the past it has been urged on the attention of the Government of India by more than one Local Government. In its despatch of the 17th November, 1910, addressed to the Secretary of State, the Government of India mentions that the Bombay Government proposed in 1903 that a civil medical service should be created. The Bombay Medical Union stated in its written evidence that the Governments of Bengal and Madras also were in favour of such a course at one time. "If the Civil

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Medical Service," observed the Government of Madras, "was to be purely for civil purposes, and primarily for civil purposes, there was no occasion to make it military." And the Government of Bengal in criticising the existing method of recruiting the superior medical appointments wrote, "Among the defects of the system must be recognized a want of stability, a want of strict identification with the interests of the natives of the country, an exclusiveness which renders it difficult to introduce the natives of the country to the higher employments of the service." As Dr. Nilratan Sircar said in his evidence, "All the world over the pride of a professor was to be succeeded in his chair by one of his own pupils, but in India it was otherwise. None of the Indian Medical Service professors of the Medical Colleges would care to see one of his own students following him in his chair."

In 1907 and 1908 Lord Morley drew the attention of the Government of India to the increase in the cadre of the I. M. S., and the growing difficulties in the matter of its recruitment, and emphasized the desirability of promoting the growth of an independent medical profession by throwing open to it some posts which were reserved till then for the I. M. S., and similar appointments which might be created in future. "Notwithstanding the necessity for its restriction," he observed, "the cadre of the Indian Medical Service has in recent years continued to increase, and apart from other objections, its further increase will be likely to cause serious difficulties in the matter of recruiting. I have consequently decided that the time has now arrived when no further increase of the civil side of the service can be allowed, and when a strong effort should be made to reduce it by gradually extending the employment of Civil Medical practitioners recruited in India. When it is

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The proposal to form a civil medical service was strongly opposed by all the Local Governments and by almost every European witness who appeared before the Commission. The successes of Indian students in 1913 had disquieted them so much that many suggestions were put forward apparently with the sole purpose of making it more difficult for Indians to appear at the competitive examination for the I. M. S. For instance, the U. P. Government suggested that a period of study in Great Britain should be insisted on as a condition precedent to participation in the examination. "A year's study," it said, "is the minimum, but two years' is desirable." To give only one more illustration,

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The Commission does not go so far as to interpose obstacles in the way of Indians desirous of entering the Indian Medical Service, but its recommendations amount virtually to a rejection of the proposal for a separate civil medical service. On grounds of efficiency and economy it recommends the continuance of the existing practice. "At the conclusion," it says, "of the present war it should be possible to estimate more closely than has hitherto been the case what are the military requirements, and to what extent these can be met from private practitioners in England or in India. Calculations should also be made and reviewed from time to time of the civil needs of the country: and a purely

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Like the Indian Educational Service, the Indian Medical Service has decreased in popularity with British candidates. Its failure, however, to attract a large number of candidates is no new phenomenon. Lord George Hamilton drew attention to the difficulties connected with its recruitment in 1899, and Lord Morley emphasised them a decade later. Twenty-four examinations for the selection of candidates for this service took place from 1903 to 1914. At thirteen of these the proportion of candidates to vacancies was as 2 : 1 or slightly less. At the examination held in January 1907, in particular, only 30 candidates competed for 23 vacancies. But the service has become increasingly unpopular of late. This is due partly to the popularity of the Colonial Medical Service, which is recruited by means of nomination, and partly to the increased demand for doctors in Great Britain. But the agitation carried on against the service by its members is responsible to no small extent for the decline in its popularity. Sir Charles Ball stated that they had created the impression that the number of appointments open to officers of the Indian Medical Service had been curtailed, that Europeans might be placed under Indian officers, and that their position in such cases would not be the same as under European officers. "This sort of talk," he said, "had been going on for the last four or five

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The pay of members of the Indian Medical Service was considerably increased probably during the administration of Lord Curzon. The following table, which relates to the Panjab, gives a good idea of the improvement effected in their salaries.

	Pay in 1900.	Pay in 1913.
	Rs.	Rs.
urgeon, 1st class.	500–1050	550–1450
Pr ,, 2nd class.	400–950	450–1350
ofessors, Medical College.	850–1050	750–1650
Sanitary Commissioner.	1200–1800	1500–1800
Dy. Sanitary Commissioner.	600–1000	600–1500
Chemical Examiner	800–1400	800–1550
Superintendent, Lunatic Asylum.... ...	600–1400	650–1550

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	Lieutenant.	Lieut.-Colonel after 25 years, service.
	Rs.	Rs.
Indian Army.	500	1300
R. A. M. C.§	420	1150
1st class Civil Surgeon.	550	1350
Professors of Medical College.	750	1550
Principals. Do.	—	1700
Sanitary Commissioners.		1500–1800
Deputy Sanitary Comissioners.	700	1500
Bacteriological Department.	650	1500
Jails (1st class).	650	1450

These figures do not represent the highest salaries to which officers can attain, but only salaries which they can expect to draw in the regular course of promotion after 25 years' service. It may appear from the above table that District Medical Officers are paid less than other officers in the Indian Medical Service, but the impression is erroneous for they are entitled to private practice. The United Provinces Government states in its

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CIVIL ASSISTANT SURGEONS.

In 1913 there were 821 officers employed in the subordinate civil medical departments whose status was equivalent to that of Civil Assistant Surgeons. Of these 98 were military assistant surgeons, who are required to be Europeans or Eurasians, who have received a low degree of education, who are trained entirely at the expense of the State, whose course of instruction lasts for four years as against five prescribed for civil assistant surgeons, and who do not possess a qualification registrable in the United Kingdom. It may be added, however, that it has been decided now to give them a higher training. It has been mentioned in the preceding section that of the 93 civil surgeoncies open to members of the subordinate medical departments, 46

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are occupied by military assistant surgeons and 47 by civil officers. Thus, while 46 Civil Surgeoncies are open to 98 Military Assistant Surgeons, 723 Civil Assistant Surgeons have to be content with only 47 civil surgeoncies. Even all of these are not held by them. Fifteen of them are held by members of the Uncovenanted Medical Service, which, in the words of Dr. Bahadurji, was created in 1867 for "the encouragement and utilisation of the best products of our Indian Medical Schools," but which is in a moribund condition now. The Secretary of State suggested to the Government of India in 1912 that civil surgeoncies, not reserved for the Indian Medical Service, should be given to Civil Assistant Surgeons as far as possible. The Government of India declined to give effect to this suggestion, one of the arguments which it advanced being that Military Assistant Surgeons "make up in administrative capacity what thay may lack in professional ability."

It has been admitted by competent authorities that the qualifications of Civil Assistant Surgeons are of a high order. Their status should be raised, therefore, by forming them into a service to be called "Provincial Medical Service," and their merits recognised by reserving one-third of the civil surgeoncies for them. If military assistant surgeons are to share in them, they should not be allowed to occupy more than 20 p. c. of the posts set aside for being filled by officers employed in civil medical departments.

The scale of salaries for Civil Assistant Surgeons was fixed about the year 1850, and remained unchanged for about half a century. Their starting salary was Rs. 100, and the maximum which they hoped to receive Rs. 200. In 1898 a senior grade of Rs. 300 per mensem was created in all the provinces except Madras, where the highest grade yet open to them is that of Rs. 200 per month.

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Civil Assistant Surgeons promoted to civil surgeoncies draw Rs. 350–400 in the Punjab, Rs. 400–600 in the United Provinces, and Rs. 350–500 elsewhere, with the exception of Burma, while military assistant surgeons in corresponding positions receive Rs. 350–700 per mensem. These salaries, compared with those received by provincial officers in other departments, are miserably low. The Commission recommends accordingly that Civil Assistant Surgeons should start on a salary of Rs. 150 a month, rising in the course of 18 years to Rs. 400, and that such of them as are appointed to civil surgeoncies should receive Rs. 500–50/2–800 per month. Even these rates are not suitable if private practice is not to be allowed. The prospects of Civil Assistant Surgeons should be the same as those of officers serving in the provincial civil service.

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Chapter XI.

PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT.

The Public Works Department formerly included the engineering section of the Railway department. This system was abolished in 1905 when the Railway Board was established. Nevertheless, the engineers appointed to the Public Works and Railway departments are recruited through the same agency and possess similar qualifications. Their conditions of service and the rules governing their salary, leave and pension are also the same. It will be convenient, therefore, to deal with the Public Works Department and the engineering branch of the Railway Department together. The recommendations relating to the engineering branch of the Telegraph Department, also, will be discussed in this chapter as they are based on the same principles as those underlying the proposals regarding the Public Works Department.

Before 1895, the names of engineers recruited in India and in England were borne on the same list, and all officers received the same pay, irrespective of the place of their recruitment. A departure was made from this policy at the instance of the Public Service Commision of 1886, and a provincial service was created in 1895, which was to consist of officers recruited in India, who were to be paid two-thirds of the salary paid to members of the Imperial service. The names of the two sets of officers continued, however, to be entered in the same gradation list. This change, which was introduced tentatively for a period of seven years, violated, at least, in spirit, the pledge given with the concur-

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rence of the Government of India by Sir William Muir, Lieutenant-Governor of the North Western Provinces, shortly after the establishment of the Royal Indian Engineering College at Coopers Hill. The creation of this institution had given risen to apprehensions regarding the future of the men trained at Rurki. Referring to these fears, Sir William Muir said in a speech delivered in 1873, "It is.....with sincere satisfaction that I am able to announce to you and through you to those without who are interested in the Thomason College, that the institution at Coopers Hill will in no degree affect the relations of the Government of India with the College, nor the employment which has been hitherto guaranteed to its more successful students." The relegation of Indian engineers to an inferior service, with the consequent deterioration in their prospects, was inconsistent with this assurance, which was perhaps forgotten in 1895. At the expiration of the period for which the provincial service had been created in the first instance, a memorial was submitted to the Government of India asking for its abolition. On its rejection the Secretary of State for India was appealed to in 1906, but in vain. In 1908 a reorganisation scheme was sanctioned, which made the position of the officers of the provincial service much worse than before. Its cardinal features were that their promotion was to be retarded and their names removed from the list of Imperial officers. It was cancelled, however, in 1912 on account of the determined opposition of the provincial service.

The strength of the Public Works and Railway departments was 928 in 1913, the authorized cadre of the Imperial service being 648 and that of the Provincial service 280. The number of officers in the Provincial service is, thus, about 30 per cent. of the whole cadre. The Imperial service consists of Royal Engineers and

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officers appointed by the Secretary of State. The latter are selected from among eligible candidates by a committee appointed by the Secretary of State. According to a rule framed in 1909, natives of India, if duly qualified, must be appointed to the extent of 10 per cent. of the assistant engineers recruited in England. The average number of recruits to the Imperial service during 1909—1914 was 30. The Provincial service is recruited in India partly from the graduates of engineering colleges, chosen by means of a competitive examination, and partly from the upper subordinates. Nine and ten vacancies are filled in alternate years from the alumni of the engineering colleges (six and seven alternately from Rurki, and one every year from the colleges at Poona, Sibpur and Madras), and five and four by promotion from the upper subordinates. A very objectionable system prevails in in regard to the selection of men from Rurki. Two men are appointed tentatively to each post, one from those who succeed in the competitive examination and one from those who do not, and the final selection takes place at the end of the period of probation. Taking into consideration the statutory natives of India appointed in England, they are recruited for 37½ per cent. of the vacancies every year.

The Commission desires that the distinction between the Imperial and Provincial services should be swept away and that Indians and Europeans should be appointed in equal proportions. Half the cadre should be recruited in India, and the obligation to select 10 per cent. of the candidates appointed annually in England from statutory natives of India should be done away with. The Commission is opposed to the recruitment of the entire personnel in India, as it believes that a substantial European element is necessary in the Public Works Department and the engineering branch

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No policy in regard to civil or military affairs can be accepted by Indians without demur which is based on racial distinctions, but apart from this, the evidence recorded by the Commission does not disclose any political or military grounds for restricting the employment of Indians in the Public Works and Railway departments. The Secretary to the Government of India in the Public Works Department said, "In his judgment no political considerations were involved in making appointments to the Department, and, thefore, the men who had the best education in engineering should be employed whether they were found in England or in India." It is true that the Secretary to the Railway Board suggested that in making appointments to the Railway Department it should be borne in mind that railways are "a necessary factor in maintaining the security of the country," but he too admitted that the safety of the passengers was a question of more immediate importance. Besides, it should be observed that of the 648 officers in the Imperial service only 70 are Royal Engineers. The rest are civil engineers, to whose recruitment in India there should be no objection, if men with the requisite qualifications can be obtained. There ought to be no dearth of such men as the education given in India is of a high order. The Principal of the Thomason College, Rurki, stated that "in the opinion

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In view of the facts mentioned above, there is no reason why the higher personnel of the Public Works and Railway departments should not be recruited wholly in India. The recommendation of the Commission for increasing the Indian proportion from 37½ to 50 per cent. is satisfactory so far as it goes, but the goal which Government should set before itself ought to be that recruitment from England should be stopped in the near future.

TELEGRAPH (ENGINEERING) DEPARTMENT.

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The Commission is of opinion that considerations of policy require the employment of Europeans in the Telegraph Department. It recommends the amalgamation of the Imperial and Provincial services, but suggests no other changes, specially as no new recruits will be selected for some years. Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim considers that if the above-mentioned proposals are accepted, they will affect the Indian colleges adversely by curtailing the recruitment from them. He proposes, therefore, that three-fourths of the recruitment should take place in India, 50 per cent. of the appointments being given to direct recruits and 25 per cent. being filled by promoted upper subordinates.

The Commission gives no reason for considering the employment of Europeans in the Telegraph Department to be essential. Nor does the evidence disclose one. The opposition to the appointment of Indians in large numbers was based on the ground that the requisite technical training was not available in India. Not a single witness suggested any other reason for continuing to recruit officers from Europe. Whatever weight may be attached to this objection now, it will lose all its force when the recommendation of the Commission regarding the provision of technical institutions ranking with similar institutions in England has been carried out. There will be no justification then for not

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Chapter XII.

SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL SERVICES.

With the exception of the Survey of India Department, the duties of which are primarily military, the Commission includes all the technical and scientific departments in the third group, which comprises those services which should be recruited in India. The most imprtant of these departments are the Agriculture, Civil Veterinary, Forest, Geological Survey of India, and Locomotive and Carriage and Wagon departments, to which we may well confine our attention. The Survey of India Department also merits our consideration, but it will be convenient to consider the five civil departments first and to deal with the Survey Department afterwards.

The Agricultural Department was established in 1871. It appears that from the very commencement the intention of the Government of India has been that it should be staffed largely by Indians. "We adhere firmly," wrote the Government of India to the Secretary of State in 1910, "to our frequently declared policy that that Service (the agricultural service) should be manned utlimately by Indians, and that the object to be kept steadily in view is to reduce to a minimum the number of experts appointed from England, and to train up indigenous talent so as to enable the country to depend on its own resources for the recruitment of its agricultural staff in the higher branches." But so far this policy has not been translated into action. In several provinces the agricultural colleges have been a failure, partly because the standard of instruction

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provided by them is not sufficiently high, and partly because the prospects offered to their graduates are not such as to attract men of suitable qualifications. The Imperial service has become the monopoly of Europeans, while Indians are confined to the provincial service. The evidence of Dr. Harold Mann and of the representative of the members of the provincial service in the Punjab shows that many highly qualified Indians, several of whom possess European degrees or experience, have been unable to find admission into the Imperial service, which has been manned by recruits imported from Europe, who, says Dr. Mann, labour under the serious disadvantage that their experience relates to a system of agriculture "which in its organisation is quite foreign to most parts of India and will be for a long time to come."

The Imperial Forest Service has the same tale to tell as the Agricultural service. The Inspector-General of Forests stated in his evidence that "when the Forest Department was instituted, and for a long time afterwards, both the Government of India and the Secretary of State expressed the opinion that it was a special Department in which the service of Indians should be utilised as largely as possible." Yet from 1891 to 1906 no steps were taken to provide for direct recruitment to the provincial service, and it was laid down in 1912 that candidates for the Imperial Forest Service "must have obtained a degree with honours in some branch of natural science in a University of England, Wales or Ireland" or the B. Sc. degree in pure science in one of the universities of Scotland. A special course for recruits to the provincial service has been instituted only recently at the Forest College, Dehra Dun. Out of 216 major charges 49 are open to the members of this service, but they have been appointed only to 41 of these charges, of

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which no more than 14 are held by Indians. Moreover, officers of the provincial service when holding major charges do not form part of the Imperial service. Their position in regard to the Imperial service is the same as that of the holders of listed posts in relation to the Indian Civil Service. In the Imperial service, itself, out of 213 officers there are only two statutory natives of India.

Even in the provincial service the number of Indians is not as large as it should be. Excluding the Imperial service, there were 184 posts of Rs. 200 and over in the Forest Department, and of these no less than 90 were held by Europeans and Eurasians.

The Geological Survey Department, one of the aims of which is the development of the mineral resources of the country, was started in 1853. But during the three generations that have elapsed since then no institution has been established for imparting instruction of a high standard in geology. It is taught, at present, in Calcutta, Bombay and Madras, but it appears that the courses are satisfactory in Calcutta only, and even there the education is alleged to be mainly theoretical. An Indian witness quoted the opinion of Dr. Oldham, the first head of the Geological Department, concerning the fitness of Indians for this department, which showed that he had " the most unshaken confidence that with even fair opportunities of acquiring such knowledge (that of the Physical Sciences) many Indians would be found quite competent to take their place side by side with European assistants either on this Survey or in many other ways. " The Indian evidence showed that competent Indians had found the door of admission barred against them, and that up to 1913 only three Indians had been appointed to the superior service.

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The following table will show at a glance the grave injustice done to Indians in the matter of employment in the Agricultural, Civil Veterinary, Forest, Geological Survey and Locomotive and Carriage and Wagon departments :—

	Total number of officers in the superior service.	Number of statutory natives of India.
Agricultural ...	62	2
Civil Veterinary ...	34	—
Forest ...	213	2
Geological Survey ...	21	2
Locomotive and Carriage and Wagon.	77	—
	407	6

They are all but excluded from these services. And even the six statutory natives who have been fortunate enough to make their way into them are not, all of them, Indians.

The just and statesman like policy which the Commission has formulated in regard to these services has been hailed with delight throughout the country. If it is carried out in the spirit in which it has been enunciated, it will prove highly advantageous to the country both from a political and an economic point of view.

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In order that the new institutions may attract from the first recruits of a suitable type, the Commission proposes that Government should announce that not less than half the vacancies will be filled from among men

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These excellent recommendations have the cordial support of Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim, but he makes a a few suggestions which will make them more effective. He proposes that the principle of granting scholarships should be extended so as to apply to the Agricultural and Forest departments as well, and that students to whom scholarships are awarded should be selected for appointment by the Secretary of State unless they are rejected as unfit by the selection committee at the India Office. He is also of opinion that a definite period should

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be fixed during which Government should provide the educational facilities recommended by the Commission, and that recruitment from England should cease after five years for the Agricultural service and ten years for the Forest service. The suggestions are entirely in harmony with the principles laid down by the Commission, and should, therefore, be given effect to.

Besides the imperfections in the Commission's scheme, to which reference has been made in the preceding paragraph, there is one serious defect in its recommendations to which it is necessary to draw pointed attention. The Commission considers that the existing salaries in many of the scientific and technical services are insufficient to attract first-rate men and to induce them to "remain in India for a full term of service." It recommends, therefore, that the Europeans, whom it may be necessary to employ before India is able to meet her own requirements, should be granted substantially higher salaries, the cost of which, according to Sir M. B. Chaubal, will come to about 20 lacs. This proposal will seriously interfere with the carrying out of the reforms recommended by the Commission, and put off the day when the services of a foreign agency will be required no longer. For, if better prospects are to be offered to Europeans in order "*secure* and *retain*" their services, it is obvious that the goal which the Commission has set before itself will not be reached at least for a generation to come. If the figure for recruitment in Europe is once fixed on the basis of immediate requirements, it will be rigidly adhered to for a pretty long period of time. We need on the contrary a flexible system, which will lead to a rapid and progressive increase in the employment of indigenous agency without disregarding the interests of efficiency. The only way of reconciling these two conditions appears to be to treat

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The Survey of India Department yet remains to be dealt with. Its function is to prepare a topographical map of India and Burma, which is required mainly for military purposes. It is divided into two branches, the Imperial and the Provincial. There are 51 posts in the Imperial service, of which 34 are superior. Twenty-seven of these are filled by Royal Engineers and officers of the Indian army, while seven have been assigned to the members of the provincial service. The latter, however, are not transferred to the Imperial service even when occupying these posts. The Commission is of the view that ten major charges should be allotted to the provincial service and that the officers who hold them should be promoted to the Imperial service. This recommendation is approved by Mr. Justice Rahim.

The provincial service contains posts with monthly salaries ranging between Rs. 250 and Rs. 1,000. The Government of India laid down in 1884 that 25 p. c. of the vacancies should be reserved for Indians. Subsequently to the introduction of the competitive test for selecting candidates, Government again issued instructions in 1909 that for every three appointments given to Europeans or Eurasians at leat one should be given to an Indian. But out of 181 posts carrying salaries of Rs. 200 and upwards only 28 or about 15.5 p. c. were held by Indians.

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the examination that he would have been able to pass such a test "two years before he left school, when he was about 14 or 15 years old." The standard is kept so low in order to make it easy for Anglo-Indians to gain admission into the service. "The Survey Examiner," said the Surveyor-General, "had been frequently instructed by the Surveyor-General to give the Anglo-Indians a chance." This is not the only concession made in favour of Anglo-Indians. "The rule was also laid down," said the same officer, "that three-quarters of the vacancies should go to the domiciled community, and one quarter to Indians.....If the rule were abolished, it would lead to a large increase in the number of Indians recruited. One or two Indians had almost always to be knocked out. The three-quarters rule was not justified on the score of efficiency, but by other reasons." Thus, Indians are deliberately kept out of the provincial service, which is regarded as a close preserve for Eurasians, who form an infinitesimally small portion of the population of India, and whose ambition is to be regarded not as Indians but as Europeans. To remedy this glaring injustice the Commission proposes that not less than half the candidates nominated should be Indians of unmixed Asiatic descent, and that no discrimination should be made in favour of Anglo-Indians, appointments being made solely in accordance with the result of the competitive examination. The latter recommendation is satisfactory, but not so the first. As Mr. Justice Rahim says, no candidate should be prevented from appearing at the examination on racial grounds.

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Chapter XIII.

SERVICES RECRUITED IN INDIA.

The superior posts in the Post Office and Telegraph (traffic), Northern India Salt Revenue, Salt and Excise, Railway (stores), Land Records (Burma), Registration and Land Survey (Madras) departments are recruited entirely in India. But it would be wholly erroneous to conclude from this that these departments are largely staffed by Indians. The following table shows the proportion of posts occupied by Indians in these services.

	Total No. of posts of Rs. 200 and upwards.	Europeans.	Eurasians.	Asiatics of unmixed descent.
Post Office ...	277	106	39	132
Telegraph ...	664	162	441	61
Northern India Salt Revenue ...	36	16	15	5
Salt and Excise ...	338	110	98	130
Registration ...	64	...	1	63
Survey (Madras) ...	16	9	1	6
Land Records (Burma)	45	1	38	6
Total...	1440	404	633	403

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The Railway (stores) Department has been omitted from the table as figures relating to it are not available separately. It may be mentioned, however, that of the 18 superior appointmens in this section for which recruitment is made in India only one is held by an Indian. It may also be stated, that although the number of posts of Rs. 200 and above in the Telegraph Department is 664, only 86 of them have come within the purview of the Commission, and of these 46 belong to the engineering branch of the Telegraph Department.

The figures given above show that out of 1440 posts of Rs. 200 and above in the services, to which appointments are made in India, only 28 p. c. are held by Indians. If posts carrying salaries of Rs. 500 and upwards only are taken into account, we find that out of 218 such appointments no more than 25 or 11·5 percent fall to the share of Indians. The number of posts of Rs. 800 and over is 115. Of these only 8 or 7 p. c. are occupied by Indians.

These figures are startling enough, but their full significance can be grasped only when reference is made to the proportion which the European and Eurasian population bears to the total population of British India. Excluding the British Army, the Europeans and Eurasians number about 209,000, while the population of British India is over 240 millions. Their proportion to the population of British India is, therefore, 1 to 1100. But while they number 1 in 1100 of the population, they occupy nearly 75 p. c. of the higher appointments. The rights of Indians have been as ruthlessly violated in the locally recruited services as in those the personnel of which is drawn from Europe.

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missioner, nomination is the method of selection which prevails in every department. The meagre proportion of Indians in the departments concerned clearly proves that nomination has led to a great deal of favouritism, and the evidence relating to these departments shows that a sufficiently high standard of education is not demanded of Anglo-Indians. Yet the Commission is in favour of the continuance of nomination on the ground that a common examination would not equally suit candidates educated at the universities and in European schools, owing to the differences in their curricula, although it recommends that the power of nomination, instead of being exercised directly by Local Governments or heads of departments, should be used by them after consulting selection committees, which should consist, as a rule, of five members, of whom two should be Indians and two non-officials. Generally speaking, candidates should possess the degree of a university or have passed an examination of a corresponding standard prescribed by Government for European schools. Further, in order to safeguard the interests of Indians, the Commission lays down that the share of vacancies offered to Indians should not go below certain fixed proportions. With regard to the Northern India Salt Revenue Department where appointments are made in accordance with the result of a competitive examination, it proposes that at least one in every three candidates nominated to sit for the examination should be an Asiatic of unmixed descent. In the Salt and Excise Departments, in Madras and Bombay, at least every alternate vacancy should be given to an Indian. No recommendation is made with regard to Burma, but in the other provinces, where the cadres are new, the Commission anticipates "that a larger percentage will be given without question." In the Railway (stores), Survey (Madras) and Land Records

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(Burma) departments half the appointments to be made in future should be reserved for Indians. No proportion is fixed for the Post Office Department, because the Commission thinks that the number of Indians in it is sufficiently high.

The fixing of minimum proportions for Indians will certainly improve their position, but it will still leave a community, which is numerically insignificant, in possession of nearly 50 p. c. of the superior posts, not because it can excel others in a fair competition, but because Government has taken it under its wing. Besides, while Indians are expected to be graduates of a university, the standard is kept purposely low for Anglo-Indians so that they may have an advantage over Indians The only way of putting an end to the scandalous partiality shown to Anglo-Indians, and, at the same time, of getting efficient public servants is to make open competitive examinations among graduates of Indian universities the main avenue to admission into the services dealt with in this chapter. Insistence on the possession of a degree will keep the number of candidates within manageable limits, and, so, no previous nomination will be necessary. The Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs stated in his evidence that in the past "the Local Governments in Bombay and other Provinces held examinations for their Provincial Civil Services, and the Post Office would take the first or second man who just failed to get these posts." And he admitted that the recruits so obtained were not of an inferior quality. Before 1905 the higher ranks of the Excise and Salt Departments were recruited for a time by competition in Madras, and according to a Madras witness the system proved a success. In the Northern India Salt Revenue Department competition still prevails and its continuance is recommended by the Commission, although there is only

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Chapter XIV.

OTHER SERVICES.

The Customs, Indian and Military Finance and Railway (traffic) departments have not been considered so far. They will be briefly discussed in this chapter.

The Customs service was a provincial service before 1906, and was recruited mainly from among domiciled Europeans and Anglo-Indians. The inefficiency of the officers yielded by this system led to its abandonment in 1906. Its failure should have taught Government the unwisdom of confining selection to small communities, and resulted in throwing open the higher ranks to Indians. But the policy of racial exclusion was adhered to and it was decided to obtain the superior officers chiefly from England. The service was at the same reorganised and brought under the direct control of the Government of India. Candidates appointed in England are required to possess high educational qualifications or to "have taken a good place at the open competition for the Home and Indian Civil Services." The regulations relating to recruitment expressly state that "Indian candidates will not ordinarily be appointed by the Secretary of State in England."‡ Excluding the six posts reserved for members of the Indian Civil Service there were twenty posts of collector and assistant collector in the Customs Department, of which only three

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were held by Indians. The number of posts of Rs. 200 and over was 246. Of these no more than 27 were occupied by Indians.

The Commission is of opinion that there are no grounds of policy for recruiting the service from Europe, but on account of the "large part played by the European non-official community in the affairs of the great Indian seaports" it considers that it would be convenient from an administrative point of view to continue recruitment for a portion of the cadre from Europe. It recommends, however, that at least half the vacancies should be filled in future by statutory natives of India. Mr. Justice Rahim dissents from this recommendation on the ground that the fact that Customs officers have to deal with Europeans should not operate as a bar to the appointment of Indians. Indians will deal with them as successfully in this department as they do in other departments. He proposes, therefore, that the whole cadre should be recruited for in India.

MILITARY FINANCE DEPARTMENT.

The Military Finance Department was formerly recruited from the officers of the Indian Army, but the Secretary of State decided in 1909 to appoint civilians to it in future. The rules governing recruitment to this department are identical with those relating to the Customs Department. The Commission does not assign any proportion of appointments to Indians, but leaves it to Government to employ them "if no military reasons exist to the contrary." Mr. Justice Rahim would like, however, to reserve 25 per cent of the posts for Indians, until the time comes for amalgamating the Indian and Military Finance Departments. Indians were not employed in the Military Finance Department in the past for the same reasons which precluded the appointment of civilians in general. But it is to be manned by civi-

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INDIAN FINANCE DEPARTMENT.

The duties which devolve on the Indian Finance Department were performed formerly by the civil accounts branch, which was controlled by the Finance Department, and the superior officers of which constituted the enrolled list, and the accounts branch of the Public Works Department. The two branches were amalgamated in 1910, and the names of officers belonging to them are now borne on one list, known as the general list, although separate cadres are still maintained for them.

Before 1899, recruitment for both the branches was made in India. Direct recruits were generally selected by a competitive examination among nominated candidates. The nominees for two out of every three examinations were Europeans for the accounts branch of the Public Works Department, and Europeans and Anglo-Indians for the enrolled list. The candidates at every third examination were statutory natives of India. A change was made in this system in 1899, as suitable candidates were not available among Europeans and Anglo-Indians, and it was decided that 45 per cent. of the vacancies should be filled by men selected by the Secretary of State in England, 22 p. c. by statutory natives of India who succeeded in the competitive examination referred to above, and 33 per cent by the promotion of deserving subordinates or the appointment of qualified officers from other departments.

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decided that half the vacancies in the Civil accounts branch should be given to Indians of unmixed Asiatic descent and half to Europeans and Anglo-Indians, and that the power of making appointments by promotion from the lower ranks or by nomination should be exercised in exceptional cases only. Generally speaking, the same policy was adopted under pressure from Lord Morley in connection with the accounts branch of the Public Works Department, where "a very large proportion of the three-ninths vacancies assigned to promoted subordinates had gone to men of European parcentage and apparently as a result of the examinations being below the University standard and through more Europeans and Anglo-Indians than Indians having been nominated, most of the two-ninths examination vacancies had also gone to members of the domiciled community."* The rule now in force regarding the vacancies in the general list is that half of them must be recruited for from pure Indians. The Commission considers that there are no grounds of policy for recruiting for any proportion of the posts in England, and that in future recruitment should be confined to India. It recommends that one-sixth of the vacancies should be filled by promotion from the subordinate service, and that of the remaining vacancies two fifths should be filled by nomination, and three-fifths by examination "which has produced a body of highly qualified officers." Thus, half the posts are to be recruited for by examination, and one-third by nomination, while the remaining one-sixth are to be reserved for deserving subordinates. Nominations for direct appointments are to be made by the Government of India from candidates "possessing an educational qualifica-

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RAILWAY (TRAFFIC).

"It should be clearly understood," announced a resolution of the Government of India in 1879, "that all posts in the Revenue Establishments of State Railways are open to Natives of India, and as men in every respect qualified for the superior grades are found, the Government of India will be glad to receive from Local Administrations recommendations for their employment in suitable positions." Yet in 1913 there were only eleven Indians in the higher grades of revenue establishment which comprised 214 officers. Ten of them were employed in the traffic branch which consisted of 112 officers.

Before 1907 recruitment to the traffic branch of the Railway Department was made entirely in India, and, it appears from the evidence of the Secretary to the Railway Board, almost wholly from the domiciled community, but the appointment of Anglo-Indians exclusive-

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The Commission considers that a European element is necessary in the traffic department. This element can be supplied by the appointment of Royal Engineers. The rest of the staff should be recruited in India, and "in no case should application be made for the appointment of an officer in England if a suitably qualified candidate is available in India."

The question whether it is necessary on grounds of policy to recruit for a substantial proportion of the higher appointments from England has already been discussed in the chapter dealing with the engineering branch of the railway department, and need not therefore be discussed again. As for the recruitment of Royal Engineers, the Secretary to the Railway Board when questioned about it said, "He did not consider they were necessary, but the system provided suitable occupation for a certain number of Military officers in time of peace and a training for military emergencies." It does not appear from this that the services of Royal Engineers are needed in the traffic department, but if it is considered necessary for any reason to employ them, then, the rest of the staff should not merely be recruited in India but should consist largely of Indians, for, as Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim says, "it is specially important that there should be an adequate number of Indian officers in the traffic establishment as it may be expected that their knowledge of the customs and habits of the people will contribute materially to the smooth working of the passenger traffic on the railways."

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Chapter XV.

CONCLUSION.

Speaking in 1892 in a debate on Siam, Sir Charles Crosthwaite is reported to have said, that the most important consideration to be kept in view was how "to find fresh markets for our goods and also employment for those superfluous articles of the present day, our boys."§ The Islington Commission appears to have looked at things from the same point of view. It has shown itself fully alive to the importance of preserving the means for the disposal of the superfluous commodities which caused Sir Charles Crosthwaite so much anxiety. It is true that it shows a praiseworthy recognition of the principle that the services of a country should be recruited within its own borders in the case of the scientific and technical services and the Finance Department, and that its recommendations represent an advance on the present state of things. But in the case of the Indian Civil and Police services it enunciates a principle which is a violation of our constitutional rights. The doctrine it lays down implies that the principle of British sovereignty carries with it the corollary that power must for ever be wielded by men of British birth, and teaches Indians that the maintenance of British rule is incompatible with their highest development. This is a dangerous principle, and cannot be too strongly repudiated in the interests of India and the Empire alike. Again, as has been repeatedly stated, the most important services in India are the Indian Civil, police, educational, medical and engineer-

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Deep and passionate dissatisfaction with existing conditions prevailed throughout the country even when the Commission began its enquiry, and it was plain that the sedulous exclusion of Indians from high offices had contributed not a little to its growth. One European witness after another expatiated on the political unrest and advanced it as a reason for standing still. This unrest was only a symptom of the resentment which educated Indians felt at being condemned to be hewers of wood and drawers of water in their own country. It was a proof that they were losing all faith in the good intentions of British statesmen. Its history shows that it was the outcome of a feeling of despair, which in some cases drove sensitive minds to adopt desperate courses of action, and the intense longing for a new order based on principles of justice and equality. This yearning has been strengthened by the war, which broke out long before the Commission submitted its report, and which has put a new face on Indian politics. It has produced a profound change in men's outlooks and their attitude towards the deeper problems of life, and led everywhere to a searching examination of the basis on which the existing order rests. The causes which have influenced other countries have been at work in India also. They have burned into her soul the value of liberty. A new wave of enthusiasm has

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Appendix No. I.

Recruitment of Services in India and England.

Department.	No. of officers in service recruited.		Total Number of Officers in the Department.
	In England.	In India.	
1. Indian civil service...	1,350	61 (1)	1,411
Provincial civil services—Executive branches ...	...	1,527	1,527
Provincial civil service—Judicial branches	...	1,045	1,045
2. Agricultural—Imperial service	62	...	62
" Provincial service	...	56	56
3. Civil veterinary—Imperial service	34	...	34
" " Provincial service	...	36	36
4. Customs (2)	20	...	20
5. Education—Imperial service	199	...	199
" Provincial service	...	386	386
" Women's appointments	17	31	48

(1) Officers promoted from the provincial services.
(2) Ordinarily recruited in England.

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Appendix No. I.—(*Continued.*)

Department.	No. of Officers in service recruited.		Total Number of Officers in the Department.
	In England.	In India.	
6. Factory and boiler inspection	14 (1)	24	38
7. Indian finance (2)	82	81	163
8. Military finance	57	...	57
9. Forest—Imperial service	213	...	213
„ Provincial service	...	208	208
10. Geological survey	21	...	21
11. Land records (Burma)	...	48	48
12. Medical (including jails and sanitary)			
Superior Appointmets	446	120	566
Appointments of minor importance	...	821	821
13. Mines	5	...	5
14. Mint and assay	7	...	7

(1) Factory inspectors—ordinarily recruited in England or amongst Europeans in India.
(2) Recruited half in England and half in India.

Appendix No. I.—(*Continued.*)

Department.	No. of Officers in service recruited.		Total Number of Officers in the Department.
	In England.	In India.	
6. Factory and boiler inspection	14 (1)	24	38
7. Indian finance (2)	82	81	163
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9. Forest—Imperial service	213	...	213
,, Provincial service	...	208	208
10. Geological survey	21	...	21
11. Land records (Burma)	...	48	48
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Appointments of minor importance	...	821	821
13. Mines	5	...	5
14. Mint and assay	7	...	7

(1) Factory inspectors—ordinarily recruited in England or amongst Europeans in India.
(2) Recruited half in England and half in India.

Appendix No. I.—(*Continued.*)

Department.	No. of Officers in service recruited.		Total Number of Officers in the Department.
	In England.	In India.	
15. Pilots (Bengal)	74 (2)	...	74
16. Police—Imperial service	661	10 (6)	671
" Provincial service	...	255	255
17. Post office and telegraph—Post office	...	247	247
" Telegraph (traffic)	...	40	40
" Telegraph (engineering)	23 (2)	23 (2)	46
18. Public works, including railway (engineering) ...	648 (3)	280 (4)	928
19. Railway (revenue)—Management	7	...	7
" " Traffic (5)	67	45	112
" " Locomotive...	60	...	60

(1) Mainly recruited in England.
(2) The service is equally divided between imperial and provincial branches.
(3) Imperial service.
(4) Provincial service.
(5) Three-fifths recruited in England and two-fifths in India
(6) Officers promoted from the provincial service.

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

Appendix No. I.—(*Continued.*)

Department.	No. of Officers in service recruited.		Total Number of Officers in the Department.
	In England.	In India.	
15. Pilots (Bengal)	74 (2)	...	74
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(3) Imperial service.
(4) Provincial service.
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(6) Officers promoted from the provincial service.

Appendix No. I.—(*Continued.*)

Department.	No. of officers in service recruited.		Total Number of Officers in the Department.
	In England.	In India.	
Railway (revenue)—Carriage and wagon	17	...	17
" " Stores	...	18	18
20. Registration	...	21	21
21. Northern India salt revenue	...	45	45
22. Salt and excise	5 (1)	262	267
23. Survey of India—Imperial service	51	...	51
" " Provincial service	...	96	96
24. Survey (Madras)	...	23	23
Total ...	4,140	5,809	9,949

(1) Distillery experts.

Appendix No. I.—(*Continued.*)

Department.	No. of officers in service recruited.		Total Number of Officers in the Department.
	In England.	In India.	
Railway (revenue)—Carriage and wagon	17	...	17
" " Stores	...	18	18
20. Registration	...	21	21
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" " Provincial service	...	96	96
24. Survey (Madras)	...	23	23
Total ...	4,140	5,809	9,949

(1) Distillery experts.

[illegible]

Appendix No. II.

(A) *Civil Appointments of Rs. 200 and upwards on the 1st April, 1913.*

Department.	Europeans and Anglo-Indians.			Indians and Burmans.	Grand Total.	Percentage of Indians and Burmans to Grand Total.
	Europeans.	Anglo-Indians.	Total.			
1. Agricultural	59	3	62	50	112	45
2. Civil veterinary	35	3	38	14	52	27
3. Customs	104	115	219	27	246	11
4. Education	273	61	334	493	827	60
5. Facory and boiler inspection	17	4	21	...	21	...
6. Indian finance	76	51	127	59	186	32
7. Military finance	68	8	76	3	79	4
8. Forest	239	62	301	96	397	24
9. Geological survey	19	...	19	3	22	14
10. Indian civil service	1,305	3	1,308	63	1,371	5
Provincial civil service (executive)	54	141	195	1,308	1,503	87
" " " (judicial)	2	12	14	915	929	98
11. Land records (Burma)	1	38	39	6	45	13
12. Medical (including jail and sanitary)	380	142	522	238	760	31
13. Mines	5	...	5	...	5	...
14. Mint and assay	7	...	7	...	7	...
15. Pilots (Bengal)	39	16	55	...	55	...
16. Police	821	87	908	450	1,358	33
17. Post office	106	39	145	132	277	48
Telegraph	162	441	603	61	664	9

A

Appendix No. II.

(A) *Civil Appointments of Rs. 200 and upwards on the 1st April, 1913.*

Department.	Europeans and Anglo-Indians.			Indians and Burmans.	Grand Total.	Percentage of Indians and Burmans to Grand Total.
	Europeans.	Anglo-Indians.	Total.			
1. Agricultural	59	3	62	50	112	45
2. Civil veterinary	35	3	38	14	52	27
3. Customs	104	115	219	27	246	11
4. Education	273	61	334	493	827	60
5. Facory and boiler inspection	17	4	21	...	21	...
6. Indian finance	76	51	127	59	186	32
7. Military finance	68	8	76	3	79	4
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13. Mines	5	...	5	...	5	...
14. Mint and assay	7	...	7	...	7	...
15. Pilots (Bengal)	39	16	55	...	55	...
16. Police	821	87	908	450	1,358	33
17. Post office	106	39	145	132	277	48
Telegraph	162	441	603	61	664	9

A

Appendix No. II (A)— *ued.*

Department.	Europeans and Anglo-Indians.			Indians and Burmans.	Grand Total.	Percentage of Indians and Burmans to Grand Total.
	Europeans.	Anglo-Indians.	Total.			
18. Public Works	608	80	688	378	1,066	35
19. Railway	330	72	402	45	447	10
20. Registration	...	1	1	63	64	98
21. Northern India salt revenue	16	15	31	5	36	14
22. Salt and excise	110	98	208	130	338	38
23. Survey of India	53	100	153	28	181	15
24. Survey (Madras)...	9	1	10	6	16	38
Total ...	4,898	1,593	6,491	4,573	11,064	42

Appendix No. II (A)— *ued.*

Department.	Europeans and Anglo-Indians.			Indians and Burmans.	Grand Total.	Percentage of Indians and Burmans to Grand Total.
	Europeans.	Anglo-Indians.	Total.			
18. Public Works	608	80	688	378	1,066	35
19. Railway	330	72	402	45	447	10
20. Registration	...	1	1	63	64	98
21. Northern India salt revenue	16	15	31	5	36	14
22. Salt and excise	110	98	208	130	338	38
23. Survey of India	53	100	153	28	181	15
24. Survey (Madras)...	9	1	10	6	16	38
Total ...	4,898	1,593	6,491	4,573	11,064	42

Appendix No. II.

(B) *Civil Appointments of Rs. 500 and upwards on the 1st April, 1913.*

Departments.	Europeans and Anglo-Indians.			Indians and Burmans.	Grand Total.	Percentage of Indians and Burmans to Grand Total.
	Europeans.	Anglo-Indians.	Total.			
1. Agriculture	50	...	50	...	50	...
5. Civil veterinary...	31	1	32	...	32	...
3. Customs	28	6	34	3	37	8
4. Education	215	8	223	45	268	17
5. Factory and boiler inspection	12	1	13	...	13	...
6. Indian finance	66	47	113	45	158	28
7. Military finance...	55	8	63	2	65	3
8. Forest	183	30	213	26	239	11
9. Geological survey	15	...	15	2	17	12
10. Indian civil service	1,212	3	1,215	59	1,274	5
Provincial civil service (Executive) ...	20	47	67	332	399	83
" " (Judicial)	2	2	4	234	238	98
11. Land records (Burma)	1	12	13	3	16	19
12. Medical (including jail and sanitary)	341	34	375	36	411	9
13. Mines	5	...	5	...	5	...
14. Mint and assay	7	...	7	...	7	...
15. Pilots (Bengal)	32	14	46	...	46	...
16. Police	488	19	507	28	535	5
17. Post office	32	9	41	5	46	11
Telegraph	71	8	79	9	88	10

Appendix No. II.

(B) *Civil Appointments of Rs. 500 and upwards on the 1st April, 1913.*

Departments.	Europeans and Anglo-Indians.			Indians and Burmans.	Grand Total.	Percentage of Indians and Burmans to Grand Total.
	Europeans.	Anglo-Indians.	Total.			
1. Agriculture	50	...	50	...	50	...
5. Civil veterinary...	31	1	32	...	32	...
3. Customs	28	6	34	3	37	8
4. Education	215	8	223	45	268	17
5. Factory and boiler inspection	12	1	13	...	13	...
6. Indian finance	66	47	113	45	158	28
7. Military finance...	55	8	63	2	65	3
8. Forest	183	30	213	26	239	11
9. Geological survey	15	...	15	2	17	12
10. Indian civil service	1,212	3	1,215	59	1,274	5
Provincial civil service (Executive) ...	20	47	67	332	399	83
" " (Judicial)	2	2	4	234	238	98
11. Land records (Burma)	1	12	13	3	16	19
12. Medical (including jail and sanitary)	341	34	375	36	411	9
13. Mines	5	...	5	...	5	...
14. Mint and assay	7	...	7	...	7	...
15. Pilots (Bengal)	32	14	46	...	46	...
16. Police	488	19	507	28	535	5
17. Post office	32	9	41	5	46	11
Telegraph	71	8	79	9	88	10

Appendix No. II. (B) *Continued.*

Department.	Europeans Anglo-Indians.			Indians and Burmans.	Grand Total.	Percentage of Indians and Burmans to Grand Total.
	Europeans.	Anglo-Indians.	Total.			
18. Public works	471	22	493	85	578	15
19. Railway	257	42	299	19	318	6
20. Registration	...	1	1	3	4	75
21. Northern India salt revenue	5	2	7	...	7	...
22. Salt and excise	32	13	45	5	50	10
23. Survey of India	53	22	75	1	76	1
24. Survey (Madras)	7	...	7	...	7	...
Total ...	3,691	351	4,042	942	4,984	19

Appendix No. II. (B) *Continued.*

Department.	Europeans Anglo-Indians.			Indians and Burmans.	Grand Total.	Percentage of Indians and Burmans to Grand Total.
	Europeans.	Anglo-Indians.	Total.			
18. Public works	471	22	493	85	578	15
19. Railway	257	42	299	19	318	6
20. Registration	...	1	1	3	4	75
21. Northern India salt revenue	5	2	7	...	7	...
22. Salt and excise	32	13	45	5	50	10
23. Survey of India	53	22	75	1	76	1
24. Survey (Madras)	7	...	7	...	7	...
Total ...	3,691	351	4,042	942	4,984	19

Appendix No. II.

(C) *Civil Appointments of Rs. 800 and upwards on the 1st April, 1913.*

Department.	Europeans and Anglo-Indians.			Indians and Burmans.	Grand Total.	Percentage of Indians and Burmans to Grand Total.
	Europeans.	Anglo-Indians.	Total.			
1. Agricultural	30	...	30	...	30	...
2. Civil veterinary...	13	...	13	...	13	...
3. Customs	10	...	10	1	11	9
4. Education	90	1	91	2	93	2
5. Factory and boiler inspection	2	...	2	...	2	...
6. Indian finance	47	26	73	16	89	18
7. Military finance...	30	...	30	...	30	...
8. Forest	120	2	122	6	128	5
9. Geological survey	6	...	6	1	7	14
10. Indian civil service	741	2	743	29	772	4
Provincial civil service (executive)	6	7	13	36	49	73
" " (judicial)	2	2	4	75	79	95
11. Land records (Burma)	...	2	2	...	2	...
12. Medical (including jail and sanitary)	218	10	228	9	237	
13. Mines	4	...	4	...	4	
14. Mint and assay	7	...	7	...	7	...
15. Pilots (Bengal)	20	11	31	...	31	...
16. Police	262	4	266	3	269	1
17. Post office	25	...	25	2	27	7
Telegraph	51	1	52	3	55	5

Appendix No. II.

(C) *Civil Appointments of Rs. 800 and upwards on the 1st April, 1913.*

Department.	Europeans and Anglo-Indians.			Indians and Burmans.	Grand Total.	Percentage of Indians and Burmans to Grand Total.
	Europeans.	Anglo-Indians.	Total.			
1. Agricultural	30	...	30	...	30	...
2. Civil veterinary...	13	...	13	...	13	...
3. Customs	10	...	10	1	11	9
4. Education	90	1	91	2	93	2
5. Factory and boiler inspection	2	...	2	...	2	...
6. Indian finance	47	26	73	16	89	18
7. Military finance...	30	...	30	...	30	...
8. Forest	120	2	122	6	128	5
9. Geological survey	6	...	6	1	7	14
10. Indian civil service	741	2	743	29	772	4
Provincial civil service (executive)	6	7	13	36	49	73
" " (judicial)	2	2	4	75	79	95
11. Land records (Burma)	...	2	2	...	2	...
12. Medical (including jail and sanitary)	218	10	228	9	237	
13. Mines	4	...	4	...	4	...
14. Mint and assay	7	...	7	...	7	...
15. Pilots (Bengal)	20	11	31	...	31	...
16. Police	262	4	266	3	269	1
17. Post office	25	...	25	2	27	7
Telegraph	51	1	52	3	55	5

Appendix No. II. (C) *Continued.*

Department.	Europeans and Anglo-Indians.			Indians and Burmans.	Grand Total.	Percentage of Indians and Burmans to Grand Total.
	Europeans.	Anglo-Indians	Total.			
18. Public works	247	15	262	45	307	15
19. Railway	155	17	172	11	183	6
20. Registration	...	1	1	1	2	50
21. Northern India salt revenue	2	1	3	...	3	...
22. Salt and excise...	18	2	20	2	22	9
23. Survey of India...	43	2	45	...	45	...
24. Survey (Madras)	4	...	4	...	4	...
Total ...	2,153	106	2,259	242	2,501	10

Appendix No. II. (C) *Continued.*

Department.	Europeans and Anglo-Indians.			Indians and Burmans.	Grand Total.	Percentage of Indians and Burmans to Grand Total.
	Europeans.	Anglo-Indians	Total.			
18. Public works	247	15	262	45	307	15
19. Railway	155	17	172	11	183	6
20. Registration	...	1	1	1	2	50
21. Northern India salt revenue	2	1	3	...	3	...
22. Salt and excise...	18	2	20	2	22	9
23. Survey of India...	43	2	45	...	45	...
24. Survey (Madras)	4	...	4	...	4	...
Total ...	2,153	106	2,259	242	2,501	10

Appendix No. III.

The employment of Europeans and Anglo-Indians in the services as compared with that of pure Asiatic Indians.

(Extract from Sir M. B. Chaubal's minute of dissent—Report of the Public Services Commission).

According to the last census, out of a total population of over 302,000,000 in the country, there are only 199,787 Europeans and allied races (of whom 91,000 form the army, with their wives and dependents), and a little over 100,000 Anglo-Indians. So, roughly, for the purposes of recruitment for the public services in India, the total population between these two communities is about 209,000 or 210,000. The tendency in the latter to return themselves as pure Europeans, and in some of the Indian Christians to return themselves as Anglo-Indians, has been noticed both at the last census and in the earlier ones. Thus, strictly, the number of real Anglo-Indians would appear to be even a smaller figure than that given above. To the whole population they stand in the proportion of 1 to 1400. Assuming all of them to be literate in English, these two communities stand to the Indian literate population as 1 to 6. It should be noted that the European population given in the census includes all those that are in India purely temporarily for pnrposes of Government service or trade. The permanent European population must be very small indeed, and this, together with the Anglo-Indian population, would probably stand as 1 to 10 in literacy. The Anglo-Indian community by itself stands to the general Indian population as 1 in 3,000, and in literacy in English they stand as 1 in 13. With these figures one will be able to appreciate the surprisingly large number of posts held by Europeans and Anglo-Indians in the public services as against the natives of the country. Out of 11,064—the total number of posts—6,491, or 58 per cent., are held by the members of this small community. As regards posts of Rs. 500 and above, out of a total of 4, 984 they hold 4,042, i. e., 81 per cent., and as regards posts of Rs. 800 and above, out of a total of 2,501 they hold 2,259, or 90 per cent.

It is a matter of common knowledge that only a few out of this community possess or can acquire the educational qualification and the

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It is a matter of common knowledge that only a few out of this community possess or can acquire the educational qualification and the

acquaintance with the vernaculars necessary for entry into the executive and judicial departments of the provincial service ; and, therefore, there are now only a few from this community employed in those departments, and naturally the great bulk of this provincial service is recruited from the Asiatic Indian communities. Let us, therefore, exclude this service from consideration, and see how they stand as regards the other 23 services inquired into. If we exclude the Indian and the provincial civil services, the total number of posts of Rs. 200 and above, Rs. 500 and above, and Rs. 800 and above, is respectively 7,261, 3,073, and 1,601. Out of these, 4,974, 2,756, and 1,499 respectively are at the present day held by the members of the two communities, i. e., the percentages of higher posts held by them are 69, 90, and 94, as against 31, 10, and 6 held by Asiatic Indians. And more or less, with trifling differences, the necessary qualifications for employment in these services are and can be acquired by both Europeans and Anglo-Indians as well as Asiatic Indians. In paragraph 34 of the report an improvement of the percentage of Indians and Burmese in 1913 is shown as compared with the state of things in 1887, and it is observed that in view of the progress made by the country in the interval this increase is inadequate. Perhaps the degree of inadequacy would be higher and the increase only nominal if in 1887 the posts in the new province of Burma were not included in the calculation.

These figures speak for themselves and indicate roughly how wide the field for the larger employment of the real natives of the country is at the present day. If the three communities are taken separately, the percentage of Europeans, Anglo-Indians, and Asiatic Indians (excluding the Indian and provincial civil services) stand at 48·7, 19·8, 31·5 in the Rs. 200 and above posts ; 80·0, 9·7, 10·3 in the Rs. 500 and above posts ; and 87·7, 5·9, 6·4 in the Rs. 800 and above posts. The very meagre percentage of the Asiatic Indians in the higher service ought not to be hidden from view by lumping the Anglo-Indians and the Asiatic Indians together, under the plausible excuse of the definition of " statutory natives of India " in the Act. In the third question for inquiry in our terms of reference, the term " non-Europeans " is rightly construed to mean and refer to pure Asiatic Indians only, and I am of the opinion that this construction should be upheld throughout. It is a mistake in the present circumstances to class the Anglo-Indian with the Asiatic native of India.

acquaintance with the vernaculars necessary for entry into the executive and judicial departments of the provincial service ; and, therefore, there are now only a few from this community employed in those departments, and naturally the great bulk of this provincial service is recruited from the Asiatic Indian communities. Let us, therefore, exclude this service from consideration, and see how they stand as regards the other 23 services inquired into. If we exclude the Indian and the provincial civil services, the total number of posts of Rs. 200 and above, Rs. 500 and above, and Rs. 800 and above, is respectively 7,261, 3,073, and 1,601. Out of these, 4,974, 2,756, and 1,499 respectively are at the present day held by the members of the two communities, i. e., the percentages of higher posts held by them are 69, 90, and 94, as against 31, 10, and 6 held by Asiatic Indians. And more or less, with trifling differences, the necessary qualifications for employment in these services are and can be acquired by both Europeans and Anglo-Indians as well as Asiatic Indians. In paragraph 34 of the report an improvement of the percentage of Indians and Burmese in 1913 is shown as compared with the state of things in 1887, and it is observed that in view of the progress made by the country in the interval this increase is inadequate. Perhaps the degree of inadequacy would be higher and the increase only nominal if in 1887 the posts in the new province of Burma were not included in the calculation.

These figures speak for themselves and indicate roughly how wide the field for the larger employment of the real natives of the country is at the present day. If the three communities are taken separately, the percentage of Europeans, Anglo-Indians, and Asiatic Indians (excluding the Indian and provincial civil services) stand at 48·7, 19·8, 31·5 in the Rs. 200 and above posts ; 80·0, 9·7, 10·3 in the Rs. 500 and above posts ; and 87·7, 5·9, 6·4 in the Rs. 800 and above posts. The very meagre percentage of the Asiatic Indians in the higher service ought not to be hidden from view by lumping the Anglo-Indians and the Asiatic Indians together, under the plausible excuse of the definition of " statutory natives of India " in the Act. In the third question for inquiry in our terms of reference, the term " non-Europeans " is rightly construed to mean and refer to pure Asiatic Indians only, and I am of the opinion that this construction should be upheld throughout. It is a mistake in the present circumstances to class the Anglo-Indian with the Asiatic native of India.

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Whatever the schisms and sects and divisions among the latter, they all consider each other to belong to a common land, and they do not consider the Anglo-Indian to be in any sense a native of the country, and the Anglo-Indian will not consider the interests he has in common with the rest of the inhabitants of the country and try to get over or reduce that feeling. On the contrary, he takes a pride in being considered to be a non-Indian. He evidently thinks it would reduce his chance of being classed with the European, and it would seem to be his ambition to be so classed. He thinks he has no permanent interest in common with the masses of the population; and with the masses the Anglo-Indian poses to be as great a "sahib" as the pure European. In these circumstances I think he ought not, for the convenient purposes of getting into Government employ, be allowed to take advantage of the statutory definition; besides, it rests purely with himself to describe himself as being born of parents habitually resident in India and not established there for temporary purposes only. His position is anomalous, as he can be an Indian for getting into Government service at the same time that he can claim, along with the European, certain exemptions under the arms act and the other privileges of European British subjects. For these reasons the Asiatic Indian would rather that his ambition is gratified, and that he should be classed with Europeans in India for all purposes, except his remuneration, in respect of which the special considerations referred to in the report for a higher salary to persons recruited in Europe would have no application.

A number of difficulties and complications would disappear with an amendment of the definition in this direction. Anglo-Indians, have separate schools started for them with an European sohools course. They can, if they choose, take advantage of the educational insititutions started by Government for the other Indian communities, but the latter cannot take advantage of the schools started for them. And, owing to his colour and his European education, the Anglo-Indian finds it easier to get a disproportionate reprepentation in the public services of the country. One has only to glance at the figures in the higher service in such departments as the salt and excise, Bengal pilots, Burma land records, customs, factory and boilers, forests, Indian finance, medical (and Government of India medical), sanitary, military

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finance, Northern India salt revenue, state railways, survey of India, and telegraph, to see how, as against the pure Asiatic Indian, the Anglo-Indians have practically monopolised these departments. Indeed, the fear is that the recommendation in the report to alter the present educational qualification for entry into the executive branch of the provincial services by the recognition of "an examination of a corresponding standard in the European schools course" is likely to bring in a large number of Anglo-Indians or domiciled Europeans into this department in which at present they find admission difficult.

When, therefore, it is proposed that in certain departments where there has to be recruitment partially in Europe and partially in India, the proportion should be half-and-half, it only definitely safeguards the interests of the Europeans, and for the other half competition is introduced between the Anglo-Indians and the Asiatic Indians in which, for reasons not necessary to mention, the former are bound to score. There is no difinite recommendation, so far as I can see, calculated to remedy this. Reliance is placed on nomination, but it has to be borne in mind that the present unfair and unequal distribution has come into existence under and because of a system of nomination. In paragraph 31, for instance, it is observed that for eight services (*with the exception of a few specialist appointments*), viz., (i) post office, (ii) telegraph (traffic), (iii) land records (Burma), (iv) railway (stores), (v) registration, (vi) Northern India salt revenue, (vii) salt and excise, and (viii) survey (Madras), recruitment is made in India. *Prima facie*, this would convey the impression that a large number of Asiatic Indians would be found in these departments, in the higher posts, but what are the facts?

Service.	Total number of posts of Rs. 200 and above	Europeans.	Anglo-Indians.	Pure Asiatics.
1. Post Office	277	106	39	132
2. Telegraph	664	162	441	61
3. Land records (Burma)	45	1	38	6
4. Railway...	447	330	72	45
5. Registration	64	—	1	63
6. Northern India Salt revenue ...	36	16	15	5
7. Salt and excise... ...	338	110	98	130
8. Survey (Madras) ...	16	9	1	6
	1,887	735	705	448

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[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
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[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

The percentage of Asiatic Indians to Europeans and Anglo-Indians together is 23 to 77, being almost equal as between themselves. Out of 536 posts of Rs. 500 and above, 492 are held by Europeans and Anglo-Indians, i. e., 91·8 per cent; and of 298 posts of Rs. 800 and above, 279 are held by them, i. e., 93·6. Thus the Indian percentage in the three classes is only 23, 8·2, and 6·4. And yet they are all services recruited in India. This illustrates how large still is the field for the wider employment of Asiatic Indians in services in which recruitment is ordinarily stated to be within the country. In view of the present figures, it would be more appropriate to call them Europe recruited services than Indian recruited.

The remedy I propose is that the Anglo-Indians should be classed with Europeans, and the minimum of 50 per cent. should be reserved for Asiatic Indians. But if there be insuperable difficulties in changing the statutory definition and if the Anglo-Indian, because of his theoretic adoption of India as his country, is to be classed as a community in India, along with the other Asiatic communities, I strongly maintain that the qualifying examination for admission into Government service should be the same examination for all communities. The only substantial point of difference between the European schools course and an Indian university course is the second language, which has to be a European classic for the former. But common examination with different second languages are not a novelty in India. The European schools must teach up to the B. A. standard, and if any Anglo-Indians care to seek admission into the Government service, they must, like any other of the Asiatic Indians, submit themselves for the degree examination of an Indian University. Otherwise I see no escape from the charge that a lower educational standard is permitted by Government to get into its service a favourde community at a comparatively lower age. And their representative on the Commission emphatically asserted that his community wanted no favour—and only cared for an equality of terms along with others

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Appendix No. IV.

Recruitment of the Judiciary.

[Extract from Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim's minute of dissent—Report of the Public Services Commission p. 435].

The defects of the Indian civil service system in ensuring the qualification needed for judges have long agitated the minds of the Indian authorities and have been growing more and more manifest with time, until after an active correspondence which went on between the Government of India and the Secretary of State from 1903 to 1907 the Government of India (Lord Minto, Lord Kitchener, H. Earle Richards, law member, E. N. Baker, of the Indian civil service, C. H. Scott, military member, and J. F. Finlay, of the Indian civil service; J. O. Miller, of the Indian civil service, and H. Adamson, of the Indian Civil Service dissentients) recorded its opinion of the situation in these emphatic terms:—"It would be difficult to exaggerate the political dangers of the present situation or the importance of effecting a material improvement in the capacity, training and status of the Indian civil service judges. It is impossible at any rate in the advanced provinces to justify a system under which a gentleman who has no knowledge of civil law and who has never been inside a civil court in his life can be and often is at one step promoted to be a judge of appeal in civil cases, and to hear appeals from subordinate judges who are trained lawyers with years of legal experience." Then in another paragraph they observe, "If, however, we contrast the circumstances of the present day with those of a generation back, the considerations at once suggest themselves that the law which the modern civilian is called upon to administer is far more complicated, while the legal profession has vastly increased in numbers and has attained a far higher standard of training. At the same time the knowledge of law possessed by the natives of India generally, and their disposition to appeal has gone through a remarkable development....It is most frequently in criminal matters that the native newspapers attack our administration of justice, and that errors and irregularities have been a subject of public criticism. It is in such cases in all countries that miscarriage of justice attracts

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most attention, but in civil and revenue cases affecting private rights it can scarcely be doubted that similar errors occur, and the departmental proceedings which come before us frequently disclose surprising ignorance...Incompetent men cannot retain their position in the face of a well founded criticism which is becoming more and more searching as time goes on. On public grounds it is imperative that drastic steps should be taken to remove this blot on our administration."*

It should be pointed out that these observations must have had reference to the work of men most of whom had been admitted to the service prior to 1892, i. e., when the probation was for two years. Very few of those who were admitted to the service after that year, when probation was reduced to one year, could have been district and sessions judges for any length of time during the period of 1903–1907, so the effort which was made by Sir Harvey Adamson and repeated before us by the Indian civil service witnesses to explain the position with reference to the period of probation has nothing in its support.

* Letter from the Government of India to the Secretary of State No. 16, dated Simla, 4th July 1907.

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Appendix No. V.

Salaries of Junior Officers in the I. C. S.

[Extract from the Report of the Public Services Commission pp. 179–80].

Under the prasent scale the normal range of their salaries is through grades of Rs. 500, Rs. 700, and Rs. 900 a month, plus exchange compensation allowance. They also draw substantial allowances for officiating in the superior posts, and it has been laid down that they may expect to be so officiating without fear of being reverted after completing eight years' service. In practice, however, owing to blocks in promotion, this expectation has been falsified, and grave dissatisfaction on this score undoubtedly exists throughout the service. We are satisfied that this is reacting prejudicially on recruitment, and that young men in England are now turning their thoughts in the direction of the Home civil service in consequence The position was recently considered in connection with the officer seconded from the Indian civil service for duty in the political department when, after much discussion, an incremental scale was sanctioned for all officers, whether holding superior or training posts. This was expressly stated to have been calculated at a rate which would give members of the Indian Civil Service approximately the emoluments which they might expect to draw in the provinces and has since been extended to the officers employed under the Government of India in the new Delhi administration. The actual scale up to the eleventh year, the figures of which include exchange compensation allowance, is as follows :—

Year of service.	Pay Rs.	Year of service.	Pay Rs.
1st	Civilians will not usually be recruited till they have been three years in the provinces.	6th	750
2nd		7th	850
3rd		8th	900
		9th	1,050
4th	650	10th	1,150
5th	700	11th	1,250

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The scale is also continued until it reaches Rs. 2,400 a month for all officers of the Indian Civil Service in their 21st, and for military officers in their 23rd year and over. Subject to certain provisos an officer, who has not completed nine years' civil service, also draws, when posted to an appointment classed as superior, a charge allowance of Rs. 200 a month.

We are satisfied that nothing less than these terms will suffice to re-establish the attractiveness of this service, and we see obvious advantages in adopting the same figures. In view of the fact, however, that for reasons given in our report, we have preferred a compartment scale, which will be less favourable to the service as a whole, we advise that the allowance for holding a superior appointment be increased from Rs. 200 to Rs. 350 a month. Allowing Rs. 450, Rs. 500, and Rs. 550 a month for the first three years of our scale, the figures, which include exchange compensation allowance, will be for junior officers as follows :—

Year of service.	Pay Rs.	Year of service.	Pay Rs.
1st	450	7th	850
2nd	500	8th	900
3rd	550	9th	1,050
4th	650	10th	1,150
5th	700	11th and over.	1,250
6th	750		

We would also impose the following conditions :—

(i) no officer should draw more than Rs. 500 a month until he has passed his departmental examinations by the prescribed standards ;

(ii) no officer should draw more than Rs. 900 a month unless he is certified by the local Government to be qualified for a charge superior to that of a sub-collector ; an officer whose pay is restricted under the operation of this rule should ordinarily lose in seniority ;

(iii) an officer when posted to officiate in an appointment classed as superior should draw an allowance of Rs. 350 a month, subject to the condition that the combined pay and allowance received by him shall not exceed the lowest pay of the class of appointment in which he is officiating.

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Under this scheme every officer who joins the service will be certain of a salary which will rise gradually to Rs. 900 a month in his eighth year, whilst he may, if promotion is good, officiate for odd months in superior appointments, which will bring him in Rs. 350 a month extra. Thereafter, in his ninth year he will, in provinces other than Madras and Bombay, normally be receiving Rs. 1,400 a month, in his tenth, Rs. 1,500 a month, and in his eleventh and subsequent years Rs. 1,600 a month, until he gets his permanent step, when he will start afresh from that point In Madras, where there will be a grade of sub-collectors on Rs. 1,500 a month, an officer, so long as he was doing only sub-collector's work, would draw Rs. 1,400 in his ninth, and Rs. 1,500 in his tenth and eleventh years of service. Similarly, in Bombay where there will be a grade of sub-collectors on Rs. 1,350 a month, an officer who was doing sub-collector's work, would not draw more than this amount whether in his ninth, tenth, or eleventh year of service. In both these presidencies an officer would receive Rs. 1,400, Rs. 1,500 or Rs. 1,600 a month when he came to act as collector, and as soon as he got his permanent step to a sub-collectorship would, if acting as a collector, receive an officiating allowance under the rules now in force. In all the provinces, if promotion were blocked, officers would rise in their eleventh year to Rs. 1,250 a month and remain on that salary until promoted.

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Appendix No. VI.

Invalid Annuities for the I. C. S.

Period of Service.	Amount of annuity admissible before 1905.	Amount of annuity admissible under existing rules.
	£	£
Less than 5 years ...	Gratuity of 500 ...	Gratuity of 500
5 years ...	Annuity of 150 ...	Annuity of 150
6 years ...	,, 170 ...	,, 170
7 ,, ...	,, 190 ...	,, 190
8 ,, ...	,, 210 ...	,, 210
9 ,, ...	,, 230 ...	,, 230
10 ,, ...	,, 250 ...	,, 250
11 ,, ...	,, 270 ...	,, 270
12 ,, ...	,, 290 ...	,, 290
13 ,, ...	,, 310 ...	,, 320
14 ,, ...	,, 330 ...	,, 350
15 ,, ...	,, 350 ...	,, 380
16 ,, ...	,, 370 ...	,, 410
17 ,, ...	,, 390 ...	,, 440
18 ,, ...	,, 410 ...	,, 470
19 ,, ...	,, 430 ...	,, 500
20 ,, ...	,, 450 ...	,, 530
21 ,, ...	,, 450 ...	,, 560
22 ,, ...	,, 450 ...	,, 590
23 ,, ...	,, 450 ...	,, 620
24 ,, ...	,, 450 ...	,, 660
25 ,, (with less than 21 years of active service.)	.....	,, 700
	.....	.....

N. B.—Annuity after 25 years' of service, including 21 years of active service £ 1,000.

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Period of Service.	Amount of annuity admissible before 1905.	Amount of annuity admissible under existing rules.
	£	£
Less than 5 years ...	Gratuity of 500 ...	Gratuity of 500
5 years ...	Annuity of 150 ...	Annuity of 150
6 years ...	,, 170 ...	,, 170
7 ,, ...	,, 190 ...	,, 190
8 ,, ...	,, 210 ...	,, 210
9 ,, ...	,, 230 ...	,, 230
10 ,, ...	,, 250 ...	,, 250
11 ,, ...	,, 270 ...	,, 270
12 ,, ...	,, 290 ...	,, 290
13 ,, ...	,, 310 ...	,, 320
14 ,, ...	,, 330 ...	,, 350
15 ,, ...	,, 350 ...	,, 380
16 ,, ...	,, 370 ...	,, 410
17 ,, ...	,, 390 ...	,, 440
18 ,, ...	,, 410 ...	,, 470
19 ,, ...	,, 430 ...	,, 500
20 ,, ...	,, 450 ...	,, 530
21 ,, ...	,, 450 ...	,, 560
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[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
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APPENDIX No. VII.

The Indian Civil Service Family Pension Regulations.

For the purposes of these regulations, civil servants are classed as follows:—

Class I.—From 11 years' completed service.
" II.—From 15 to 18 years' completed service.
" III.—From 12 to 15 years' completed service.
" VI.—From 7 to 12 years' completed service.
" V.—Upto 7 years' completed service.

(A) Annual pension to a Widow during widowhood, according to the Class of her Husband at the time of his death.

	Classes of Husband at Death.				
	I.	II.	III.	IV.	V.
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
Provided by subscribers.	300	240	180	140	100
Do. Government.	...	60	120	110	150
Total...	300	300	300	250	250

Widows retain half pension on remarriage and revert to full rate on second widowhood.

(B) Annual pensions to the Orphan Children of all Classes alike.

	From Birth, till age of 6 years.			From age of 6 till age of 12 years.			From age of 12 till age of 21 years for boys, and for girls till marriage.		
	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
Provided by subscribers.	18	15	0	37	10	0	75	0	0
" Government.	6	5	0	12	10	0	25	0	0
Total...	25	0	0	50	0	0	100	0	0

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Do. Government.	...	60	120	110	150
Total...	300	300	300	250	250

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(B) Annual pensions to the Orphan Children of all Classes alike.

	From Birth, till age of 6 years.			From age of 6 till age of 12 years.			From age of 12 till age of 21 years for boys, and for girls till marriage.		
	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
Provided by subscribers.	18	15	0	37	10	0	75	0	0
" Government.	6	5	0	12	10	0	25	0	0
Total...	25	0	0	50	0	0	100	0	0

[illegible]

The pensions of motherless orphans at all ages will be made up by the Government to £ 100. An orphan in receipt of pension who becomes motherless is entitled to the increased rate.

On marriage, daughters will be granted a donation of £ 250 to be provided by the Government.

A pension will be granted to a posthumous child without any payment, provided the birth be reported within one month of the occurrence.

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Appendix No. VIII.

Salaries in India and Ceylon §.

India.		Ceylon.	
Departments and Appointments.	Salary per Annum.	Departments and Appointments.	Salary per Annum.
	£		£
Customs Department :—		Customs Department :—	
Collectors ...	1,640 rising to 2,000	Principal Collector ...	1,050 rising to 1,200
Public works department :—		Public Works Department :—	
Chief Engineer ...	2,000 rising to 2,200	Director ...	1,250 rising to 1,400
Superintending Engineer ...	1,200 rising to 1,600	Deputy Director ...	1,000
Executive Engineer ...	304 rising to 1,000	Provincial Engineer ...	650 rising to 900
Assistant Engineer ...		District Engineer ...	300 rising to 600
Survey Department :—		Survey Department :—	
Surveyor General ...	2,550	Surveyor General ...	1,012½
Superintendents, Deputy Superintendents and Assistant Superintendents	296 rising to 1,800	Deputy Surveyor General ...	850
		Superintendents ...	450 rising to 750
		Assistant Superintendents	300 rising to 400
Post office & Telegraphs :—		Post office & Telegraphs :—	
Postmaster General ...	1,000 rising to 2,000	Postmaster General and Director General of Telegraphs ...	1,050 rising to 1,200
Education Department :—		Education Department :—	
Director ...	Ranging from 1,000 to 2,000.	Director ...	1,050 rising to 1,200
Inspectors ...	425 rising to 1,487½	Inspectors ...	200 rising to 600

§ Report of the Public Services Commission, pp. 424-25.

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	£		£
Customs Department :—		Customs Department :—	
Collectors ...	1,640 rising to 2,000	Principal Collector ...	1,050 rising to 1,200
Public works department :—		Public Works Department :—	
Chief Engineer ...	2,000 rising to 2,200	Director ...	1,250 rising to 1,400
Superintending Engineer ...	1,200 rising to 1,600	Deputy Director ...	1,000
Executive Engineer ...	304 rising to 1,000	Provincial Engineer ...	650 rising to 900
Assistant Engineer ...		District Engineer ...	300 rising to 600
Survey Department :—		Survey Department :—	
Surveyor General ...	2,550	Surveyor General ...	1,012½
Superintendents, Deputy Superintendents and Assistant Superintendents	296 rising to 1,800	Deputy Surveyor General ...	850
		Superintendents ...	450 rising to 750
		Assistant Superintendents	300 rising to 400
Post office & Telegraphs :—		Post office & Telegraphs :—	
Postmaster General ...	1,000 rising to 2,000	Postmaster General and Director General of Telegraphs ...	1,050 rising to 1,200
Education Department :—		Education Department :—	
Director ...	Ranging from 1,000 to 2,000.	Director ...	1,050 rising to 1,200
Inspectors ...	425 rising to 1,487½	Inspectors ...	200 rising to 600

§ Report of the Public Services Commission, pp. 424-25.

Appendix No. VIII—(*contd.*).

India.		Ceylon.	
Departments and appointments.	Salary per annum.	Departments and appointments.	Salary per annum.
	£		£
Department of Agriculture :—		Department of Agriculture :—	
Director (I. C. S.)	Ranging between 1,275 and 2,125.	Director	1,000
		Botanist and Mycologist ...	600 rising to 750
Officer, Agricultural Department ...	320 rising to 800	Assistant Botanist and Mycologist.	300 rising to 500
Forest Department :—		Forest Department :—	
Conservator	1,200 rising to 1,520	Conservator	1,050 rising to 1,200
Deputy Conservator	304 rising to 1,000	Deputy Donservator	600 rising to 900
Assistant Conservator	304 rising to 1,000	Assistant Conservator	233½ rising to 450
Medical Department :—		Medical Department :—	
Inspector—General	Ranging between 1,700 and 2,125.	Inspector General	1,400
Civil Surgeons	Ranging between 382½ and 1,232½.	Provincial Surgeons	480 rising to 640
Veterinary Department :—		Veterinary Department :—	
Officer, Civil Veterinary Department.	425 rising to 1,020	Veterinary Surgeons	525
Police Department :—		Police Department :—	
Inspector General	Ranging between 1,600 to 2,400.	Inspector General	1,050 rising to 1,200
Deputy Inspector General	1,200 rising to 1,440.		

Appendix No. VIII—(*contd.*).

India.		Ceylon.	
Departments and appointments.	Salary per annum.	Departments and appointments.	Salary per annum.
	£		£
Department of Agriculture :—		Department of Agriculture :—	
Director (I. C. S.)	Ranging between 1,275 and 2,125.	Director	1,000
		Botanist and Mycologist ...	600 rising to 750
Officer, Agricultural Department ...	320 rising to 800	Assistant Botanist and Mycologist.	300 rising to 500
Forest Department :—		Forest Department :—	
Conservator	1,200 rising to 1,520	Conservator	1,050 rising to 1,200
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Medical Department :—			
Inspector—General	Ranging between 1,700 and 2,125.	Medical Department :—	
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Civil Surgeons	Ranging between 382½ and 1,232½.	Provincial Surgeons	480 rising to 640
Veterinary Department :—		Veterinary Department :—	
Officer, Civil Veterinary Department.	425 rising to 1,020	Veterinary Surgeons	525
Police Department :—			
Inspector General	Ranging between 1,600 to 2,400.	Police Department :—	
Deputy Inspector General	1,200 rising to 1,440.	Inspector General	1,050 rising to 1,200

[redacted]

Appendix No. IX.

Salaries in India, Japan, and the United States of America.

[The figures relating to Japan and America have been taken from an article contributed by Lala Lajpat Rai to *the Modern Review* for January, 1916. He asks us to bear in mind in comparing the salaries of officials in India, Japan and the United States, that "the economic value of the rupee, judged from the prices of necessaries of life and from the wages of labour, is about equal to that of the American dollar and the Japanese yen." The figures relating to India have been taken from the Indian year Book, 1916.]

1 dollar	=	Rs. 3/2
1 yen	=	Rs. 1/9

Heads of Governments.

Prime Minister, Japan,	yen 12,000 per annum
President, United States,	$ 75,000 ,, ,,
Viceroy, India.	Rs. 2,50,800 ,, ,,

Ministers.

Cabinet Ministers, Japan	yen 8,000 per annum
,, ,, , United States	$ 12,000 ,, ,,
Members of Viceroy's Executive Council, India	Rs. 80,000 ,, ,,

DEPARTMENTS.

United States.

"In the whole Federal Government of the United States, there are only 3 offices which carry a salary of more than 8,000 dollars a year. They are given below:—

The President of the General Navy Board	13,500
Solicitor General	10,000
Assistant Solicitor General	9,000

All the other salaries range from 2,100 to 8,000 dollars".

	Maximum Salary
State Department	$ 5,000 per annum
Treasury Department	$ 8,000 ,, ,,
War Department	$ 8,000 ,, ,,
Commerce Department	$ 6,000 ,, ,,

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Cabinet Ministers, Japan	yen 8,000	per annum
" " , United States	$ 12,000	" "
Members of Viceroy's Executive Council, India	Rs. 80,000	" "

DEPARTMENTS.

United States.

"In the whole Federal Government of the United States, there are only 3 offices which carry a salary of more than 5,000 dollars a year. They are given below:—

The President of the General Navy Board	13,500
Solicitor General	10,000
Assistant Solicitor General	9,000

All the other salaries range from 2,100 to 8,000 dollars".

	Maximum Salary
State Department	$ 5,000 per annum
Treasury Department	$ 8,000 " "
War Department	$ 8,000 " "
Commerce Department	$ 6,000 " "

Japan.

President of the Railway Board	yen	7,500	,,	,,
,, ,, ,, Board of Audit	,,	6,000	,,	,,
,, Privy Council	,,	6,000	,,	,,
Officials of the higher Civil Service	,,	3,700 to 4,200	,,	,,

India.

President of the Railway Board	Rs.	60,000	per annum	
Secretary to the Government of India, Finance Department	,,	48,000	,,	,,
Secretary to the Government of India, Legislative Department	,,	42,000	,,	,,
Secretary to the Government of India, Army Department	,,	42,000	,,	,,
Secretary to the Government of India, Commerce and Industry Department	,,	48,000	,,	,,

"Among the officers directly under the Government of India," says Lala Lajpat Rai, "there are only a few who get salaries below Rs. 20,000, most of the others get from Rs. 20,400 to 36,000."

Japan.

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Appendix No. X.

Cross-Examination of Sir Herbert Carnduff, late judge of the Calcutta High Court, by Mr. Gokhale.

How many years does one take, on the executive side, to reach the position of a Commissioner? How many years' service has a Civilian to put in on an average?—I suppose between 20 and 25 years.

How many years does a man on the jndicial side take to reach the High Court roughly?—Over 25 years.

About 25 years?—Yes.

In your answer to question (27), you say. speaking about the relative merits of the Indian and European members of the Civil Service, "Judging by actual results so far, I think that the reply must be in the negative. It apparently has not been found possible to appoint Indian members of the Indian Civil Service ordinarily to the higher executive posts, such as Commissionerships, Memberships of the Board of Revenue, and Secretaryships; and, as regards the Judicial Branch, no such Civilian has ever been appointed permanently to the Calcutta High Court, while only two who have risen to be Legal Remembrancers." We will take these statements one by one. Do yon know when Indians first entered the Indian Civil Service and came to Bengal?—I think Mr. Romesh Chunder Dutt was the first, was he not?

Yes, was it not in 1871?—Yes.

From that time we will take the executive side?—I would rather begin with the other side.

We will take the executive side first and then the judicial. You mention the Commissionership first. Can you tell me how many Indians in the Indian Civil Service dnring all these years have reached the necessary seniority to expect a Commissionership?—I cannot say.

I have looked into the qnestion, and I do not find more than fonr?—Do you mean that only four have been qualified for a Commissionership?

Only four Indians have ever reached the necessary seniority to become qualified for the position of a Commissioner. I will

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Only four Indians have ever reached the necessary seniority to become qualified for the position of a Commissioner. I will

give yon their names. Mr. Romesh Chunder Dutt was the first?—Yes.

And he acted as Commissioner twice for long periods?—Yes.

He was once appointed Commissioner over the heads of European officers?—I do not know that.

He retired while holding an acting Commissionership?—Yes.

He was not superseded?—No.

The next one was Sir K. G. Gupta. You know that he became a Commissioner, a Member of the Board of Revenue—the senior Member—and is now a Member of the Secretary of State's Council?—Yes.

So your description cannot apply to him?—No.

The third Indian was Mr. Badshah, a Parsi from Bombay. He became Postmaster-General and Excise Commissioner, much above the average?—Yes.

So your description would not apply to him?—No.

The only other man was Mr. De, Collector of Hooghly. He retired last year. I do not find any other Indian who had attained the necessary seniority so far?—I am surprised to hear it.

As regards Mr. De, you said that you did not notice what *the Pioneer* said about him?—No; I did not notice it.

He had acted twice as a Commissioner and was passed over when the permanent post had to be filled?—Yes.

This is what *the Pioneer* said—you would not charge that paper with any undue partiality to Indians! It said: "Mr. De may have the consolation of feeling that he has done much more important work for the public as a Collector than he probably could have done in the higher post. Since June 1905, Mr. De has been Collector of the Hooghly District, and it can hardly be accidental that while the other environs of Calcutta have been seething in disturbance and disorder, Hooghly, only 24 miles distant, has known nothing worse than a few petty cases of boys shouting *Bande Mataram*. When some of these youths took to throwing mud at Europeans, the people themselves took them in charge and brought them before the Collector to suffer such punishment as he could award. If it had been possible to multiply Mr. De sufficiently, there would have been no tronble in Bengal; but these are the men who glide out of the Service unnoticed, while the person who is chiefly responsible for the mischief probably makes his exit under salute, in a coat covered

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with ribbon and stars." Surely this is fairly good testimony to the work of Mr. De. His supersession does not point to very much. May I put it like that ?—I do not know what value is to be attached to that article in the *Pioneer*.

In any case there it is. Have you known any other instance where an Indian should have become Commissioner but has been passed over ?—I cannot name any.

Now I come to the Judicial side.—You might mention the Secretaryships.

Well, I will take Secretaryships. You say Indians have been passed over in ths matter of Secretaryships. Is it not more correct to say that Indians are not admitted into what may be called the heart of the bureaucratic machine—there is a reluctance to admit them into the heart of the bureaucratic machine i. e., the Secretariat ? —I cannot say that.

I will put it in another way. I suppose you will allow that the chief qualifications for a Secretariat officer, for a Secretary, are industry, general ability of a high order and some literary ability ?—Yes.

Take Mr. Dutt's case. Mr. R. C. Dutt was, by common consent, a man of great ability and high literary gifts ?—Yes.

He was also a man of prodigious industry ?—Yes.

He was never appointed Secretary ?—No.

Do you think that he was passed over for a Secretaryship on grounds of efficiency, or was it because the general policy of the Government is not to have Indians as Secretaries ?—He could not have been passed over on the ground of inefficiency.

Take Sir K. G. Gupta's case. He became the senior Member of the Board of Revenue, and certainly he could have made a good Secretary ?—He could not have been passed over for a Secretaryship for inefficiency.

He is now in the Secretary of State's Council ?—Yes.

Do you remember the warm appreciation which Lord Morley as Secretary of State expressed of him some two or three years ago ?—Yes.

Here are then cases of Indians who were qualified for Secretaryships, but were not appointed to those posts ?—Those two are certainly cases of men who might have been appointed.

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So I do not think that this can stand—the fact that Indians have not been appointed as Secretaries shows that they are inferior to Englishmen, or that the Indian average is inferior to the English average. I do not want to press you if you do not want to answer it?—I cannot.

We will now turn to the Judicial side. You say that it takes 25 years to reach the High Court?—Yes.

You yourself reached the High Court in 25 years?— Yes.

Can you tell me how many Indian Civilians have so far attained the necessary seniority to come to the High Court?—I cannot tell you.

Will you be surprised that there have been only two instances, and that in both these instances these men have acted as High Court Judges? We will take the first instance: Mr. B. L. Gupta?—He acted.

He acted twice?—Yes.

He was not appointed permanent, but was passed over?—Yes.

Three other English District Judges were passed over along with him—do you know that?—Possibly so.

When he was passed over, three other English Judges were passed over?—I think so.

And they raised a protest against their supersession?—When Mr. Cecil Brett was appointed you mean?

When he was appointed, there was a storm?—The officers passed over were indignant, and two of them retired.

Three of them retired when Mr. Gupta was passed over?—I remember two.

When those three retired, do you remember what their complaint was; you probably remember what was said at the time?—I do not remember.

We have had one Indian gentleman who acted, but was not made permanent, and he was passed over with three English Judges. You of course know that another Indian has just been appointed a Judge of the High Court?—This very day Mr. Mullick has been appointed.

He has been selected over the heads of two or three European District Judges senior to him?—Yes.

Do you know of any Indian Civilian senior to Mr. Mullick who has been superseded?—I should like to have a look at the list.

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Do you know of any Indian Civilian senior to Mr. Mullick who has been superseded?—I should like to have a look at the list.

Several officers have been superseded lately.

For the High Court Judgeship ?—Yes.

There is no officer senior to Mr. Mullick in the list on the judicial side who has been superseded ?—Messrs. Beachcroft and Chapman were brought in, and they superseded several.

I am speaking of the Indian Civilians ?—There have been a number of Indian Civilian District Judges in my time, and none of them reached the High Court except Mr. B. L. Gupta.

Men senior to yourself ?—You mean they retired after they put in 25 years' service.

I find from the list that I have that there is no name of an Indian Civilian on the judicial side who has attained the necessary seniority to reach the High Court ?—During the last 30 years ?

Except Mr. B. L. Gupta and now Mr. Mullick ?—I am surprised to hear that.

I should like to know if you know of any instance ?—I confess that I made the statement on the ground that there had been a number of Indian officers in the Judicial Branch in my time and that only one was appointed, and that was only to officiate. That was Mr. B. L. Gupta.

Mr. B. L. Gupta was appointed long before your time ?—Yes; he was appointed before I entered the Court.

Do you know of any instances where Indian civilians were superseded for the High Court? Now that Mr. Mullick has been appointed, is there any Indian senior to Mr. Mullick on the judicial side who has been superseded ?—There is no Indian senior to him.

We will turn now to Legal Remembrancers. Only two, you say have been appointed Legal Remembrancers. If two Indian civilians viz., Mr. B. L. Gupta and Mr. Mullick have reached the position of Legal Remembrancers out of only two or three who had attained the necessary seniority, would that be a bad proportion ?— No, it would not.

In the same way, going back to the executive side, if three out of four Indians reached the Commissionership and the fourth retired with that testimonial from *the Pioneer*, if three out of four reached the Commissionership, would it be a bad proportion ?—These are facts, and they speak for themselves.

Several officers have been superseded lately.

For the High Court Judgeship ?—Yes.

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Do you think that amongst the European members of the Civil Service there would be the same proportion—three out of four Collectors becoming Commissioners ?—It could not be.

Because there are only five Commissionerships for 26 Collectorships ?—It could not be of course.

Taking the average, so far as these appointments show, I do not think that you can say that the Indian average is in any way inferior to the English average ?—Those being the facts, they will alter my statement.

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